Mutualism: A Philosophy for Thieves

June 18, 2006 1:28 PM by George Reisman (Archive)

The collapse of socialism-communism has not only given rise to the remarkable growth of environmentalism, as a replacement outlet for hostility to capitalism, but also to some growth, vastly less considerable of course, in the remnants of the old anarchist movement, which now sometimes calls itself “libertarian�? or “left-libertarian.�? A leading strand of this remnant goes under the name “Mutualism.�? And its philosophy has recently been set forth in a book by one Kevin Carson, called Studies in Mutualist Political Economy (Fayettville, Arkansas: Self-published, 2004), which I reviewed in the current issue of The Journal of Libertarian Studies. The opening portion of my review appears in my blog posting of June 10 on this site.

The purpose of this posting is to expand on the following paragraph of that portion of my review:

Thus, for example, if I, a legitimate owner of a piece of property, legitimate even by Carson’s standards, decide to rent it out to a tenant who agrees to pay the rent, the property, according to Carson, becomes that of the tenant, and my attempt to collect the mutually-agreed-upon rent is regarded as a violent invasion of his [the tenant’s] “absolute right of property.�? In effect, Carson considers as government intervention the government’s upholding the rights of a landlord against a thief. He believes he has the right to prohibit me and the tenant from entering into an enforceable contract respecting the payment of rent and that such action is somehow not a violation of our freedom of contract and not government intervention.

In support of my claims, I now quote Mr. Carson:

For mutualists, occupancy and use is the only legitimate standard for establishing ownership of land, regardless of how many times it has changed hands. An existing owner may transfer ownership by sale or gift; but the new owner may establish legitimate title to the land only by his own occupancy and use. A change in occupancy will amount to a change in ownership. Absentee landlord rent, and exclusion of homesteaders from vacant land by an absentee landlord, are both considered illegitimate by mutualists. The actual occupant is considered the owner of a tract of land, and any attempt to collect rent by a self-styled landlord is regarded as a violent invasion of the possessor's absolute right of property. (p. 200.)

Careless readers of this passage from Carson may assume that all that he is talking about is the case in which a later owner chooses not to occupy or use the property to which he has obtained title. Such a case is certainly possible, but it is not the case that needs to be considered first. The case that needs to be considered first is that of land which passes from the possession of someone whom Carson acknowledges as a legitimate owner, that is, precisely the kind of person of whom he says, “An existing owner may transfer ownership by sale or gift�? to someone else, and then this someone else does, indeed, occupy and use the land.

The problem is that, according to Carson, this new party’s mere occupancy and use of the land extinguishes any possible property right in the land on the part of the previous possessor, whom Carson acknowledged as legitimate.

For suppose the first owner and the prospective second owner mutually agree on a rental of the land. According to Carson, once the second owner takes possession of the land and begins using it, he is now the legitimate owner. “A change in occupancy will amount to a change in ownership,�? he has just said. If the first owner, who no longer occupies or uses the land, collects rent on it, he is a landowner who is absent from the land on which he collects rent. He is thus, necessarily, an “absentee landlord.�? And Carson has also just said: “Absentee landlord rent, and exclusion of homesteaders [i.e., presumably the second occupant-user] from vacant land by an absentee landlord, are both considered illegitimate by mutualists. The actual occupant is considered the owner of a tract of land, and any attempt to collect rent by a self-styled landlord is regarded as a violent invasion of the possessor's absolute right of property.�?

Here there is a mutually and voluntarily agreed upon rental contract, but after taking possession, the new occupant decides that he is the owner of the land and will not pay any “absentee landlord rent,�? which Carson believes it is his absolute right to decide. Has he not obtained another’s legitimate property and is now refusing to pay for it? And, having taken it, and both refusing to pay for it and refusing to give it back, is he thus not stealing that property?

Would he have been able to obtain the use and occupancy of the land if it had been known or suspected that this is how he would behave, once having obtained it? Obviously, he would not have been able to, and the assurance of his not behaving in this way is a written and signed enforceable rental contract. In that contract it is agreed that in the event of failure to pay the rent, the use and possession of the property reverts to the first user/possessor, who is recognized as the property’s owner despite his absence from the property. The contract also provides that in the event of non-payment of the rent, the owner has the right to dispossess the tenant by force if necessary.

Carson denies the landowner’s rights in a case of this kind and regards the landowner’s act of dispossession as “a violent invasion of the possessor's absolute right of property.�? He considers the support given the landlord by the courts and the police in enforcing the contract to be “government intervention.�?

Because of these facts, I concluded in my review of his book, as I said near the beginning of this posting, that “Carson considers as government intervention the government’s upholding the rights of a landlord against a thief. He believes he has the right to prohibit me and the tenant from entering into an enforceable contract respecting the payment of rent and that such action is somehow not a violation of our freedom of contract and not government intervention.�?

It should be realized that Carson’s hostility to private property rights is not limited to the case of land. He makes clear that it also includes houses and apartments. He advocates the seizure of vacant homes and apartments by homeless squatters. Thus, he declares:

If every vacant or abandoned housing unit in a city is occupied by the homeless, they will at least have shelter in the short term until they are forcibly removed. . . . In the meantime, the squatters' movement performs a major educative and propaganda service, develops political consciousness among urban residents, draws public attention and sympathy against the predatory character of landlordism, and—most importantly—keeps the state and landlords perpetually on the defensive. (pp 377-378.)

On the basis of this and all of the foregoing, I say that Carson’s “Mutualism�? is a philosophy for thieves. As I wrote in my full-length review in the JLS:

The logic of Carson’s position extends to legitimizing auto theft: An individual rents a car from Hertz or Avis. He is the user/occupant. Hertz or Avis is the absentee owner demanding rent. It extends to the theft of clothing that is not being worn at the moment by its—absentee—owner. It extends to all property, for once in the possession of the thief, the thief as user/possessor becomes the legitimate owner, according to Carson’s conception of things.

Carson simply does not understand that ownership is not the mere possession and use of property but rather the moral and legal right to determine the possession and use of property.

Ironically, his failure to grasp this last principle totally undercuts his condemnation of the massive seizures of land that have occurred throughout history and which are the ostensible reason for his condemnation and hatred of “landlordism.�? To the extent that such seizures were the result of a population of outsiders that not only seized the land of the previous occupants but also proceeded to work it, Carson has no basis of opposition, because his principle is that use determines ownership, and they are now the users. His principle of use determining ownership leaves no basis for opposing any theft, so long as the thief uses what he has stolen.

What Carson is actually opposed to is not violent appropriation of land —indeed, as we have seen, that is precisely what he advocates whenever he thinks it is “just.�? What he is actually opposed to is merely the case in which the thief does not use what he has stolen—the leading example being when the thief settles down to become a landlord collecting rent on land that others use.

But, of course, Carson is equally opposed to someone who is not a thief also not using his own property. Non-use is alleged justification for legitimate property being seized, and, as I’ve shown, not just land but also homes and apartments, and by implication, automobiles, clothing, and everything else that is not being used by its owner.

I cannot help but suspect that what Carson is actually opposed to is not at all force, fraud, or actual injustice in the history of mankind but the existence of large inequalities of wealth and income, whatever their basis. The idle wealth of the rich is what he has in mind for seizure and subsequent use by the poor, who would allegedly be its rightful owners by virtue of the mere fact of their use of what they had stolen.

Hopefully, in the future, I will be able to address further the problems connected with violent seizures of land in the past and explain why they are irrelevant to the present and do not justify programs of redistributionist “land reform.�? For those who may be interested, I have already written on this subject in my book Capitalism, on pp. 317-322.

For now what it is essential to understand is that Carson’s “Mutualism�? is a philosophy that urges theft.

This article is copyright © 2006, by George Reisman. Permission is hereby granted to reproduce and distribute it electronically and in print, other than as part of a book and provided that mention of the author’s web site www.capitalism.net is included. (Email notification is requested.) All other rights reserved. George Reisman is the author of Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics (Ottawa, Illinois: Jameson Books, 1996) and is Pepperdine University Professor Emeritus of Economics.

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Comments (116)

Donny R

Reisman asserts:

"I cannot help but suspect that what Carson is actually opposed to is not at all force, fraud, or actual injustice in the history of mankind but the existence of large inequalities of wealth and income, whatever their basis."

I agree, ever since I first heard about "Mutualism" and read Carsons book, I have suspected that they are simply another political philosophy that masquerades as propenents of liberty and free markets but are motivated by hatred and envy of the succesful. I would like to note, however, that I sympathise with the Mutualists stance against any sort of Government protected special interests.

I would like to say something more in depth than simply agreeing with you, but I haven't the time. (If I had the time, I would especially like to address your argument about the property owner and the tenant, and Carson's amusingly ad hoc rebuttal in the Journal).

In closing I would like to congratulate you, Professor Reisman, for writing "Capitalism" which is the most brilliant economic treatise ever written. Also, please keep posting your brilliantly insightful articles, you are one of the main reasons I have mises.org bookmarked.

Published: June 18, 2006 6:35 PM
David C

This would completely ruin poor people. They would never be able to rent cars, they would never be able to rent even a steam cleaner, they would never be able to use hotels, and they probably wouldn't even be able to check out books from the library.

A rich person could get arround these restrictions easially, he could simply buy the apartment or hotel he's renting as a condo and then sell it for the rent differential later on. He could simply buy the car he is renting, and then sell it back at a pre agreed price.

This would also put many small businesses out of business almost immediately. It is not uncommon for small businesses to take posession of goods or commodities before they pay for them, and then pay them off after the sale. Carson's attempt to assign ownership to posession would destroy that system for all but the most established businesses. It would also increase the cash flow requirements of all businesses and probably lead to drastic increases in prices.

Yep. If I hated poor people, this would be a very efficient way to royally screw them over. They always said that the problem with the USSR, wasn't Communisim - only that it was implemented incorrectly. Well, perhaps this is what they were talking about?

(The ironic thing is that we may see this economic condition very very soon anyhow because the US economy has more debt than it can pay off and the US fiat money system will "solve" this problem by printing up tons of money and make almost any sort of lease worthless)

Published: June 18, 2006 10:11 PM
Keith Preston

"...in the remnants of the old anarchist movement, which now sometimes calls itself “libertarian�? or “left-libertarian.�?

It was the historic anarchists who were actually the first to use the term "libertarian" in a political context, not that we have exclusive right to it, given our opposition to patent privileges. See, we're not such envious, thieving, greedy bastards, after all, LOL!

"The logic of Carson’s position extends to legitimizing auto theft: An individual rents a car from Hertz or Avis. He is the user/occupant. Hertz or Avis is the absentee owner demanding rent. It extends to the theft of clothing that is not being worn at the moment by its—absentee—owner. It extends to all property, for once in the possession of the thief, the thief as user/possessor becomes the legitimate owner, according to Carson’s conception of things."

"Non-use is alleged justification for legitimate property being seized, and, as I’ve shown, not just land but also homes and apartments, and by implication, automobiles, clothing, and everything else that is not being used by its owner."

This is a misrepresentation that is being used to construct a reductio ad absurdum argument. Virtually all non-Lockean (or, more accurately, non-Misesian) free market economists, whether mutualists, geoists or left-Rothbardians, distinguish between "property" in pre-existing natural resources (like land) or "property" held by corporative entities connnected to the state (like the Catholic Church in traditional Europe, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or the majority of the corporate classes of the modern state-capitalist regimes) and personal possessions and individual proprietorships. For that matter, so do anarcho-communists, syndicalists, the majority of conventional socialists and not a few Marxists.

