Robert Nozick and the Immaculate Conception of the State
 Robert Nozick, 1938–2002 |
Ask a nonlibertarian academic for the title of a libertarian book. If they've heard of any, it will be Harvard Philosopher Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia, the winner of the 1975 National Book Award. Nozick's libertarianism was heavily influenced by the antistatist radicals of Murray Rothbard's circle, but Nozick was no Rothbardian. His book defended the existence of the state as both inevitable and necessary to liberty.
Rothbard's reply goes straight to the heart of the matter:
Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia is an "invisible hand" variant of a Lockean contractarian attempt to justify the State, or at least a minimal State confined to the functions of protection.
Beginning with a free-market anarchist state of nature, Nozick portrays the State as emerging, by an invisible hand process that violates no one's rights, first as a dominant protective agency, then to an "ultraminimal state," and then finally to a minimal state.
Before embarking on a detailed critique of the various Nozickian stages, let us consider several grave fallacies in Nozick's conception itself, each of which would in itself be sufficient to refute his attempt to justify the State.
Comments (11)
In college I was apathetic on political matters and if pressed would probably lean Democrat (since they care about the downtrodden of course)...then a friend handed me Anarchy, State, and Utopia, and I was changed forever.
Looking back it's easy to see the flaws. But if today I had a friend who I thought could be saved from apathy or modern liberalism, I wouldn't hand them Human Action, but Nozick's book. That's no reason to be offended though; if I wanted to help a child read I'd do better with Green Eggs and Ham than Atlas Shrugged.
Published: November 9, 2007 2:18 PM
Nozick's argument for procedural rights might fail, but it is intuitively attractive that people are obliged to use the best procedures available to determine guilt of an offense. Even if one accepted Nozick's view of procedural rights, though, Nozick's argument for the state still fails. Even if it is legitimate to use force to prevent others using risky procedures to determine guilt a) What happens if an independent or competing agency uses the same procedures as the dominant agency? b) What happens if a competing protection agency uses less risky procedures than the dominant agency? c) What happens if a competing protection agency uses risky procedures, but doesn't use them against the customers of the dominant agency? In none of these cases does Nozick's argument supply the conclusion that, because the dominant protection agency has a right to protect its customers against risky procedures, that it has a right to prohibit competition against it.
Published: November 9, 2007 3:33 PM
@Scott S - I agree, I wouldn't hand them Human Action, but I'm not sure I'd hand them Nozick either. My concern arises from my grad school experiences - I'd argue some libertarian point, and the response would be (rather than actually engaging the argument) "but even Nozick is ok with..." Personally, I'd hand them Rand.
I agree with Rothbard on the substantive issue, but have to disagree on one point. It is true that a present agreement cannot bind future generations, but I don't think that's what Nozick is arguing here. He isn't saying, as far as I can tell, that once established, the state is legitimate forever more simpliciter - however, if all parties to the state agree to a deed restriction, and their children remain on their property, then it seems it would self-perpetuate, barring emigration.
Also, I think Nozick is willing to concede the empirical question that no states have come about this way, but is arguing that, since a state could emerge through this process, therefore states are legitimate, not just if they come about in this way, but regardless of how they are formed. The argument would be, I'd think, that if you wouldn't object to the existence of the state by other means, you shouldn't object to its existence the actual means. Of course, I took the whole argument as yet another reason not to make agreements that have so many widespread effects, such as deed restriction agreements. I'd also argue, even if the agreement was made voluntarily, that future generations have the right to rebel. To see why, imagine that an ultraminimal state was formed by deed restriction globally - that is, it controlled all liveable land. Suppose this state then becomes oppressive (as it will) but all its actions are within the agreement, if not its spirit. Not allowing for rebellion dooms all future generations, ever, to not object to this situation.
