A Crusoe Social Philosophy
If, writes Murray Rothbard, Crusoe economics can and does supply the indispensable groundwork for the entire structure of economics and praxeology — the broad, formal analysis of human action — a similar procedure should be able to do the same thing for social philosophy, for the analysis of the fundamental truths of the nature of man vis-à-vis the nature of the world into which he is born, as well as the world of other men. Specifically, it can aid greatly in solving such problems of political philosophy as the nature and role of liberty, property, and violence. FULL ARTICLE
Comments (31)
As well as the recent interesting analysis of '24', it might be worth Mises.org doing an analysis of 'Lost'. We have the statist society, 'the others', versus the totally voluntary society, 'the good guys', all living a life very close to the Rothbardian Crusoe model.
I'm absolutely certain that at least one of the writers or producers of 'Lost' has a copy of 'Man, Economy, and State' up his or her sleeve.
What is even more interesting is that the 'good guy' characters all have a reason not to return to the statist society they left back home.
With '24' displaying the horrors of the totalitarian state, 'Battlestar Galactica' glorifying resistance against imperial aggressors, and 'Lost' pitting a totally voluntary society up against an amoral coercive society, I'm almost minded to think that the ideas of Uncle Murray are finally beginning to bear more main-stream fruit under the surface, than may at first be realised. His influence will only grow with the passage of time.
Published: February 9, 2007 7:19 PM
Question: Does the concept Rothbard introduces in the following quotation from this article, as a rejection of "voluntary slavery", have any consequences for one's right to borrow money at interest? I ask because I believe the argument here also implies the unjustness of enforcing contracts entered into by a "past self" against a "present self".
"The distinction between a man's alienable labor service and his inalienable will may be further explained: a man can alienate his labor service, but he cannot sell the capitalized future value of that service. In short, he cannot, in nature, sell himself into slavery and have this sale enforced — for this would mean that his future will over his own person was being surrendered in advance. In short, a man can naturally expend his labor currently for someone else's benefit, but he cannot transfer himself, even if he wished, into another man's permanent capital good. For he cannot rid himself of his own will, which may change in future years and repudiate the current arrangement."
Published: February 10, 2007 1:47 PM
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Rothbard,
as did Mises, had a way of saying very little while employing very many
words.
As usual, in this chapter he is all over the map, kind of cherry
picking his anecdotes
to suit his needs at the moment. In so doing he comes very close to
seeing a
concept that doesn’t fit his needs and glances off in another direction
ignoring an obvious possibility.
He
begins: Crusoe finds virgin, unused land on the
island; land, in short, unused and uncontrolled by anyone, and hence style="">unowned. So far, so good.
But
now
look what he does: By finding
land resources, by learning how to use them, and, in
particular, by actually transforming
them into a more useful shape, Crusoe has, in the memorable phrase of
John
Locke, "mixed his labor with the soil." Rothbard
suggests land doesn’t become owned
until it is improved to something that produces.
And
here’s
where that goes: In doing so, in stamping
the imprint of his personality and his energy on the land, he has
naturally
converted the land and its fruits into his property.
Hence, the isolated man owns what he style="">uses
and transforms; therefore, in
his case there is no problem of what should
be A's property as against B's. Rothbard is suggesting here
that he (A)
gains ownership of the land by improving it and thus owns it where (B)
does
not. But what we really have here is “first come, first served” whether
the
land is improved or not. Further, if (A) does not protected his claim
to the
land, he has no right to it for (B) can easily just beat him up and
take it
away from him. Real estate is a collection of rights. And a right is a
defended
claim. Keep this in mind when it comes to ownership.
What
Rothbard wants is this: His property in
land and capital goods continues down the various stages of production,
until
Crusoe comes to own the
consumer goods which he has produced, until they finally disappear
through his
consumption of them. And he gets it
just by saying it … but that doesn’t make it so.
This
is the
flaw in people who believe in capitalism. They think the capitalists
are about
improving things and thus owning them and thus being able to hold sway
over
those who haven’t improved and thus don’t own.