I think reasonable and honest libertarians can disagree on this question, but pre-existing natural resources like land, rivers, oceans, wildlife and ecosystems are not merely "property" derived from "mixing one's labor and personality" with thin air. The existence of these precedes any effort by any individual. Does Neil Armstrong have title to the moon because he was there first? Maybe he should now be considered "absentee landlord" and entitled to collect rent from all subsequent astronauts and space travelers?

"It should be realized that Carson’s hostility to private property rights is not limited to the case of land. He makes clear that it also includes houses and apartments. He advocates the seizure of vacant homes and apartments by homeless squatters. Thus, he declares:

'If every vacant or abandoned housing unit in a city is occupied by the homeless, they will at least have shelter in the short term until they are forcibly removed. . . . In the meantime, the squatters' movement performs a major educative and propaganda service, develops political consciousness among urban residents, draws public attention and sympathy against the predatory character of landlordism, and—most importantly—keeps the state and landlords perpetually on the defensive. (pp 377-378.)'"

This is an issue I actually have a fair amount of experience with. In my city, houses and apartment buildings are all over the place that have, quite literally, been abandoned by their "owners". Typically, these buildings are dilapidated to the point where they are unsafe or extremely unattractive for people of any means whatsoever. Consequently, they are squatted by people from various marginalized populations, usually drug addicts, vagrants, drunks, homeless teenagers or runaways, the lowest level street prostitutes and other similar figures. Needless to say the municipal authorities are rather unhappy about the situation so, in addition to conventional police raids and outright repression, they will attempt to bring the "owners" up on charges related to building codes, zoning, property upkeep laws, the whole deal. However, these "owners" are typically, and quite literally, nowhere to be found meaning it is often unclear who exactly, if anyone, actually has legal title to the "property" in question? So the squatters' will typically be evicted if not arrested and the "property" will be seized by the local government and sold to developers, speculators or conventional landlords at blue light special prices, if not given away. I've heard of landlords being given such properties for as little as $100 (I'm not kidding here!)

These kinds of situations illustrate quite well what is wrong with "landlordism" from a traditional anarchist perspective.

Anyway, here is Carson's actual take on rental property (from another thread on this site):

"Tucker in places seemed to leave open the possibility that house-rent would continue: so long as the state did not prevent homesteading of vacant land, market competition would reduce house rent"

If someone is able, out of their own savings, to buy a piece of real estate they don't actually build a house on (but just like the view or something) or buy a house they rent to others, that's fine by me, but that's not how institutionalized landlordism actually works.

"Hopefully, in the future, I will be able to address further the problems connected with violent seizures of land..."

Please do.

" and explain why they are irrelevant to the present and do not justify programs of redistributionist 'land reform.'"

Why are they irrelevant? If the structural foundations of the status quo are indeed built upon prior interventions and expropriations, and if the status quo are indeed the net beneficiaries of those expropriations, why are the net victims of those expropriations not entitled to their "forty acres and a mule"?

"For now what it is essential to understand is that Carson’s “Mutualism�? is a philosophy that urges theft."

Yeah, yeah, and pro-choice libertarians are accomplices to child genocide. Libertarians who oppose antidiscrimination laws are crypto-nazis. Libertarian opponents of vice and drug laws are libertines and immoralists. We've heard all that.

Published: June 18, 2006 10:46 PM
Urbanitect

Mr. Preston, you as well as most mutualists fit the description of a "past-oriented" person, in that you are obsessed about correcting the injustices of the past at the expense of the future course of mankind. What this mutualist principle amounts to is a prohibition of rental agreements and a legitimization of theft. A future-oriented person will recognize how such a prohibition will destroy many critical exchange relationships and force property-owners to take otherwise unnecessary actions to protect their property.

Published: June 18, 2006 11:16 PM
Curt Howland

I'm a landlord.

I have property that I would rather not sell, that I see as being more valuable to keep than to divest at this time.

I allow someone else to use the property today, for a fee. It is entirely voluntary and mutual.

If the property is destroyed, say by flood or earthquake, the renter loses nothing. They move on, just as they were. I lose everything. That is the risk I take as owner, that is the risk they avoid as renter.

What I find absurd is that a mutually agreeable arrangement, that of renter and landlord, can be nay-sayed at all. It is mutual! If I asked too much, or the prospective renter offered too little, both of us are free to say no. Hardly the situation with the IRS!

Lastly, the renter may offer to buy me out at any time they wish, at any price they wish to offer. I am also free to accept or turn down that offer, and it has nothing what so ever to do with their "status" as renter or my "status" as landlord.

My investment in property is no different than my investment in a truck. If it costs me more to keep it than to sell it, I will sell it. If I expect to have greater return by using it to haul trash, I will use it to haul trash.

Right now my property is best utilized to be a dwelling for 3 college students who themselves believe it is more efficient for them to rent a place to live until graduation than to try to buy a home.

Tell me again how I am "exploiting" anyone?

Curt-

Published: June 18, 2006 11:37 PM
Person

Guys, you have to be a little careful with Curt_Howland. While I agree with his conclusions on this matter, it's obvious he's not advancing the debate any by merely assuming the validity of his claim to the land. I do have a question that I've always wanted answered, and it seems like Keith Preston, who is both articulate and a defender of mutualist property arragements, would be a good person to answer.

Keith: You say land is "pre-existing", rendering null anyone's superior claim to it by virtue of being first. But land is certainly not "just there", available for anyone to take, if only those parasites got out of the way. Land must be discovered. Land that no one knows about has no value. It in no sense "precedes the efforts of any individual". Until someone can do all of the labor in finding and getting to that land, no one can make any use of it. So why should the discoverer have an equal claim to those who did not render it useful through discovery?

And as for the distinction between the evil landlordism in renting out land, and the non-evil carlordism in renting out cars, if there's a distinction, Carson didn't make it in his book, and that's why Reisman was so adamant about making that point.

Published: June 19, 2006 8:39 AM
quasibill

Person,

I know you addressed this to Preston, but I'd like to add a little to this.

"Until someone can do all of the labor in finding and getting to that land, no one can make any use of it. So why should the discoverer have an equal claim to those who did not render it useful through discovery?"

This is the root of the entire question. When you own land, what are the limits of your possession? Clearly, it is fairly easy to describe the two dimensional boundaries. A problem comes in with the third dimension, however.

Does your right to the land allow you to build a skyscraper on your land? How about if there is currently an airport nearby that requires that planes be able to fly over your property at 300 feet? What if that airport was in existence for 30 years before you bought the property (and leaving the question of noise nuisance aside)?

Going in the other direction, we know that the earth is a sphere (or close to one), so how we draw those lines? Or should we even do that? Given your preference (which I tend to share) that whoever first liberates a resource into usable form gets ownership, what's wrong with slant drilling? Or mining under another's surface property, so long as you don't damage their support (my state, PA, has quite a bit of case law dealing with this very issue).

And finally, going back to Preston's comment, what exactly permits a valid claim to land? Did Christopher Columbus possess valid title to the entire new world? What gave the European monarchs the right to sell property in what became the colonies? What gave the U.S. government the right to parcel out the West?

Granted, I concur with urbanitect, that getting too obsessed with the past is counter-productive in determining how to go forward. However, it is vitally important to appraise our current situation for what it is, in its entirety - the result of state engineering. Had the state(s) not intervened to the extent that they have, I don't think society would look anything like it does today, and that includes much of the centralization of goods and services that were achieved through state interference (it's always easier to tax fewer, centralized businesses than it is to tax a truly mobile, de-centralized, free market economy - that's why the socialist governments in Africa quickly acted to destroy the traditional property rights of nomadic hunter-gatherers, leading to today's poverty)

Published: June 19, 2006 9:15 AM
Yancey Ward

It seems clear to me that Carson's position is the logical outcome of true anarchism. You only own property to the extent that you can defend the ownership yourself. Any cooperative effort with others to defend said property, and the property of the others, is the genesis of a state.

If the homesteading of unused property is legitimate, then my back yard is open to any squatter to take possession since I use the backyard less than 100% of the time. Indeed, the same could be said of the three bedrooms that I do not sleep in, or, even, of the one I do. There are no boundaries or rules on ownership in anarchy. As soon as you can't defend your property, it is no longer yours.

Published: June 19, 2006 9:25 AM
Keith Preston

"Mr. Preston, you as well as most mutualists fit the description of a "past-oriented" person, in that you are obsessed about correcting the injustices of the past at the expense of the future course of mankind."

Well, these "injustices" from the past are the foundation of the present state of social, economic and class relations. I doubt you would take such a defensive attitude towards the status quo built upon prior expropriations by Commie regimes, like Cuba or North Korea? Why let the state-capitalists/corporate-mercantilists off the hook?

"What this mutualist principle amounts to is a prohibition of rental agreements and a legitimization of theft."

The usufructary approach to property rights favored by mutualists is the same as that offered by those great Marxist ideologues, G.K. Chesterton and Hillaire Belloc, and that great den of Commie thieves, the Catholic Church. You can argue against this perspective on technical economic grounds if you wish, but this discrepancy among libertarians over property theory is no different from conflicting ideas about the "right to life" that leads libertarians to have differing views on things like abortion, capital punishment, "just war" doctrine, euthanasia, animal rights, environmentalism and other things.

"A future-oriented person will recognize how such a prohibition will destroy many critical exchange relationships and force property-owners to take otherwise unnecessary actions to protect their property."

Yeah, we wouldn't want compensation for victims of prior expropriations getting in the way of "progress" or inconveniencing the beneficiaries of those expropriations, would we?

"Keith: You say land is "pre-existing", rendering null anyone's superior claim to it by virtue of being first. But land is certainly not "just there", available for anyone to take, if only those parasites got out of the way. Land must be discovered. Land that no one knows about has no value. It in no sense "precedes the efforts of any individual". Until someone can do all of the labor in finding and getting to that land, no one can make any use of it. So why should the discoverer have an equal claim to those who did not render it useful through discovery?"

I'll respond to that by referring to the "Gilligan's Island" analogy I've used in other debates on this site.

Gilligan and the castaways are shipwrecked on the island. Does the island become their private property by virtue of discovery? Or does it remain the property of whatever headhunters or Tarzan-like characters happen to be on the island? If it belongs to the castaways, how much of the island can they claim? The whole thing? Enough to farm for their own subsistence? Enough to build huts or tents for themselves? How does this break down on an individual basis? Are the Skipper, Gilligan, Ginger, Mary Ann, etc. each entitled to an equal share of the island? If the Skipper exerts more energy in pulling the Minnow ashore, fighting off savages, picking berries, is he entitled to a greater share than Mr. Howell who sits around complaining about the heat and mosquitos? What if another group of castaways is subsequently shipwrecked on the same island? Are Gilligan and his friends obligated to share the island with the newcomers? Or can they just push them back into the sea because Ayn Rand or Murray Rothbard said they could? If so, is it realistic to expect the 2nd group of castaways to say, "Well, in the spirit of compliance of the idealized property rights vision of John Locke, as enunciated by his apostle Murray Rothbard, we therefore agree to subject ourselves to death by starvation, saltwater poisoning or drowning, or shark attacks, because of our sworn fidelity to the eternal spirit of Ayn Rand." I doubt it would go down that way. More likely, the 2nd group would arm themselves with bamboo spears and have at it with Gilligan and associates.

You can take this argument to absurd extremes in either direction. From one end, you can say Neil Armstrong has a legitimate title to the moon. From the other end, you can say someone else can stake a claim to your backyard if you don't have an actual garden, swimming pool or playpen for the kids there.

I'm actually somewhat agnostic on the question of how property rights should be defined down to the last letter of the law. I lean towards the mutualist perspective because it seems to me to be a happy middle ground between staking claims to the moon on one hand and total negation property rights on the other. The question is where do you draw the line. It's like the abortion question: If abortion is permissable, why not infanticide? If abortion is impermissable, why not contraception?