One common argument given against anarchists is that we are inconsistent in recognizing private property. After all, the argument goes, we allow the owner to decide what happens on his property, so why not the state to decide what happens on its property? The fallacy here is, of course, that the objector cannot explain how the state came to take ownership of the land. More importantly, though, there are some things that you cannot do to other people without their consent, and private property is not a defense. There are other morally wrong things than offenses against property, and the commission of a morally wrong thing may well justify retaliation that does harm private property.
Published: November 9, 2007 3:54 PM
I agree with Joshua. Rand essentially converted me to libertarianism, but for the greater substance I go for Austrian works. Jan Narveson's The Libertarian Idea is also a better starting place and much clearer in its prose than ASU.
Published: November 9, 2007 6:05 PM
"...every State where the facts are available originated by a process of violence, conquest, and exploitation..."
This is only poetically true, in general. While some states did start in that simplistic way, e.g Ireland under the Normans and the Heptarchy English kingdoms of the Dark Ages, the usual situation was much subtler, e.g. Scotland under the Normans (e.g. Robert the Bruce was a Norman lord), the united England that arose after resisting the Danes, modern Sweden and Holland, or the Kingdom of Israel.
What usually makes the first approach fail is that it is obviously going on, leading to active or passive popular resistance; people don't fall for the idea of the conqueror as benefactor. Unfortunately, it usually gives rise to a reaction that does fall for this, enthroning a liberator (whether a dynasty or a system, as in the USA) that has adopted the same techniques. The combination of popular support and a free hand to counter-conquer, or to anticipate and copy (as in ancient Israel), can often prevail. So the ideas of force etc. are there, only the people have themselves embraced the new order under the impression that it is not their master but their safeguard. In time, it reverts to the former default behaviour, often too slowly to notice or else ignored through psychological denial.
Published: November 10, 2007 12:06 AM
I wouldn't be so quick to dismiss that argument, P.M. Lawrence. A conqueror doesn't need a graduate seminar on the thought of Sun-Tzu to realize that he'll have a lot easier time subjugating a populace if he credibly presents himself as a liberator.
The point you've made, though, raises an important, if subtle, issue. At the margin, the bulk of a conquered populace may see a conqueror as providing greater liberation for them than the current crop of (previous) conquerors, currently in charge.
Published: November 11, 2007 3:13 AM
You're still missing it. I wasn't talking about a subtler and less obvious way to carry out a conquest; that has been tried, e.g. by Napoleon in Switzerland, but it still doesn't always work.
Have another look at the examples I gave. The usual case is not conquest. It's imitation to anticipate or to resist conquest or similar outside pressure. Like committing suicide to avoid being murdered, it sort of works - you do not end up conquered, just under a home-grown thumb.
What it comes down to, I wasn't reclassifying subtle conquerors, I was pointing out that most actual states were the result of becoming what they feared. It's particularly ironic when the thing feared and imitated was misunderstood; the cure then is worse than the disease, since the disease didn't actually have all the harmful features that the cure brought (think USA again).
Published: November 11, 2007 5:37 PM
If one looks at the history of many monarchies one can ascertain what Mr Lawrence is saying.
Published: November 11, 2007 7:00 PM
I tried to listen to the audio version of this article on my iPod this afternoon. I couldn't get past the first minute. Who is the reader?
My God, the guy could cure insomnia. I'm sure he's a nice fellow and all, but could we possibly get someone (anyone!) with a hint of passion in his voice? Something less monotone and robotic might breath some life into Rothbard's ideas. Please!
Published: November 11, 2007 8:47 PM
I loved Anarchy, State and Utopia. It was probably my first exposure to the idea of anarchism. While I agree that Nozick's argument for the minimal state is weak, let us not forget the rest of the book that covers distributive justice and the entitlement theory, Nozick's response to John Rawl's A Theory of Justice, and a very good response it is.
Published: November 13, 2007 2:44 PM
I agree with Michael. When Nozick was writing on leftist ideas, he was at his best. He offered brilliant arguments against Rawls.
Published: November 13, 2007 6:19 PM