But
what
really is going on here is the rule of “first come, first served”.
Further is
the rule of “an undefended claim is not a right”.
What
Rothbard doesn’t develop is that (A) owns that land whether he improves
it or
not because he got there first. And he also doesn’t develop that (A)
can lose
that land by not defending his claim to it, regardless of whether he
improves
it or not.
This
kind
of cherry picking has always brought the “Austrian” economists to
frustrated me.
Published: February 10, 2007 4:47 PM
Todd Marshall,
I'm sure we all appreciate the free verse, but if the right to property in land "is the flaw in people who believe in capitalism," what is it that you believe in?
Published: February 10, 2007 7:06 PM
Todd, your own quotes of Rothbard would seem to make it clear--Rothbard doesn't simply advocate "first come, first serve", but the transformation of the land, which should be obvious from where he went into some detail about what constituted a legitimate claim and what didn't. Are you saying that it *should be* first come, first serve, or that it should not be? Your position isn't clear on this.
Published: February 11, 2007 11:59 AM
Would someone please address my question above? I consider myself a libertarian, a hard-core one in fact, but Rothbard's statement here seems problematic to me. Is this not a point of controversy in libertarian thought? Have I simply utterly missed the point? Does he clarify this issue in some of his other writings?
Published: February 11, 2007 12:51 PM
jawa, all contracts bind "future selves" in one way or another, or they wouldn't be entered into, and I don't see why a lending contract would be any different. Sure, the loan could be usurious -- just look at card fees -- but if you defaulted on it, well, that what the courts are for.
Published: February 11, 2007 2:34 PM
Suppose you buy a car by making a downpayment and then making monthly payments until it's paid for. Can you quit halfway through? I think you should be able to, but the terms of exit would require you to not only return the car, but to make sure the depreciation is paid up for the length of time that you had the car. The seller may be able to turn around and sell the car again, but not for the original price.
Similarly, interest is the price of borrowing money. While there's no "product" like a car to resell, you still have to return the money and pay the interest on it for the time you borrowed it. It's a voluntary exchange issue--by trying to avoid returning the money and the interest on it, you're trying to defraud the lender. The lender would never have agreed to loan the money in the first place if they thought you would default on it.
Interest is a legitimate charge for borrowing money. If the "price" of borrowing were free, then who would be willing to loan it out? Would you put your money in a savings account or other investment that paid you nothing?
Published: February 11, 2007 5:00 PM
I agree with both of your comments, but, as I've said, I'm a libertarian, so it goes without saying that I believe in freedom of contract, the right to charge interest, etc.
My issue is: Rothbard's statements seem to imply that any contract (he notes only selling onesself into slavery) which binds one's "future will over his own person" is unenforceable under natural law. This is patently ridiculous as it would make any contract unenforceable the moment one party's "will" changed.
If I were to play "devil's advocate", I would argue that credit card interest rates, if enforced, differ only in form from the slavery Rothbard rejects as unenforceable, being as it were a sale of "capitalized future value" of A PORTION OF one's labor.
I would then further argue that only two options are open to avoid this dilemma: either we accept the enforceability of a contract by which a man sells himself into slavery, or we reject all contracts as unenforceable under natural law. In the latter case it would be the contractor's responsibility to make sure he contracts with the trustworthy, and failing that, he must bear the burden WITHOUT enforcement.
Do either of these two options sit well with anyone?
Published: February 11, 2007 5:40 PM
Hmm...not sure if I can raise a good argument, other than what Rothbard himself raised. Your labor may not be alienable, but the products of your labor are, which, as Rothbard said, is why you can sell them, but not yourself. Are you sure we're not just playing with semantics?
Otherwise, you'd have to say that nothing short of an immediate exchange is possible, which would deny not just interest, but employment contracts, as well. And rentals. Nobody could live anywhere if they didn't either own the property outright or they were a guest of the owner. Maybe my brain's fuzzy today.