"And as for the distinction between the evil landlordism in renting out land, and the non-evil carlordism in renting out cars, if there's a distinction, Carson didn't make it in his book, and that's why Reisman was so adamant about making that point."

Well, I don't know what kind of distinction, if any, Kevin would make between landlordism and "carlordism". However, his approach to land rights theory is rooted in traditional non-Lockean views on this question like those offered by Proudhon, Henry George or Chesterton and Belloc. As I said before, most adherents of perspectives of this type distinguish between property rights in natural resources like land and property rights in personal possessions and consumer goods like tools, clothing or automobiles.

As I've also said before, the aspect of Kevin's arguments I find most compelling are the degree to which he has established that prior expropriations have determined the present state of class relations. Even if you prefer Lockean over mutualist or distributist property theory, I think his arguments along these lines would still hold up about as well.

Published: June 19, 2006 9:39 AM
Keith Preston

Here's a link to an article by Kevin Carson on the whole "slavery reparations" issue that summarizes his approach to class and property relations quite well.

http://mutualist.org/id9.html

Published: June 19, 2006 9:41 AM
xteve

Yancey:

"It seems clear to me that Carson's position is the logical outcome of true anarchism. You only own property to the extent that you can defend the ownership yourself."

Why limit that to anarchism? Couldn't you say that's equally true under statism? If you steal my wallet then it wouldn't matter how valid my claim to the wallet is because you would still have it, regardless of my claims or the existance of a state.

I think what we're doing here is trying to establish what constitutes of valid claim to property. That's actually a method of defending claims to property. When this rational method fails, force might be an option to gain possession, but that doesn't necessarily make the outcome valid.

"Any cooperative effort with others to defend said property, and the property of the others, is the genesis of a state."

I would have said that it's the forcible seizure of (rather than the cooperative defense of) rationally determined property claims that is genesis of a state. Interesting.

Published: June 19, 2006 10:47 AM
Yancey Ward

xsteve,

What is the purpose of a valid theory of property rights beyond one's ability to defend the property in anarchy? If one follows the mutualist's philosophy, then there are no real property rights beyond that point. Using the example of the backyard of my property, how does one define "use" in anarchy? It seems to me that the mutualists simply accept that the owner of any property is the one who is more willing to fight for it, thereby demonstrating the greatest need; and any intervention of third parties to the conflict is a violation of the natural rights of one or both of the original contestants.

Published: June 19, 2006 11:07 AM
Vince Daliessio

xsteve has a point, in that currently, individually-owned property (e.g., by homeowners or other non-farm or non-corporate entities) is not really owned at all, but simply rented, such rents being the property taxes demanded by the municipality. It is an implicit assumption that an individual really cannot own the land at all, whether by mutualist, communist, Lockean, Hoppean, or Rothbardian conception - as long as the state is involved, we are but simple tenants.

Published: June 19, 2006 11:12 AM
Person

Keith_Preston: In response to my challenge about the requirement of labor for land to be usable, your response is, and please correct me if this is in any sense a misrepresentation (as long as you say precisely how):

1) First use is hard to define. (quasibill made a similar point but didn't claim it was a refutation)

2) In practice, people will fight over land.

If this is your reply, which appears to be the case, and if you're being serious (which I hope is not the case), then my response goes as follows and begins now:

2) is irrelevant to determining *whose* property claim, for which they're fighting, is more morally valid. 1) is not a reason to prefer mutualist property rules, since it also requires "use" to be definied, and in fact tags on the additional problem of what constitutes "abandonment."

Well, I don't know what kind of distinction, if any, Kevin would make between landlordism and "carlordism".

Er, yeah, that's Reisman's point. He *doesn't* make a principled distinction, and that's the problem. That's why Reisman's reductio refutes Carson's position. If landlordism is wrong, carlordism is wrong. So is clotheslordism. Anyone who rents a tuxedo (which if anyone cares is primarly a product of labor) is fully justified in running off with it. Any theft is justified as long as you continue to use it and the victim wasn't using it at the time.

Sometimes I wonder if mutualists are even aware that under mutualist property rules, people would hoard as much land as they could be considered "using" under the letter of the law and extort the same "usurious" land prices, except that you would have to buy in full to use the land at all. Plus, with interest kept low, that land would be worth ... let's just say, a lot.

Published: June 19, 2006 11:36 AM
Keith Preston

Yancey: "What is the purpose of a valid theory of property rights beyond one's ability to defend the property in anarchy?"

I reject the view that some libertarians seem to maintain that "property rights" (Lockean or otherwise)can be rooted in some sort of conception of metaphysics or are somehow decreed by the Gods, the Cosmos or Nature. In a Hobbesian "state of nature", you have whatever "property" you can get by buying, begging, borrowing, gifts from others, pillaging, plundering, raping, killing, etc. You get to keep this "property" (whether in land, goods, chattel, women or whatever) to the degree that you can successfully ward off those who would take it from you. "Property rights", like "human rights", "civil rights", "individual rights", "States' rights" and so on, is an intellectual, cultural, political and legal construct designed to settle disputes over contending claims to resources in a less bloody manner, thereby making social existence more bearable. This is why societies typically establish legal or cultural taboos against theft, killing, maiming, etc.

Quasibill: "Does your right to the land allow you to build a skyscraper on your land? How about if there is currently an airport nearby that requires that planes be able to fly over your property at 300 feet? What if that airport was in existence for 30 years before you bought the property (and leaving the question of noise nuisance aside)?

Going in the other direction, we know that the earth is a sphere (or close to one), so how we draw those lines? Or should we even do that? Given your preference (which I tend to share) that whoever first liberates a resource into usable form gets ownership, what's wrong with slant drilling? Or mining under another's surface property, so long as you don't damage their support (my state, PA, has quite a bit of case law dealing with this very issue)."

This is why a "one size fits all" approach to "property rights" doesn't work. Any workable approach to property rights by a real-life legal system would have to combine abstract theoretical considerations (Lockean, mutualist or otherwise) with matters of custom and habit, sets of negotiations and agreements worked out by contending parties in particular instances, and the formulation of these into a body of case, customary or common law to be referenced as an authoritative precedent for the sake of maintaining stability, predictability or continuity in property relations or legal structures.

"(it's always easier to tax fewer, centralized businesses than it is to tax a truly mobile, de-centralized, free market economy - that's why the socialist governments in Africa quickly acted to destroy the traditional property rights of nomadic hunter-gatherers, leading to today's poverty)"

Excellent example! And here's a piece by Wendy McElroy illustrating the effects of European imperialism on Africa:
http://www.lewrockwell.com/mcelroy/mcelroy55.html

Vince: "an individual really cannot own the land at all, whether by mutualist, communist, Lockean, Hoppean, or Rothbardian conception - as long as the state is involved, we are but simple tenants."

Amen to that one, too!

Published: June 19, 2006 11:43 AM
RalphBorsodi

Vince: "an individual really cannot own the land at all, whether by mutualist, communist, Lockean, Hoppean, or Rothbardian conception - as long as the state is involved, we are but simple tenants."

how about rather than paying the state one is actually paying your neighbors directly who you are directly excluding?

Published: June 19, 2006 11:52 AM
Keith Preston

"2) is irrelevant to determining *whose* property claim, for which they're fighting, is more morally valid. 1) is not a reason to prefer mutualist property rules, since it also requires "use" to be definied, and in fact tags on the additional problem of what constitutes "abandonment."

Agreed. That's one of the reasons why I stated in my previous post that, ANY system of property rights, to be workable, has to take into account a variety of considerations and, more or less arbitrarily, attempt to strike a balance among these considerations.

Published: June 19, 2006 11:53 AM
Vache Folle

The use and occupancy stricture applies to realty, not personalty.

The theory of mutualism is such that it recognizes as legitimate ownership in land predicated on use and occupancy. Other claims are not recognized under the theory; therefore, it makes no sense to call the tenant a "thief". You are mixing your theories here. Presumably, in a society practicing mutualism, the landholder would know that renting the land would not be recognized as an enforceable arrangement.

Published: June 19, 2006 12:29 PM
quasibill

Yancey,

"It seems to me that the mutualists simply accept that the owner of any property is the one who is more willing to fight for it, thereby demonstrating the greatest need; and any intervention of third parties to the conflict is a violation of the natural rights of one or both of the original contestants."

Doesn't appear to be true to me. In actuality, they would just consent to a different set of property rules than an Austrian AnCap would. They don't believe in "might makes right" anymore than an Austrian AnCap does, rather, they believe that they would resolve disputes according to a different set of rules.

I'll agree that, at this point, I don't prefer their set of rules in certain areas, based on both utilitarian and philosophical grounds. However, it is important to note that this is a preference, not some sort of universal truth.

Published: June 19, 2006 1:01 PM
Anonymous Anarchist

Re: Vache Folle
Presumably, in a society practicing mutualism, the landholder would know that renting the land would not be recognized as an enforceable arrangement.

This was what I found absurd about Reisman's argument that mutualist property arrangements interfere with freedom of contract. The would-be landlord is perfectly free to sign a contract with the would-be tenant, but surely, he must know beforehand that no one will help him enforce it.

It seems as if Reisman believes that mutualist property relations could be somehow imposed on a Misesian society. But who would do the enforcing? Security agencies, arbitration agencies, etc., would make decisions on the basis of custom --- in a mutualist society, the would-be landlord would be out of luck (and deserve it, for being stupid); in a Misesian society, the tenant would be evicted.

In my opinion, mutualist property arrangements are fairer, more rational, and more productive of liberty than capitalist ones. But unless my neighbours are willing to help me enforce those property arrangements, my opinion doesn't matter much, does it?

Published: June 19, 2006 1:17 PM
Yancey Ward

quasibill,

As a "practical" implementation of the mutualist philosophy, it may be the case that the mutualists would agree to definitions of "use", "abandonment", and other such terms that still allow a degree of absentee ownership of properties (but it would not be mutualism any longer). However, I was referencing to the anarchist component to the philosophy. In anarchy, how do you implement the mutualist creed?
It appears to me that true anarchy is the cornerstone of their philosophy since it is the absence of a state that prevents the ownership of any property beyond what one can use, hide, and/or defend physically one's self. Any step beyond this limit is a violation of the philosophy.

Published: June 19, 2006 1:30 PM
David J. Heinrich

I've always thought the leftie forms of anarchism to be nothing more than justifications for theft.

Some of the examples cited by Keith in support of Keven Carson's position strike me as simple red herrings. Under libertarianism, there is also a theory of abandonment. If someone either decrees abandonment, or it is clear that someone has abandoned property -- as the case with run down buildings -- then it reverts to an unowned status, and first homesteaders have just claim to it. What currently happens in that situation is irrelevant to the position of anarcho-capitalism, except that ancaps may have criticisms of it.

Certainly, it is not abandonment when I leave my house to go to work, or go on vacation. It certainly does not justify some bums stepping into my house and using it for shelter while I'm gone. And of course, Carson's absurd theory would also mean I'd abandoned all of the sentimental items in my home: e.g., pictures of my family. These would all be up for grabs -- or destruction -- by bums.

Let's say that some middle-class person living in a neighborhood leaves their home for a vacation. Now, some horny teenagers notice this, and decide that they're going to occupy use of this property at least until the home-owners get back. So, they go in there and have sex on every surface in the house. Hell, let's say they invite some more of their heathen friends over, and have an orgy. So, of course, the property is completely defiled. When the home-owners get back, they are outraged and disgusted. Maybe one of them has OCD, and their previously clean and ordered house is now in complete chaos; with various items destroyed or otherwise defiled; there are broken beer bottles all over the place; and there is a bunch of naked punk teenagers passed out laying on the floors, couches, and beds. Of course, the homeowners would be outraged. In their defense, the awakening drunkard libertines note that, "Well, the theory of mutualism states that as you were absent, we were justified in 'occupying' this house, at least until you return".

I provided this example to illustrate the moral bankruptcy of mutualism. There is a very clear conceptual difference between absenteeism and abandonment. In practice, the difference is very clear in the vast majority of cases, as well.

Published: June 19, 2006 1:51 PM
Pellinore

posted by Keith Preston

In my city, houses and apartment buildings are all over the place that have, quite literally, been abandoned by their "owners". Typically, these buildings are dilapidated to the point where they are unsafe or extremely unattractive for people of any means whatsoever. Consequently, they are squatted by people from various marginalized populations, usually drug addicts, vagrants, drunks, homeless teenagers or runaways, the lowest level street prostitutes and other similar figures.

Of course I do not know where you are, but this sounds an awful lot like the results of rent control and a superabundance of subsidies for low-income housing. Once the subsidies run out and only the controls are left, the properties effected are reduced to their "market ideal" form; specifically, burned out, run down hovels no one in his right mind would want to live in or maintain. We have those in my area too, and I suspect virtually anywhere in the U.S. with a median or higher population does.

Pellinore

Published: June 19, 2006 1:52 PM
Urbanitect

"Well, these "injustices" from the past are the foundation of the present state of social, economic and class relations. I doubt you would take such a defensive attitude towards the status quo built upon prior expropriations by Commie regimes, like Cuba or North Korea? Why let the state-capitalists/corporate-mercantilists off the hook?"

If it were possible to buy out Fidel Castro or Kim Jong-Il's regime in exchange for freedom for Cubans and Koreans then I would support it without reservation. Better freedom and peace than more conflict and war in the name of correcting past injustices. All that does is perpetuate the injustice.

Published: June 19, 2006 1:54 PM
quasibill

"In anarchy, how do you implement the mutualist creed?"

The same way you would implement a capitalist creed in anarchy - 1) brute force - you have bigger weapons than everyone else and can defend your claims; 2) general cultural agreement within the local area, whereby you agree with like minded neighbors to certain dispute resolution mechanisms and security services, eventually leading to a uniformity of local ethics in that dissenters are killed or forced to leave the area; or 3) get a large block of land, invite settlers/citizens, and create your own city-state that includes binding covenants upon all who enter the property.

There may be others, but those are the ones I can think of off the top of my head.

"It appears to me that true anarchy is the cornerstone of their philosophy since it is the absence of a state that prevents the ownership of any property beyond what one can use, hide, and/or defend physically one's self. Any step beyond this limit is a violation of the philosophy."

That appears to be more of Reisman's strawman than anything else. As several have noted, there are distinctions made between personalty and realty, just as there are in the common law (which is as close to a free-market, all-encompassing body of law that we have). I have never seen anyone, except of course Reisman's strawman, argue that personalty is subject to the same rules as realty in mutualism.

Further, again, they don't appear to believe in might makes right anymore than Austrians do. They would agree to certain property rules, and those rules would be enforced in the same way Austrian property rules would be enforced in anarchy.

Published: June 19, 2006 1:57 PM
xteve

Yancey,

"What is the purpose of a valid theory of property rights beyond one's ability to defend the property in anarchy?"

I still maintain that arguing for a rationally deduced theory of property rights is one way (among others) to help defend those rights. However, your asssertion that...

"the mutualists simply accept that the owner of any property is the one who is more willing to fight for it, thereby demonstrating the greatest need"

...sounds an awful lot like might-makes-right. Using that reasoning, the mutualist's is tenant/landlord viewpoint is worthless if I'm more powerful.

Besides, a greater willingness to fight would not ensure victory, & neither willingness nor victory demonstrates greater need. So either you phrased that sloppily or mutualism is less reasoned than I thought.

Vince,

I'm not sure I actually said that, but it's totally true nonetheless. If my understanding of mutualist theory as explained by Yancey is correct then the state is the legitimate owner of my property - & yours - since they're bigger & stronger than I am & I can't possibly fight them off violently by myself alone.

Published: June 19, 2006 1:58 PM
Paul Edwards

Keith,

“I reject the view that some libertarians seem to maintain that "property rights" (Lockean or otherwise)can be rooted in some sort of conception of metaphysics or are somehow decreed by the Gods, the Cosmos or Nature.�?

I get more the feeling that you reject property rights period. What you advocate is the might makes right view. The strongest group of brutes who are the most willing to aggress and do battle, is the one most justified in possessing property (as long as this group “uses�? this property of course).

“In a Hobbesian "state of nature", you have whatever "property" you can get by buying, begging, borrowing, gifts from others, pillaging, plundering, raping, killing, etc.�?

I reject that pillaging, plundering, raping and murdering are justified methods of property appropriation. They are property violations. But this is only apparent to one who recognizes the validity of private property in the first place.

“You get to keep this "property" (whether in land, goods, chattel, women or whatever) to the degree that you can successfully ward off those who would take it from you.�?

This system is no ethic, but rather an invitation for further conflict and aggression. The purpose of an ethic is to provide for conflict avoidance, not provide an environment that encourages conflict. Why advocate anarchy when the state is such a powerful and despotic aggressor already. Certainly the great might of the state, under this Hobbesian ethic, makes it the most right of all.

Published: June 19, 2006 2:14 PM
RalphBorsodi

The difference between a Georgist and a Mutualist:

Under a Mutualist system of land ownership there would be a helluva lot of unowned land to freely homestead but not much economic rent to collect.

Under a Georgist system of land ownership there would be a helluva lot of economic rent to collect and distribute and not much unowned land to homestead.

Published: June 19, 2006 2:31 PM
Paul Edwards

Anonymous Anarchist,

Vache: “Presumably, in a society practicing mutualism, the landholder would know that renting the land would not be recognized as an enforceable arrangement.�?

AA: “This was what I found absurd about Reisman's argument that mutualist property arrangements interfere with freedom of contract. The would-be landlord is perfectly free to sign a contract with the would-be tenant, but surely, he must know beforehand that no one will help him enforce it.�?

Let me just summarize my impression of the mutualist community under (libertarian?) anarchy. It’s slowly coming into focus, but do correct me where I’m mistaken:

It is a libertarian system (this was hard for me to perceive this at first).

Everyone in the community is or can be a property owner to the extent that he continues to use and can continue to defend his property.

By implication, or by explicit covenantal agreement, everyone agrees not to rent out any resource they own, or they will be immediately subject to confiscation of that resource by the renter. This is because such a contract would be a violation of the covenant and would be unenforceable by the first owner.

By covenantal agreement, every resource that was once owned, but that is currently unused is currently unowned. For instance, the shovel in my shed, my shed, and my back yard, which are all currently not in use, are also presently unowned, and subject to legitimate acquisition by someone who happens on it and can break down the gate and kill my (for sake of argument) guard dog, etc.

By covenantal agreement, the stranger who just broke into my house, which is currently empty and unused while I work, would also, by virtue of his using the house now, now own it.

It would be agreed that we would not seek the services of security guards and warehouse facilities to safely store our property because by covenantal agreement, it is the possessor who necessarily owns the property and if the warehouse confiscates your property, it is because it is his property, not yours because of course he possesses it, not you.

Am I missing anything, understating or overstating the implications?

If I’m close, here’s my assessment: Nobody will live in your mutualist community except perhaps the criminally insane. The rest must be forced against their will. You’ll need a state for this purpose. You’ll also need a state to arbitrarily assign who really does own a resource because no one could live under such chaotic circumstances otherwise, even if they wanted to. Because of human nature, your voluntary mutualist anarchy is a wild illusion. What you’d need is a great leader like Stalin to keep it in tact.

Published: June 19, 2006 3:18 PM
RalphBorsodi

Paul,

"For instance, the shovel in my shed, my shed, and my back yard, which are all currently not in use, are also presently unowned, and subject to legitimate acquisition by someone who happens on it and can break down the gate"

I think a mutualist would draw a distinction between personal possessions not used in pursuit of economic profits vs. those used in pursuit of economic profits as they (mutualists) don't recognize the legitimacy of property rights in pursuit of economic rent, economic interest, and economic profits particularly as it relates to the alienation of labor from ownership/occupancy/use.

Published: June 19, 2006 5:02 PM
RalphBorsodi

Forgot to add - as economic rent, economic interest, and economic profit are only available to the rent seekers, usurers, and labor exploiters based on the government granted privileges granted and codified in law via supposedly nuetral property relations.

Published: June 19, 2006 5:07 PM
Anonymous Anarchist

Paul Edwards,

Am I missing anything, understating or overstating the implications?

I'm glad you're trying to understand this. I think, though, you're missing the idea of "occupancy and use" in mutualist property relations. It doesn't mean "I'm occupying or using this piece of property right now." It means more along the lines of "A normal member of my society would regard me as occupying or using this piece of property." It's normal use of your house to get up in the morning, and leave it to go to work. It's normal to go on vacation and come back. No one would consider your house abandoned and subject to homesteading for those reasons. If you left for five years and let it become run down with the roof falling in, certainly. If you left town for a year without telling your neighbours and no one asking about the house could find out the status of it, probably. And if you explicitly said, "I'm not going to live in this house, and I'm going to let someone else live in it instead," as in the case of the would-be landlord, then you certainly wouldn't be considered to be occupying and using it. Now, disputes over whether or not some real property was or wasn't in use would certainly happen sometimes. But this would generally be resolved by the parties involved agreeing to arbitration by a third party or third parties (such as a jury).

As for your shovel, most mutualists don't consider personal, movable possessions as equivalent to real estate in this respect. Your shovel is your shovel. Land is a special case, because it's not a product of labor.

I hope that clears up some of your misunderstandings about mutualist views of property rights. I understand it is hard to get an accurate view of something when you are hearing about it mainly from its opponents.

Published: June 19, 2006 5:12 PM
xteve

So why exactly can I not "use" a house for rental income? Exactly what principle does that violate?

Published: June 19, 2006 5:18 PM
xteve

Also...

"Land is a special case, because it's not a product of labor."

I don't buy that, but even if I did, isn't the house a product of labor, & thus valid property by your definition? So why can't I rent it out?

Published: June 19, 2006 5:24 PM
Anonymous Anarchist

Steve,

In the case of "using" the house for rental income, you're not using the house -- you're extracting wealth based on someone else's use of it. I understand that it's a different way of looking at things. If you assume Lockean property in land, then rent makes sense, but it just doesn't get along with occupancy and use.

As for the house being a product of labor, it certainly is, and it's perfectly sensible for you to sell me a house (prefab, or build-to-order), but a house is tied to land in a way other possessions really aren't.

I understand the arguments about land being a product of labor (discovery, surveying, improvement, etc.), but in my opinion, if you accept them, along with Lockean property, you are opening up a bigger can of worms than occupancy and use does! See quasibill's comments above about the New World and Kieth Preston's about Gilligan's island.

Published: June 19, 2006 5:37 PM
Keith Preston

Paul,

You're misinterpreting my argument.

"I get more the feeling that you reject property rights period. What you advocate is the might makes right view. The strongest group of brutes who are the most willing to aggress and do battle, is the one most justified in possessing property (as long as this group “uses�? this property of course)."