Published: February 11, 2007 6:01 PM
jawa,
"My issue is: Rothbard's statements seem to imply that any contract (he notes only selling onesself into slavery) which binds one's 'future will over his own person' is unenforceable under natural law. This is patently ridiculous as it would make any contract unenforceable the moment one party's 'will' changed."
OK, point taken, and I'm with you on asking those better in the know on Rothbard your question. For at the end of the day, it's all about making a promise, which is nothing more (or less) than an obligation that one will do in the future what one says one will do. And insofar as promises are "unenforceable under natural law," then so are contracts be and hence society as we know it.
Surely Rothbard believed no such thing, so I get your point and reinforce your question accordingly.
Published: February 11, 2007 6:36 PM
I don't think it's just semantics.
For example, if one were foolish enough to sign an employment contract agreeing to work 10 hrs a day (or even 24) in a mine for the next 60 yrs (or 250) in return for $100,000 today, would this contract be enforceable? If yes, then slavery is practically acceptable, if no, then what NON-ARBITRARY criterion distinguishes this contract from one that, say, requires one to deliver 40 lbs of tomatoes next week, and again in two weeks, in return for $100. Both require the person to perform a specific service over a set period of time in return for money received now. Any attempt to set a maximum amount of time the contract may cover is certainly arbitrary, so what distinguishes the two cases?
Published: February 11, 2007 6:36 PM
Thanks for the backup David.
I discovered this site after having read "Human Action", and, I must admit, fell in love with it. I should also admit that, other than what is in the Daily Articles, I haven't ready any Rothbard, which is why I'm curious if this issue was better developed elsewhere. If Rothbard's meticulousness is anything like that displayed by Mises in "Human Action", I'm sure it was. But I guess I must have high time preference, because I'd like to know that better developed argument before reading 600 pages of Rothbard. :)
Published: February 11, 2007 6:48 PM
jawa,
I think the solution is as follows:
The fact that you have accepted the $100,000 makes the contract valid. It is more than just a promise because real goods have been exchanged in the expectation that you will perform certain services in the future.
Now, if you change your mind, you have clearly defrauded the other party. Now you are correct in stating that the contract could not be "enforced" by enslaving you. But that is not the only option for enforcement. This contract would probaby be enforced by requiring you to return all or part of the $100,000 that you obtained fraudulently, and possibly requiring you to pay other damages as well. Ideally, these terms would be spelled out in the terms of the contract, but they could also be determined by a court or arbitrator.
As I recall, Rothbard discusses this in detail in a later chapter of The Ethics of Liberty.
Published: February 11, 2007 6:57 PM
Todd,
"Just a promise"? So since my wife and I didn't exchange a wad of dough, there's no "expectation that [we] will perform certain services in the future"?
I don't think so and would say, rather, that the most important contracts in life, if it is to be worth living, are neither formal nor monetary.
Gotta go, as it's time to put my non-contractual kid to bed.
Published: February 11, 2007 7:08 PM
David,
There's a big difference between a contract and a promise.
While a promise may create expectations, there is nothing enforceable about a promise if no title to tangible property has changed hands.
And you are right that a marriage is not an enforcable contract - nothing against marriage. Or at least it would not be an enforceable contract in a libertarian society. Of course the State enforces
See Chapter 19 of The Ethics of Liberty for Rothbard's view.
Published: February 11, 2007 7:22 PM
This issue was discussed at great length in a thread a few months back. To answer your original question, Jawa, no, the two situations are not equivalent. If you borrow $100,000 and agree to repayment at interest, you are accepting property in the form of money and agreeing that in exchange, you will give back a greater sum of money, but over a period of time. Should you refuse to pay back the money, it is theft, because you have not paid the agreed-to price for your loan.
Contrast this with the following situation: you agree to promote a product for a year in exchange for $100,000. Three months in, you feel the need to break off the agreement. Rothbard is simply saying that you could not be compelled to continue with such an arrangement.
And that's about as far in as I want to get without dredging up some deeper issues.
Published: February 11, 2007 7:57 PM
Scott,
Do you happen to remember which thread? I'd rather not rehash old topics if it's been already been covered, but I still feel the dilemma is unresolved.