What I am saying is that this is how things work in a Hobbesian state of nature. Most people find this to be an unattractive way of life, for good reason, so different kinds of people-economists, philosophers, lawyers, political theorists, clergy and others-come together to formulate alternative ways of doing things like "property rights", "human rights", "civil rights" or what have you. These are social, cultural and intellectual constructs, not anything that exists in nature like the sun, moon or trees. Perhaps they are useful and important constructs, but constructs nonetheless, like any other kinds of civil law or cultural taboos. You seem to be arguing that "property rights" are something more like Plato's Forms (correct me if I'm wrong). I don't think such a view is rational.

"I reject that pillaging, plundering, raping and murdering are justified methods of property appropriation. They are property violations. But this is only apparent to one who recognizes the validity of private property in the first place."

Well, they may not be "justified" (however you define that term) but they are still methods of acquiring property as any common street thug will tell you.

"This system is no ethic, but rather an invitation for further conflict and aggression. The purpose of an ethic is to provide for conflict avoidance, not provide an environment that encourages conflict. Why advocate anarchy when the state is such a powerful and despotic aggressor already. Certainly the great might of the state, under this Hobbesian ethic, makes it the most right of all."

The Hobbesian state of nature is not a ethic, I agree, but merely a condition or situation. "Property rights" is indeed an ethic, albeit a subjective one in my view. Because I regard property rights as subjective does not mean that I reject property rights in toto anymore that my skepticism concerning the view that "life begins at conception" means that I advocate carte blanche homocide. My skepticism of the claims of animal rights activists that animals should be given the same legal or social rights as humans does not mean that I am in favor of gratuitious cruelty to animals, either. There's a such thing as formulating a system of social, political and legal ethics based on deductive reasoning and a balanced consideration of contending needs, interests and points of view. However, this does not mean that any conclusions reached are not still subjective.

You don't think there's going to be conflict in an an-cap system where everyone buys whatever laws they want from whatever private court anyone wants to set up and then hires whatever mercenary army they want to enforce them? I suspect there would be quite a bit of conflict in such a system. It may not be any worse than the present system, but I doubt it would be a paradise of peace and understanding either.

Published: June 19, 2006 5:51 PM
Paul Edwards

Thank-you for the responses,

I see now that RalphBorsodi’s reference to the Georgists in this context is more relevant than i had realized. So land is a special case; we are getting further.

I'm interested to hear the answer to xteve’s question too. Also, can the mutualist rent out his

capital equipment
horse
car
shovel

and expect to have it returned according to the contract? Is it purely land that the mutualist expects people will wish to voluntarily prevent themselves from benefiting from rental agreements, but they will accept all other forms of rental transactions? If I’m on track with this, is it a tricky question to ask if I can rent out an apartment on the 20th floor of an apartment building without risking loss of my property? What would be the outcome in mutualist anarchy?

I have to say, this idea of land as a special case strikes me now, as it did when discussing Georgist theory, as arbitrary, unnecessary and unsatisfactory.

Published: June 19, 2006 5:52 PM
xteve

"In the case of "using" the house for rental income, you're not using the house -- you're extracting wealth based on someone else's use of it."

I'm not sure how that's different from renting out anything else. If I rent a movie, would a mutualist assert that Netflix is not entitled to my money? After all, they would only be profitting from my use of the movie. They're not using it. It's likely they never use it themselves, only to "extract" my wealth.

As I see it, renting a house, or even a large track of land, is fundamentally no different than renting a DVD. Rather than shell out a larger amount of money for something I only intend to use for a short period of time, I agree to only borrow that thing in exchange for a much smaller amount. It's win/win. No moral transgressions whatsoever.

If indeed there are moral transgressions, then what are they? If not, exactly what's the problem?

Published: June 19, 2006 6:05 PM
Paul Edwards

Hi Keith,

OK, I see I misinterpreted your intent, sorry. Let us continue to bash away and see how things proceed:

“These are social, cultural and intellectual constructs, not anything that exists in nature like the sun, moon or trees. Perhaps they are useful and important constructs, but constructs nonetheless, like any other kinds of civil law or cultural taboos. You seem to be arguing that "property rights" are something more like Plato's Forms (correct me if I'm wrong). I don't think such a view is rational.�?

I have to admit ignorance over Plato’s Forms, but let’s see if I can muddle through a response anyways. I agree that what we are discussing, in libertarian ethical norms, is not laws of physics or biology. However, I will argue that they are as praxeologically necessarily true, as any “law�? of economics that we ever came up with. Humans must and do act. This we hold as necessarily true. There other things of this nature as well that are neither issues of the sun and the moon, and yet are undeniably true. Libertarian ethical laws are in this realm. They are more than useful and important conventions. They are simple and indisputably necessary human norms that allow for the possibility of conflict avoidance.

This is the essential argument: there is necessarily and indisputably only one way to make conflict avoidance possible. This approach, not a convention, but a set of necessary norms, is contained in the institution of private property, the implied connected concept of original appropriation of previously unowned resources, and also the acknowledgement of contract between property owners. To show this, I argue first of all, that to debate the subject requires that we argue. To argue, we must and do presuppose certain norms; this is undeniable because to deny it would require an argument, and the argument presupposes the norms one would attempt to deny. No arguments that necessarily make such presuppositions can consistently argue and show to be valid any conclusions or propositions that are contradictory to those presuppositions.

The presuppositions of argumentation are that when determining ethical norms, these norms must be universalizable (can be accepted by all in principle), that people are self owners and that people have the right to control (claim property in) other resources that allow them to survive. Note that it is not proven that these presuppositions are true, it is merely that anyone who argues, necessarily presupposes it is true.

All other ethics fail to accomplish the result of making conflict avoidance possible. This ethic, on the other hand, completely succeeds in the goal of making conflict avoidance possible. Therefore, it is the ONLY ethic that is justifiable.

Superficially, this conclusion may sound like it is based more on faith and hope than anything else, but in fact, it is as sound and scientific as is any economic argument ever put forward by Mises. It is an argument based on praxeology.

So from where I am coming, the libertarian ethic is not simply something that libertarians like. It is the only ethic that when you make an argument for it, you don’t end up contradicting the essential and necessary presuppositions of the act of argumentation itself. All others do contradict those presuppositions in some way or another, and in this way, I can say they are not, and cannot be justified.

“You don't think there's going to be conflict in an an-cap system where everyone buys whatever laws they want from whatever private court anyone wants to set up and then hires whatever mercenary army they want to enforce them? I suspect there would be quite a bit of conflict in such a system. It may not be any worse than the present system, but I doubt it would be a paradise of peace and understanding either.�?

I think it is very important and certainly very interesting to discuss how justice might come about in an an-cap system and I’ve read some very good material on the subject. However, if I could put the practical details away for a very interesting discussion at a later time, allow me to remain with the theoretical argument a while longer.

I would say, human nature being what it is, that there is no possibility that conflict will in fact be avoided entirely. What I mean when I say “conflict avoidance is possible�?, is it allows people to avoid conflict if they want to; it is inherently just, and provides principles that one can apply consistently to achieve what will be in the long run, the most correct and fair arbitration in disputes. This is because it is theoretically founded in the only norms that actually can allow such an outcome in the first place. Human error may prevent the system from providing perfect results, but the system itself is correct, given humans are involved in the process.

As an important outcome of this, while it is very true that through a collection of agreements and contracts or a covenant, libertarians can, in an an-cap environment, put restrictions on each other and their use of property, they cannot, on the other hand, abolish private property itself and yet still claim to have a system that allows for conflict avoidance. Any non-libertarian agreements to eliminate private property must encourage conflict. Finally, any libertarian agreements that are contrary to human nature, such as disallowing landed property or contracts involving landed property, will not be voluntarily adopted and in the end will require state coercion to maintain.

Published: June 19, 2006 6:59 PM
Peter

Had the state(s) not intervened to the extent that they have, I don't think society would look anything like it does today,

But of what possible relevance is that? If different things had happened in the past, things would be different today. True. So what? The world today is as it is today. The only relevant question is what to do from here. Even if you could somehow determine what would have been had things been different (which is utterly impossible), it wouldn't necessarily be the Right Thing to move towards that state of affairs.

Published: June 19, 2006 10:42 PM
David J. Heinrich

This isn't a concrete ethical critique, but I'm surprised no-one has noted that under the left-anarchist systems, capital accumulation is impossible, because ownership is associated with possession. So, it becomes impossible for people to make plans, without the resources they set aside for capital accumulation for the funding of something in the future...being disturbed by others. This means such a society can barely grow any richer.

It seems to me that a social system which would mandate massive poverty and prevent any societal progress...is fundamentally unethical. I believe there is a very close -- possibly inseparate -- connection between the moral / legitimate system by Natural Law, and the progress of civilization.

Published: June 20, 2006 1:25 AM
Paul Edwards

David,

It is a very cool thing to recognize that the (libertarian) ethic which happens to maximize wealth also is the only ethic that can be justified. But I guess the tone of the thread was set on an ethical rather than economic note from the start, and amazingly, we didn’t deviate from that direction. But I agree with your point. A prohibition against rental agreements is unnatural, in that it is contrary to the fundamental essence of private property and human nature, and it would severely diminish the prospect for prosperity by severely hamstringing the capitalistic mechanism which would deepen the structure of production. It is not a norm that people would find themselves generally wishing to limit themselves to, and therefore they would not, except under the coercive influence of the state.

Published: June 20, 2006 1:56 AM
quasibill

"Finally, any libertarian agreements that are contrary to human nature, such as disallowing landed property or contracts involving landed property, will not be voluntarily adopted and in the end will require state coercion to maintain."

Except the historical record belies your assertion that private ownership of land is human nature. In fact, most societies have had commons or land that wasn't privately owned. Human nature is not the objective portrait you are trying to paint it to be.

Once again, I find it humorous that so many professed Austrians proclaim that there is an objective set of values held by all humans beings.

I tend to agree that private property in land is preferrable, but I also think that adverse possession is a valid component of real property law, and think that in fact the time component is too long. If you don't kick squatters off your property for 5 years, I'm not sure your claim to the real property is all that strong.

And again, the difference between real property and personal property has a long historical pedigree. Look no further than the fact that we have two separate terms in English for the types of property! Also, as I described previously, there are issues with defining the extent of claims in real property, and especially here in the U.S., most paper title has its origin in theft or robbery. There are a myriad of legitimate reasons why realty is subject to different rules than personalty.

Published: June 20, 2006 7:45 AM
Yancey Ward

Paul Edwards,

Since no mutualist has stepped forward to answer your question (though David Heinrich alluded to the answer), I will answer it based on my understanding of the philosophy.

You asked if a mutualist can rent out capital equipment. The answer would be no. This would be identical to asking the person to work for wages which is anathema to the mutualists I have encountered. To do so is to extract economic rent from this person without laboring yourself. You can sell the capital equipment to the workers, but you cannot employ others to work it and extract a profit from their labor.

Published: June 20, 2006 9:07 AM
RalphBorsodi

Also - why would anyone want to rent capital equipment when they would have such easy access to a mutual credit clearing system?

Published: June 20, 2006 12:19 PM
Yancey Ward

RalphBorsodi,

Like the owner of a house who would have to be a moron to try to rent the property in a mutualist society, I would also have to be a moron to lend at cost to any member of a mutualist society who could simply regard my loan as his property once taking possession of it.

Published: June 20, 2006 12:38 PM
Paul Edwards

Quasibill,

PE: "Finally, any libertarian agreements that are contrary to human nature, such as disallowing landed property or contracts involving landed property, will not be voluntarily adopted and in the end will require state coercion to maintain."

Quasibill: “Except the historical record belies your assertion that private ownership of land is human nature.�?

History shows also that states have existed, men have been aggressive and tyrannical against other men; many lies have been told and believed and many wars have been fought, killing many millions and destroying much property all for nothing; murders have been committed, and property has been stolen. All this is true and history confirms it.