Published: February 11, 2007 8:16 PM
Oh, boy. I was afraid you were going to ask that :).
I don't have the time to look it up tonight, but I'm pretty sure it was a blog post by Stephan Kinsella, and it must have been early December or sometime in November. I haven't really put my blog-searching skills to the test on this site. Guess I'll give it a go tomorrow, unless someone beats me to it.
Published: February 12, 2007 12:54 AM
Todd,
A contract is a formal promise rendered enforceable by this fact. Arnold Palmer had a handshake (i.e., unenforceable) agreement with his agent that lasted until the latter's death, but that is obviouwsly the exception to the rule.
Even so, to the extent that social relations are contractual, society is weakened, as it is to that extent devoid of trust. After all, what if you had to sign a contract to buy a candy bar or a gallon of gas? To say nothing of your relations with family and friends.
Published: February 12, 2007 8:03 AM
Hey Jawa,
This issue has been bothering me too, for quite a while; still trying to figure out a way out of the maze, for myself… And the question surely isn’t merely one of rhetoric or semantics.
As you correctly put it:
“I would then further argue that only two options are open to avoid this dilemma: either we accept the enforceability of a contract by which a man sells himself into slavery, or we reject all contracts as unenforceable under natural law.”
Yet, all three options [the two-prong alternative you suggest and the inconsistent line in the middle] have been defended by libertarians or anarchists in the past, and sometimes at great length.
Obviously, Rothbard’s position is logically untenable as it stands. If one cannot freely enter slavery at time T on the grounds that one can’t bind one’s future self at time T+1, then one can never be bound by any agreement she contracted into.
Interestingly, John Stuart Mill adopts the same middle position, though on different grounds, in his refutation of no-victims-crimes. Mill claims that individual liberty is the reason why we should reject paternalism. Then, he singles out voluntary slavery as the one unique exception to the freedom of contracts; since it would allow us to willingly lose our autonomy, thus undercut the reason why paternalism is wrong in the first place. Ingenious but circular... Plus, this re-introduces paternalism through the back-door.
On the other hand, some old days’ anarchists rejected the enforcement of promises, contracts, liability for tort, natural law, etc.; actually, the enforcement of anything at all at any given moment in time (Bakunin comes up to mind). Pretty much along the lines advocated by Rothbard. This has quite interesting corollaries from a criminal law perspective: the criminal has the liberty to agree with the penalty imposed on her, or refuse the punishment altogether, as the alternative would unduly curtail her present freedom of action; so, the only avenue available in cases where compliance with the judgement is not explicitly accepted by the criminals, is their exclusion from the community.
This implies both a Hobbesian (as opposed to Lockean) concept of liberty (ie, a non-moralised notion of liberty) and a questioning of the permanence of identity over time.
Indeed, there is one metaphysical bit of a problem with the coherence theory. It assumes the identity of the person at times T and T+1, and thus presupposes a whole philosophy of rationality, free will and the self. Then, your answer to the original question might have to do with your own definition of the self and lead you to a serious analysis of the nature of humanity, agency, etc.
Finally, some libertarians (chiefly Nozick) bite the bullet all the way through and justify voluntary slavery on the basis of self-ownership. In a nutshell, my owning myself implies that i have discretionary powers to do whatever suits me with my own body and person; merely barring violations of someone else’s rights to integrity, liberty and property. Any further limitation on my personal freedom (eg, to become your slave) is blunt paternalism and, therefore, immoral interference with my basic rights. The only question remaining unsettled is whether, by contracting into slavery, i also forfeit my (natural) duty to act in conformity with the moral law or if i conserve this parcel of my autonomy.
Btw, guys, re/ the enforcement of promises and contracts under natural law, i just don’t see why there should be any distinction between the two in the first place? Or am i missing something here?
After all, from a libertarian viewpoint, what binds you is your freely expressed consent to deliver something (be it tangible or immaterial), and not any transfer of goods or money. If not, then, we’ll have to swallow the statist line on public goods and fairness; ie, the Hart/Rawls defence of the legitimacy of positive law and legal obedience on the account that your benefiting of goods (here, law and order) implies that you contribute to their payment, else you’d be free-riding on the system. Of course, that argument was dismissed as fanciful by Nozick; you can’t impose unwanted benefits on someone and then force them to pay the price.
Now, if you believe that it’s not the free-engagement or promise, but the execution of the other party’s part of a contract, that binds you to respect your own side of the deal. Then, you end up giving some recognition to the fairness claim that we are bound to repay people for whatever advantage they lavish on us (including a welfare-warfare coercion system). Not a very libertarian result (in my book, at least); so, you might wish to reconsider the premises…
Another point: one streak of libertarianism bases entitlements on the pre-legal concept of actual possession. Thus, there is nothing particularly queer about Rothbard’s reliance on the Lockean mixing of one’s labour.
Besides, deriving property claims from possession presents one major advantage over the simple up-for-grabs model. Property rights are a legal construction and, as such, not falling from heaven. In a pre-legal state of nature, entitlements require justification. The job is done via a combination of self-ownership (eg, of my labour) and active possession or use of part of the external world; ie, my labour is ‘tainting’ previously un-owned external resources, which gives me de facto power and (crucially) moral entitlement to the said resources.
In the absence of such a trick, you end up with absolutely no moral basis to assess the distribution of property and powers. For example: James Buchanan, who has a radically non-cognitivist and subjectivist approach to ethics, has tried to ground property rights (and the whole classical liberal society) on the first-come-first-served principle and unanimous agreements. The price he pays for this epistemological choice is the acceptability of claims based on pure force (over stolen goods, etc.) and a rather ambivalent attitude toward the statu quo. Being a natural law theorist, Rothbard would evidently reject this line entirely.
Last, i do happen to struggle with the role and the intrinsic value Rothbard confers to life preservation. To me, part of this extract comes pretty close to Rand’s position; which is to some extend problematic. Any thought on that, anyone?
Cheers & thanks, M-
Published: February 12, 2007 9:05 AM
Ah, yes, Crusoe. Libertarian advocates of the corporation would benefit greatly from a few minutes of gedankenexperiment regarding just how it is that Crusoe and Friday will go about creating a corporation. In fact, I think the experiment breaks down at the very beginning of the process. You know, where a STATE with MONOPOLY POWER issues a charter.
Published: February 12, 2007 1:28 PM
The family is the atomic unit of sustainable society, not "Crusoe" who cannot even reproduce for Pete's sake. That is the nature of man's social life. Rothbard got many of his fundamentals wrong, and the morality that is "axiomatically" derived from it then suffers.
Published: February 13, 2007 11:37 AM
JIMB,
No, you are wrong*. Rothbard was adressing the nature of man, not the "atomic unit of [a] *substainable* society." Even if Rothbard had used the "Swiss Family Robinson" and then brought in outsiders, his conclusions and results would not have differed at all, so long as he had remained consistent with "self-ownership" and mans nature (i.e. he needs to act to survive,ect).
In sum, isolating Cruscue is simply a way to make the analysis of mans self-ownership and nature easier, and once that analysis is completed, one can bring in other individuals for Croscue to interact with (heck, even give him a family). In fact, Rothbards method of considering Croscue by himself, and then bringing in other individuals, is similiar to the analysis of projectile motion in physics, where one assumes the projectile is only acted on by by gravity and no other force. Once that analysis is complete one can consider more complicated motion that includes air resistance, spin, ect.
Moreover, all areas of human knowledge must start with the simplest case possible and gradually add degrees of complication. The primary reason for doing this is it is easier to detect errors in the simpler cases, and once one starts adding complications, one can see if the analysis remains consistent with the error-free (we hope) simplest case.
Furthmore, to reiterate, starting with the more complicated case, the "Family" does not really change anything, because any logical and consistent analyisis is still going to yield self-ownership and the fact that each man has a specific nature, one aspect of it being his sovereignty from other men. This in turn will the same basic conclusions about agression, property ownership, and so forth.