But I am not saying aggression and lack of respect for property is not inherent in the uncivilized human being, the statist and the dupe. I’m saying that people who value peace and prosperity (the majority of men not living under the influence of a state) that have had the knowledge of what makes peace possible have always advocated private ownership in land and other property.

It is inherent in man to need objective borders around scarce resources and objective, justifiable links to their owners in order to avoid conflict.

“In fact, most societies have had commons or land that wasn't privately owned. Human nature is not the objective portrait you are trying to paint it to be.�?

Observing that coercive states have historically enforced non-libertarian norms on people is not a proof that people would choose them voluntarily. On the contrary, it suggests that coercion was necessary. In the case where these norms are voluntarily chosen, they fail economically, and the system will either dissolve by voluntary choice, or be maintained strictly by the initiation of violence.

Finally, where property is pooled voluntarily and successfully, it is still necessarily done within the framework of private property ownership. People must have the right to private property to voluntarily donate it to a collective ownership.

“Once again, I find it humorous that so many professed Austrians proclaim that there is an objective set of values held by all humans beings.�?

In contrast, I find it frustrating that statists point to coercive encroachments of the state on people of the past as being somehow a justification of such behavior in theory. People who are not severely deluded and who are not coerced do not choose to be stripped of private property rights. And those foolish and deluded soles who choose it, will be soon disillusioned and will wish for private property once again. There are many facts that can be logically deducted through praxeology, and this is one of them.

Published: June 20, 2006 1:41 PM
quasibill

Paul,

You're going to have to do a little more work on anthropology and history to support your arguments. Commons existed in the absence of coercive governments (and in fact, were often seized and "privatized" by coercive governments).

Just as one easily accessible example - go rent "The Gods Must Be Crazy" (the first 1. #2 is not nearly as good). Here is a tribe that exists with extensive commons, in the absence of a coercive state. Observe the main character, and how he is not impressed with modern life. You, clearly, disagree with his assessment, but there you go - you two have subjective value assessments. Of course, as a Rand-roid, you'll claim yours are objectively superior to his, but that's not Austrian. It's Rand-roid.

Then, when you're ready to learn a little more, read "governing the Commons" and read about the many diverse, complicated systems that arose historically to deal with commons problems. Some examples in the book could be classified as coercive or state-like, but in the end, they are only as much so as an An-Cap condominium community.

Then, consider the U.S. north atlantic fishing industry until the 1940s - a non-coercive form of regulating a commons. And one, that I might add, has only been made worse by the coercive government stepping in to try to make private property rights.

Then, travel to Eastern Africa, and observe the horrors caused by socialist governments forcing nomads off of common property to live more "modern" and "productive" lifestyles. View the poverty caused by ignoring the traditional knowledge held by the nomadic cultures involved.

But, hey, you love that grinding poverty caused by socialist coercion, because these people were merely dupes, not smart enough to recognize that you have all the answers and disapprove of their arrangements, and instead needed the benifence of private property forced upon their ignorant lives, right?

Just because people don't share your Rand-roid values does not make them dupes or thieves. And accusing them of being such (or me of being statist) shows more about the consistency of your professed belief in subjective value than anything else.

Published: June 20, 2006 2:01 PM
Kevin Barnett

In response to Keith's "Gilligan's Island" scenario:

As I recall, the shipwrecked victims of the show did not claim the whole island for themselves, nor did they ever fully explore the island. They did claim a portion for housing, etc. It would have been ridiculous for them to force newcomers back to the sea, given the plentiful resources and the fact that they were always whining about how lonely they were. It is hard to imagine anyone wanting to bunk with Gilligan unless you were REALLY lonely.

I think a more suitable situation for you to pose would be one where the survivors never made it to an island but were stuck on a raft at sea with limited food and drink, only to have more survivors swim to the raft.

Although in Gilligan's Island, everyone seemed quite content with Mary-Ann's coconut cream pies and the professor's bamboo/coconut HAM radio sets. The professor even lent his sugarcane ethanol A/C power supply to Ginger so she could use her curling iron once in a while - for a nominal "fee" of course.

Published: June 20, 2006 2:50 PM
RalphBorsodi

Yancey-

Mutualism is based on the principle of reciprocity.

Credit is part of the social commons and the economic interest charged is not privatized.

Published: June 20, 2006 3:14 PM
Yancey Ward

Ralph,

I guess this credit system is another example of the gift economy that Robin Cox was pitching here last week. You guys really, really need a primer on human nature.

Published: June 20, 2006 3:19 PM
Paul Edwards

Quasibill,

“You're going to have to do a little more work on anthropology and history to support your arguments…

“Just as one easily accessible example - go rent "The Gods Must Be Crazy" ... Here is a tribe that exists with extensive commons, in the absence of a coercive state.�?

LOL! That’s good. OK, I am weak in anthropology, I admit, so I am glad that this movie can help me in this area because I have watched it more than once.

For starters, they accept private property do they not? Tell me this: do they believe in self ownership? Did they believe anyone can hit anyone else if they want? If I recall they were libertarians on this count as people had the right not to be hit on the head with a bottle. Secondly, did they own their clothes and the tent? Do you think they would see an invader as justified in taking their clothes and their tent and dousing their fire at night for fun? Do you think they feel they had a right to the food that they collected or if someone took it would it not be theft? I think they believe in property.

But further, if there arose conflict over the scarce resource of animal meat, or land or roots, do you think they would lay down and die, or would they feel justified in defending their means of sustenance. If the former, they will indeed eventually lay down and die. If the latter, they have an implicit belief in property. Their problem is they may not have a sufficiently elaborated theory of property to avoid either extinction or conflict. Property is inherent and necessary in a sustainable culture that wishes to avoid conflict. It is not just my opinion, it is a fact.

“Observe the main character, and how he is not impressed with modern life. You, clearly, disagree with his assessment, but there you go - you two have subjective value assessments. Of course, as a Rand-roid, you'll claim yours are objectively superior to his, but that's not Austrian. It's Rand-roid.�?

quasibill, You’re killing me here. You’re not going to believe this, but I’ve never read Rand; ever; at all. But I’ll take the accusation as intended, LOL. I am not saying I disagree with this tribe’s lifestyle exactly. What I’m saying is they already do and must accept the concept of property; they just don’t apply it in the extensive manner necessary to allow them to survive in the long run, or avoid conflict. They have no objective link to the animals that they hunt, so there can be conflict over their use. If another tribe hunts the animals they hunt, they can expect conflict because there is no objective link to those resources and an owner. It’s not a question of a superior life-style. It’s an objective fact that resources are scarce and there can be conflict over them. It is simply only the institution of private property that allows this conflict to be avoided.

“Then, when you're ready to learn a little more, read "governing the Commons" and read about the many diverse, complicated systems that arose historically to deal with commons problems. Some examples in the book could be classified as coercive or state-like, but in the end, they are only as much so as an An-Cap condominium community.�?

When I’m ready to learn a little more? LOL. You’re knocking me out with all this assistance. You say some examples in the book could be classified as “coercive or state-like�?? I’m sure they could and that many of us would. You say you consider an an-cap condominium community as coercive and state-like? I do believe you would.

Let me skip back to the chase. None of the means you or anyone else will propose will allow for conflict avoidance if they RULE OUT ownership in private property. Private property is necessary for voluntary, conflict free action. You can agree to pool property communally, but at the base of this, there must be an acknowledgement of a right to private property.

“But, hey, you love that grinding poverty caused by socialist coercion, because these people were merely dupes, not smart enough to recognize that you have all the answers and disapprove of their arrangements, and instead needed the benifence of private property forced upon their ignorant lives, right?�?

I don’t think you could misconstrue my position more if you actually made it your objective to do so. Private property is the necessary corollary to liberty. Do you think private property is something that can be coercively inflicted on people? LOL. Free people already believe in private property. Your coke bottle wielding community recognized the need for private property long before the arrival of that bottle. But certainly, they got a taste of what happens when people contest over an “unowned�? valuable and scarce resource. They get conflict. If they avoided this conflict over the bottle by destroying the bottle, conflict must only re-emerge in food, or land or other things eventually. They could have avoided the conflict over the coke bottle, by the way, by assigning ownership of it to the finder. What a drag, huh? But still I liked the movie.

“Just because people don't share your Rand-roid values does not make them dupes or thieves. And accusing them of being such (or me of being statist) shows more about the consistency of your professed belief in subjective value than anything else.�?

Well, I guess I’m arguably too harsh, and I’m sorry about that. But it’s what I believe. The position that private property can be abolished and all can still be well and conflict can still be avoided is simply foolish. I don’t believe that is merely opinion, I think it has been shown to be a fact. But in any event, quasibill, relax; I get carried away. Have you never let your contempt for someone’s position show through?

Published: June 20, 2006 3:26 PM
RalphBorsodi

Yancey-

Mutualist are individualist anarchists and thus believe in markets and money without the benefit of government granted privilege whereas anarcho-communists are collectivist anarchists and therefore don't believe in either markets or exchange (aka gift economy).

Published: June 20, 2006 4:30 PM
quincunx

Ralph, et al. in the mutualist camp

Except that markets are meaningless without stable property rights. In mutalism-land I will not need to save and invest to buy your property - I will just wait till you go to work, or on vacation, or I can just claim your dirty attic/basement.

"Credit is part of the social commons and the economic interest charged is not privatized."

This is another thing that bugs me about mutualists. They are money cranks. They recognize that land is scarce (otherwise who cares how property is appropriated?), but don't extend that principle to everything else. The mutualists are 0% interest rate fetishists.

How can credit be social commons if there exists private property for use? The only way is to not have private property for use in the first place. Which boils down to plain out theft even with property for use. Which is what Yancey, Edwards, & Reisman contend is the actual result of applying mutualist philosophy.

I am simply amazed that people can fall for this mumbo-jumbo, and believe that people will voluntarily engage in trade on a fuzzy notion of property rights amidst hyperinflation.

I'm sure mutualist philosphers have not heard of Gresham's Law, since they persist in thinking that people will voluntarily continue using debased currency.

"Mutualism is based on the principle of reciprocity."

Yeah, indeed. You steal my stuff, I steal your stuff, or I go after another to steal from. The stuff I steal is devalued by another group of thieves printing up certificates of stolen deposit.

@quasibill

"Commons existed in the absence of coercive governments (and in fact, were often seized and "privatized" by coercive governments"

For more information on an AnCap view of the Commons, read: http://mises.org/journals/jls/19_2/19_2_1.pdf

I don't agree with everything in this paper, but It's quite sound.

Published: June 20, 2006 5:11 PM
Kevin Carson

My responses, for anyone interested, can be found here:

There He Goes Again!

Published: June 20, 2006 7:34 PM
Kevin Carson

quincunx,

Re the "money crankery" and "hyperinflation" issues:

I didn't address this in my post, because I wanted to concentrate on Reisman's criticisms and the comments that subsequently developed them.

But you might want to READ what I actually wrote in my rejoinder to Rothbard on that subject before you go any further in characterizing a doctrine you don't really know anything about.

Published: June 20, 2006 11:06 PM
Person

But you might want to READ what I actually wrote in my rejoinder to Rothbard on that subject before you go any further in characterizing a doctrine you don't really know anything about.

Kevin_Carson, considering that until last week, you didn't even realize that one's home would be worthless collateral under your own desired property rules (and thus wouldn't do much for your interest rates), I'd be careful about lecturing someone about critiquing a doctrine from ignorance. And I don't want to be unfair to you: if you can show me some time before June '06 where you recognized that a home is worthless collateral in mutualism, or gave a "failed business" exception to the use-occupancy rule, I'll be glad to admit my error.