* I really dislike these "the basic unit in society is the family" individuals. They almost always turn out to be sniveling conservative statists, although there are exceptions.
Published: February 14, 2007 2:14 PM
I should add that a society that respects mans nature, and hence his self-ownership and property is the only truly *sustainable* society, and the family and repoduction are merely aspects of mans nature.
Published: February 14, 2007 2:18 PM
Interesting discussions. Does Rothbard define slavery anywhere? I think the issue of whether one can sell oneself into slavery depends on what you mean by slavery. The OT law in the Bible condones slavery, although with a lot of qualifications and protections for the slave. But the Biblical concept of slavery is not much different from our current concept of a work contract, or that of an indentured servant.
If by slavery Rothbard had in mind the immoral form practiced in the US before the Civil War, I can't imagine anyone willingly selling himself in such a contract. If a rational person calculated a reasonable price for such a contract, including the discounted value of all future earnings (minus room and board) of himself and his offspring who would also become slaves, that price would be very high. If I were to attempt something similar today, I would put the price at several $ million. Who would want to purchase such a slave?
But I might sell myself as an indentured servant, or in the Biblical model for a limited number of years, with certain protections and rights, for a reasonable amount, say $500,000.
If Rothbard had the indentured servant or Biblical slave in mind, I think he's wrong and that such slavery is just another form of contract. If he had the American model in mind, I think he's correct, but then the American model only worked because it was not voluntary and was based on theft.
Published: February 14, 2007 2:41 PM
Bob- you should know Rothbard refused to (intellectually) defend children from abandonment or starvation - children were and are quasi-property in his arguments, sometimes fully property (such as the yet unborn, who it was presumed could be dealt with by killing it as an aggressor against the rights of the woman).
Self-ownership is a non-coherent concept. There is no subject and object separation, hence no "ownership" that can take place.
Published: February 14, 2007 4:28 PM
Bob - I should add that the "simplest case" for Rothbard's Crusoe examples have no basis for morality, as Crusoe will quickly die and leave no progeny. If "Natural Law" means anything, it means that there is built into the structure of the universe certain social laws (such as economics) that pertain to man. To start with a single man as the basis for economics is to avoid the necessary structure of natural law to begin with. Then to continue on with the Orwellian conclusion (which existed in the premises) that 'some people are more equal than others' is just dishonest -- children have an inherent right to the support of their parents. That is an undeniable fact of existence - not subject to a string of reasoning, but simply a fact.
Published: February 14, 2007 4:39 PM
Self-ownership is a non-coherent concept. There is no subject and object separation, hence no "ownership" that can take place.
Oh, not this nonsense again. Do you own your left hand?
[I know, I know, JIMB is a horrid little troll; "don't feed the trolls"...sorry]
Published: February 14, 2007 6:44 PM
Self-ownership is a non-coherent concept. There is no subject and object separation, hence no "ownership" that can take place.
This is, of course, the classical error brought about because of inconsistent use of "self" to mean both one's consciousness (the subjective self) and one's body (the objective self).
Saying that you own your body is quite coherent.
Published: February 14, 2007 9:10 PM
Averros - The question is the "right to an action" - there are some positive responsibilities of parents to their children and that's not a result of reasoning - it's a given, a fundamental truth which is observable like gravity, even if the state is not involved in enforcing those rights.
Morality is broader than the libertarian ethic -- the "self ownership" phrase pre-defines a lot of moral questions - hence Rothbard's faulty analysis of caring for children. In my view, a lot of libertarians haven't thought this through. At least Rothbard pursued the line of thought honestly and completely.
The family is the proper starting point for any lesson in morality, not Crusoe economics. Too bad Rothbard botched that one - he's so good in other areas.
As far as self-ownership being incoherent, I don't think anyone can even explain it: does it mean self-control (the mind controls the body?), does it mean the mind owns the body (as if they can be apart or are distinct?). WHAT does it mean? You see the problem.
Published: February 21, 2007 8:25 AM