And of course, even if there had been some mutualist society, where people did recognize such an exception, and a reasonable number of people (say, 10%) saw their businesses[1] fail and result in eviction, ... why do I get this strange feeling you would characterize their eviction as unjust and some form of "state intervention", despite such a rigid adherence to mutualism? Or worse, what if they had pledged their future labor as collateral (i.e., a practice you fully endorse and would believe would help drive interest rates down significantly) and then their business failed, effectively making them slaves to a bank. You would have nothing negative to say about such an eventuality, right?

[1]I'm of course, referring here to businesses such as manufacturing Playstation 2's by hand from home using your own hand tools, which is obviously only more efficient in a factory today because of state intervention. Okay, maybe not. But just maybe.

Published: June 20, 2006 11:43 PM
Jacob

I do not intend to speak for every 'left' anarchist, but I think most 'left' anarchists and some 'right' anarchists would base ownership claims on similar standards.

Basically, use need not be continuous, but it should be clear. Once one person has clear use, other people should restrict use to either (1) noninterfering use (any use of abandoned goods/land is noninterfering use), (2) negotiated agreements (e.g. sales), (3) common sense (e.g. borrowing a hose to stop a fire), and (4) reciprocity.

Further, if people trust someone's word, they will risk small unenforcible agreements, but if they distrust someone's word, they will not. Finally, if the tuxedo rental, tux rental, etc. is a fee for service, people will give it more respect than if it is a tax on some tenants.

Published: June 21, 2006 12:07 AM
Kevin Carson

Person,

Since I nowhere wrote that homes would be "worthless collateral," in June 2006 or at any other time, my criticism of your reading skills still stands. My comments in my blog post were intended to show how a home *could* serve as collateral consistently with occupancy and use tenure.

Sorry to have disturbed your nap.

Published: June 21, 2006 12:37 AM
quasibill

Paul,

"Tell me this: do they believe in self ownership?"

I would say yes, although they probably wouldn't necessarily class it as such. However, and this is important to me, self-ownership does NOT immediately imply ownership of anything else. You need a philosophical value applied to self-ownership to make the next step. I have that value (my labor is mine, therefore the product of my labor, in general, should be mine). However, it IS a subjective value, not a logical deduction. It is held be a large number of people, so it seems objective, but it isn't, really. In other words, one can believe in self-ownership and logically not believe in physical property outside of it.

"they just don’t apply it in the extensive manner necessary to allow them to survive in the long run, or avoid conflict."

Here's where you get onto shaky ground, due to your lack of historical and anthropological knowledge. Compare the longevity and peacefulness of this tribe to Western Civilization since Locke. If you don't already know the answer, it's going to make your above statement look extremely foolish.

It takes nothing more than a respect for their personal ownership of themselves to respect their claims, which, in fact, are collective in nature, and not private (none of them claim the land they use as personal property, they claim it as a collective).

"You say some examples in the book could be classified as “coercive or state-like�?? I’m sure they could and that many of us would. You say you consider an an-cap condominium community as coercive and state-like? I do believe you would."

You miss the point - these examples are only coercive to the point that people have already agreed to the terms by living there. They are not coerced into staying there. I'm not sure how you could distinguish this from an AnCap condominium that prohibited homosexual lifestyles. This, by the way, is how state-like oorganizations arise in the first place - you get a group of property owners to voluntarily agree to a group of rules that will run with the land, so that all new purchasers of the land will then be subject to the old rules...

"Do you think private property is something that can be coercively inflicted on people? LOL."

Well, since the nomads, like many american indians, believed that the land was owned in common, at least within the tribe, and it took coercive government to break that belief and force them to settle, yes, I would say the available evidence absolutely contradicts your assertion.

Again, be careful conflating realty with personalty.

"If they avoided this conflict over the bottle by destroying the bottle, conflict must only re-emerge in food, or land or other things eventually."

Except they have peacefully avoided such conflict for quite a bit longer than you would like to admit.

"They could have avoided the conflict over the coke bottle, by the way, by assigning ownership of it to the finder. What a drag, huh?"

Not a drag at all. I agree with your preference (despite the fact you keep trying to paint me as a statist or socialist - I actually disagree strongly with some of the basics in Carson's systems - I just admit that, especially with respect to real property, his property rules are logically consistent, and fully capable of working in a voluntary fashion).

"But in any event, quasibill, relax; I get carried away. Have you never let your contempt for someone’s position show through?"

Me? I never get carried away! I am always perfectly in control of my emotions, *&@!
[caught red-handed, the bell ringer slinks away]

Published: June 21, 2006 8:05 AM
RalphBorsodi

Paul,

"Tell me this: do they believe in self-ownership?"

I dare say more so than the Austrians!

Government granted privilege that allows private enclosure of the natural (land) and social commons (credit) violates the self-ownership rights of those being excluded to their wages because it rewards behavior that captures value (rent seeking) rather than creates value (wealth).

The economic term for this is "value from obligation" rather than labor inputs.

The private enclosure creates a legal and monetary obligation on those that are excluded that can only be satisfied by sacrificing their absolute right to the fruits of their labor - hence self-ownership itself.

Published: June 21, 2006 8:46 AM
quincunx

"But you might want to READ what I actually wrote in my rejoinder to Rothbard on that subject before you go any further in characterizing a doctrine you don't really know anything about."

Why don't you argue directly instead of referring to some rejoinder you can't even link.

Maybe I don't know everything about your silly doctrine but when I hear terms like:

Mutualist Bank, Credit belongs to the commons, down with interest, free banking (though not private),

I think: Money Cranks, Hyperinflation, Non-Voluntary.

I maybe wrong, but that is what I hear from your disciples. Maybe they don't get it either.

"I dare say more so than the Austrians!

The private enclosure creates a legal and monetary obligation on those that are excluded that can only be satisfied by sacrificing their absolute right to the fruits of their labor - hence self-ownership itself."

Really? Well then logically, one would have to adopt the ideal Primitivist model where the mere physical existence of a human being prevents another from occupying his space. This individual must be killed, otherwise you can't exercise your self-ownership in standing on his spot.

Published: June 21, 2006 10:47 AM
RalphBorsodi

quincunx,

"...where the mere physical existence of a human being prevents another from occupying his space. This individual must be killed, otherwise you can't exercise your self-ownership in standing on his spot."

All dominion over a specific territory in the plant and animal world is either initiated via force or maintained via force.

Your example would only be true if we were packed in like sardines on the landed surface of the earth.

Published: June 21, 2006 11:57 AM
quincunx

"All dominion over a specific territory in the plant and animal world is either initiated via force or maintained via force."

And yet it is only one iota more extreme than your position.

"Your example would only be true if we were packed in like sardines on the landed surface of the earth."

Well, in that case mutualist property for use is only necessary when we run out of Lockean non-proviso private property. We have not, aside from state appropriation. Eliminate the state, and maybe in a few thousand years the mutualist position will make slightly more sense, assuming we never get off this planet.

Published: June 21, 2006 12:10 PM
Kevin Carson

Quincunx,

Why do YOU express an opinion about the ideas in a piece you haven't read, on the basis of a hostile characterization? Both Reisman's review and my rejoinder are available in pdf format at the JLS site, which you can easily track down from here.

I've got writing commitments of my own, and limited time to hang out in discussion threads. So it seems kind of like spoon-feeding to repeat arguments that someone is too lazy to look up before expressing an opinion on them.

But anyway, here it goes: mutual banking is not based on currency inflation, like greenbackers and other 19th century money cranks who thought a limited supply of currency was the main evil. Mutual banking's main point of criticism is the limited competition among banks in the supply of credit, because of market entry barriers like licensing and capitalization requirements. As I pointed out in my rejoinder to Rothbard and Reisman, Rothbard himself made EXACTLY the same criticism of the life insurance industry, which under state regulations was capitalized far beyond simple actuarial requirements. The idea is that, in the supply of ANY good or service, when you've got licensing and other entry barriers limiting the number of people supplying it, they can charge an artificially high price.

Published: June 21, 2006 12:34 PM
quincunx

"Why do YOU express an opinion about the ideas in a piece you haven't read, on the basis of a hostile characterization? Both Reisman's review and my rejoinder are available in pdf format at the JLS site, which you can easily track down from here."

Actually I have read it, but for some reason thought your off-hand non-linked referral to "Rothbard's rejoinder" was something separate you wrote in the past, something I might have missed (I typically don't remember all subheadings in one paper - which was the case).

"I've got writing commitments of my own, and limited time to hang out in discussion threads. So it seems kind of like spoon-feeding to repeat arguments that someone is too lazy to look up before expressing an opinion on them."

So I take that means you read Reisman's Capitalism in its entirety? Did you skimp through it? Or is your response simply based on what Reisman directed at you?

Please, tell me Mr. Carson, at what point can one express an opinion? When they already agree with you?

By your rules, it seems no one EVER needs to debate anything, afterall, you can just research both sides of the argument and then decide which one is correct. Down with the internet? I suppose.

It's funny that you can post to a thread, and then claim to be too busy to engage in argument. You want a one-way crapshoot, but it doesn't work like that.

"But anyway, here it goes: mutual banking is not based on currency inflation, like greenbackers and other 19th century money cranks who thought a limited supply of currency was the main evil. Mutual banking's main point of criticism is the limited competition among banks in the supply of credit, because of market entry barriers like licensing and capitalization requirements. As I pointed out in my rejoinder to Rothbard and Reisman, Rothbard himself made EXACTLY the same criticism of the life insurance industry, which under state regulations was capitalized far beyond simple actuarial requirements. The idea is that, in the supply of ANY good or service, when you've got licensing and other entry barriers limiting the number of people supplying it, they can charge an artificially high price."

I totally agree with this. My questions are:

You rejoinder to Rothbard, says nothing about whether fractional reserve banking is legitimate or not, what is your opinion on this?

is it OK (in mutualist philosophy) to charge interest on money or not?

If it is OK, why is there a term 'mutual banking' when 'free banking' does the trick? Or a simple elimination of the state would just create 'banks'.

It's sort of like using the term 'mutual car', and being surprised when people mistake it for something else. I don't think there should be regulation on who can make cars, but I wouldn't call this 'mutual car'.

I would think the word 'mutual' sounds awfully close to 'cartel' (mutually beneficial to it's participants & restrictive to competition) as opposed to 'free', therefore I wouldn't use it, unless there something more to 'mutual banking' that I'm missing?

I hope you're not too busy with your writing commitments to answer my simple questions.

Published: June 21, 2006 2:24 PM
Yancey Ward

Kevin Carson,

In your rejoinder to the critiques of your work you wrote that credit would be cheaper and more widely available absent state granted privilege and state created barriers to entry. I find much to agree with what you have written in this regard, and I doubt many here would disagree. However, do you really think the cost of credit would fall to zero? I can think of few human beings that would lend savings for no return.

Published: June 21, 2006 3:52 PM
Paul Edwards

RalphBorsodi,

PE: "Tell me this: do they believe in self-ownership?"

RB: I dare say more so than the Austrians!

Ok, that's a yes, we can agree that far, so do they believe in ownership in the food they put their mouth? Yes, they must. They believe they have the right to the exclusive control over the resource which is food that they put in their mouth to survive. This is the justification of private property. And people who argue at all, presuppose its validity. And this is whether they are consistent enough to recognize this is the case, or not.

I think where we differ is this: i say private property, the homesteading principle, and finally, private contract, are all quite necessary concepts to institute, to allow for the pursuit of peace and the avoidance of conflict. I know it sounds like i am just saying my values are better than someone who disputes me, but i am really trying to say it is a simple fact of life which is necessarily true a-priori.

The other view is that private property is a convention, it is arbitrary, it is ok for some, not ok for those who voluntarily reject it. My response is this: those who reject private property necessarily reject the possibility of conflict avoidance. And for those who value peace, this is not a consistent option. I'm not telling you that you must value the pursuit of peace over conflict; i'm just saying that if you do value peace over conflict, which you demonstrate a preference for incidentally, when arguing, you must necessarily be an advocate of private property, homesteading and contract.

Now this is important, so if you dispute me, include this comment in your argument: what voluntary community/communal non-market arrangements that private property owners wish to participate in, at their own whim is not what I am concerned with. I am merely pointing out that an advocate of peace cannot be an advocate, ever, of the abolition of private property. It is a contradiction. So you can join a commune, give them your possessions, and give them your labor for free in exchange for their agreement to transfer back to your possession, as your property, at an agreed rate, food etc, for you to justifiably consume. You also might contract for (implicitly perhaps) the right of passage out of the commune should you or they decide the arrangement is no good. This agreement is called a contract between free private property owners. But if you value peace, you will not join or endorse a commune that rejects private property outright. The distinction may seem too subtle to matter, but it is very important.

Published: June 21, 2006 4:12 PM
Kevin Carson

Quincunx,

"Or is your response simply based on what Reisman directed at you?"

Yes. I have not read Reisman's capitalism, although I intend to do so. Until I have, I have no comment on it. I comment only on his arguments that I have actually read. If I commented on stuff I hadn't read, I'd have a lot more time to hang out on message boards.

"You rejoinder to Rothbard, says nothing about whether fractional reserve banking is legitimate or not, what is your opinion on this?"

If the bank can find customers using fractional reserve methods, fine. Competition is the way to address all such issues. I'm not for suppressing fractional reserve banking so long as it's willingly agreed to by all parties.

"is it OK (in mutualist philosophy) to charge interest on money or not?"

It's OK in the sense that I certainly wouldn't suppress it. If the lender at interest can find a willing customer, more power to him. I just think that without state-enforced monopoly returns, he'd have a lot harder time finding customers.

There's no cryptic meaning to my choice of the term "mutual banking." That's simply the term that was used by William Greene, one of the early writers on the subject, and I accepted it as the default terminology. But "free banking" is fine.

Yancey,

"However, do you really think the cost of credit would fall to zero? I can think of few human beings that would lend savings for no return."

I don't really disagree. The original idea was that the cost of *secured* loans would fall to zero, because they weren't strictly speaking "loans" in the first place. Unsecured loans would surely carry some risk premium.

David Edwards,

I'm not "Ralph Borsodi," but I'll contribute my $0.02 anyway. I don't think there's anybody that rejects private property in principle, although some collectivist types may reject that terminonolgy. Even in a syndicalist or libertarian communist society, the means of production are in some sense the joint property of individual work collectives. And for mutualists, Lockeans and Georgists, who all believe in market systems of some sort, it goes further than that. We all believe in private property--we just have different rules for establishing who owns it at any particular times. As Nozick said, any private property system must have rules for initial acquisition, transfer, and abandonment. All three private property systems have similar rules for initial acquisition of unowned property, but differ on the other two points.

Published: June 21, 2006 6:42 PM
Person

Kevin_Carson:

Since I nowhere wrote that homes would be "worthless collateral," in June 2006 or at any other time, my criticism of your reading skills still stands. My comments in my blog post were intended to show how a home *could* serve as collateral consistently with occupancy and use tenure.

Yes: your comments did establish that, if you were to fundamentally revise your property theory to say "the user and occupier is always the owner ... well, unless a landlord is evicting him because he failed a business. Then it's okay.", then a home would not be worthless collateral. So that means you are taking the second option, and you believe that some time before June '06, somewhere you outlined this exception to the occupancy and use standard (though it differs from that outlined in Studies in Mutualist Political Economy, which quite clearly maintains that for a landlord to evict the "real" user is an instance of the "land monopoly" and state intervention) and thereby resolved the apparent contradiction in your previous statements.

So, remind me again, where you did that?

Published: June 21, 2006 7:08 PM
RalphBorsodi

Paul,

"I say private property, the homesteading principle, and finally, private contract, are all quite necessary concepts to institute, to allow for the pursuit of peace and the avoidance of conflict"

"an advocate of peace cannot be an advocate, ever, of the abolition of private property. It is a contradiction"

I don't reject private property. I reject homesteading as an act of privilege beyond Locke's proviso because it no longer represents value creation but rather value capture.

The value being captured is the labor products (the basis of property rights) of those being excluded.

So rather than rejecting private property rights I am suggesting that I am for strengthening TRUE property rights and thus self-onwership itself. In fact far stronger than the Austrians!

Published: June 21, 2006 7:32 PM
Kevin Carson

Person,

That "unless a landlord is evicting him" part is something else you hallucinated, I'm afraid. I specified that physically evicting an owner-occupier from the property was the one recouse *not* available in the event of default on a loan. That does not make the pledge of a house "worthless collateral" any more than the absence of debtors' prisons and debt peonage makes a loan contract unenforceable. Seizure of moveable property and assets, and other sanctions short of eviction, *would* be options.

I addressed the question of how a house could be collateral under mutualist property rules at least as early as May 2002 in a Libertarian Alliance Forum yahoogroup discussion on mutual banking and property theory. If it's that big a deal to you, please look it up for yourself.

Published: June 22, 2006 1:00 AM
Paul Edwards

Carson,

“I don't think there's anybody that rejects private property in principle, although some collectivist types may reject that terminonolgy.�?

What is important is not necessarily that we all use the same term “private property�? as much as that we all agree to what the term implies.

“Even in a syndicalist or libertarian communist society, the means of production are in some sense the joint property of individual work collectives.�?

Yes, in some sense, but I hope to establish here a sense that is required to allow us to avoid conflict.

“And for mutualists, Lockeans and Georgists, who all believe in market systems of some sort, it goes further than that. We all believe in private property--we just have different rules for establishing who owns it at any particular times.�?

The goal of private property is to allow conflict avoidance to be possible. My contention is that only one basic set of rules can accomplish this, and it is this set of rules and only this set of rules that we should think of when we mention the terms “private property�?.

“As Nozick said, any private property system must have rules for initial acquisition, transfer, and abandonment. All three private property systems have similar rules for initial acquisition of unowned property, but differ on the other two points.�?

So let me re-iterate what I believe to be the fundamentally necessary framework of property rights to allow for conflict avoidance. A set of norms necessary to allow peaceful and cooperative interaction are

1. self-ownership
2. private property
3. voluntary contract between private property owners
4. homesteading principle

These concepts encompass the anarcho-capitalist system, and are the single basis of conflict-free, cooperative interaction. All other forms of anarchy such as mutualism, communalism, etc, must be derived from A-C through mutually agreed contractual and covenantal agreements, based on these four concepts.

For instance, private property ownership implies freely entered, non-fraudulent rental contracts are naturally allowed. However, voluntary covenantal agreements could be established which would prohibit rental contracts. These agreements would be entered into on the basis of mutually beneficial expectations that the participants, say in a neighborhood would somehow benefit by such an agreement. Say they felt renters would lower the value of the neighborhood or they happened to be a community of mutualists. From that point on, they would be bound by agreement not to rent their property to renters.

Such agreements could be entered into for any number of mutually agreeable restrictions on use of private property, including communal agreements to pool property, etc. But the important thing to understand is that the root set of norms that allow for conflict avoidance remains the A-C set. Baring any contractual or covenantal restrictions to the contrary, this implies that the original appropriator of a resource is and remains the acknowledged owner until he gives the property away, sells it, or abandons it. He inherently, assuming no agreements to the contrary, retains the right to continue to use it, to not use it, or to rent it to another via contractual agreement.

Note though, that certain covenantal agreements are highly unlikely to emerge. For instance, agreements restricting one’s use of their capital, or limiting one’s ability to profit from investments, entrepreneurial enterprises, and capitalistic pursuits. Agreements that are likely to inhibit economic advancement are unlikely, but not necessarily impossible to imagine. But the important point is that they must emerge based on contractual agreements and covenants on the basis of the A-C ethic.

The only inherent restriction on property use under A-C is it may not materially encroach on another’s private property in a coercive or fraudulent manner. All other restrictions which conform to a mutualist ideal, for instance, must be derived from contractual agreement.

Published: June 22, 2006 3:31 AM
Keith Preston

Paul,

Do you believe that a slavery or indentured servitude contract would be enforceable according to an-cap principles? What about a contract between a white slaver and prostitute who is promised subsistence amounts of bread, water and heroin in exchange for turning tricks for perpetuity? What about a contract between two gladiators and an entertainment company to fight to the death on pay-per-view television?

If I recall correctly, J.S. Mill made an argument against the legitimacy or enforceability of these kinds of contracts rooted in something to do with "alienation of the will". If you accept the validity of contracts of this type, fine. If not, how is your rejection of these contracts inherently different from Kevin's approach to contracts for absentee landlordism?

Contracts themselves reflect an adherence to pre-existing sets of principles. As Kevin says, a system of property rights has to have rules determing what is legitimate property and what is not. Likewise, a system of contract enforcement has to have rules determing what is a valid contract and what is not.

If I understand Kevin's position correctly, all he is saying is that a contract for absentee landlordism is not valid because the landlord is not renting legitimate property in the first place according to the rules of property that Kevin would favor. Let's say Neil Armstrong was able to con some sucker into paying rent on a plot of land on the moon where the sucker hoped to build a golf course once commercial space travel became feasible. Neil could justify this by saying he was there first ("homesteading") and mixed the moon with his labor (swinging a golf club). But if he actually tried to collect rent from the sucker, he would be laughed out of court on the grounds that the moon is not his valid property to rent given the established rules of property that courts tend to adhere to.

Published: June 22, 2006 5:00 AM
Peter

A "slavery contract" is not valid under an-cap law. Nor is Armstrong's claim to the entire moon (or probably any of the moon, in fact). So I'm not quite sure what you're driving at (ha ha). [BTW, Neil Armstrong didn't swing a golf club. At least, not on the moon; I don't know whether he played earthbound golf. You're thinking of Alan Shepard.]

Published: June 22, 2006 6:36 AM
TGGP

Here is a very good Walter Block piece against the concept of "inalienability" that justifies voluntary slavery, gladiators, and so on: http://mises.org/journals/jls/17_2/17_2_3.pdf

My problem with it is the sale of moral responsibility. I think it is really owned by everyone EXCEPT Block's seller, and only with all of their consent can it be given away.

Published: June 22, 2006 7:56 AM
Person

Kevin_Carson:

That "unless a landlord is evicting him" part is something else you hallucinated, I'm afraid. I specified that physically evicting an owner-occupier from the property was the one recouse *not* available in the event of default on a loan. That does not make the pledge of a house "worthless collateral" any more than the absence of debtors' prisons and debt peonage makes a loan contract unenforceable.

You're confusing separate issues: 1) Whether a lender would value having a home offered as collateral under mutualist property rules (and thereby revise downward the interest rate at which he would deem the loan worthwhile), and 2) Whether there exist any legal remedies in the even of default, and then, whether 3) the absence of a given legal remedy would lead to no loans ever being offered. I'm only disputing 1) here. Yes, loan contracts are enforcible without debtors' prisons; but nevertheless, if placing someone in a debtors' prison could not possibly happen in the society in which the loan is made, contracting that "I'll submit to a debtor's prison if I can't pay" would indeed be a worthless offer, and would not secure a lower interest rate. Likewise, an unseizeable home is worthless as collateral, even if that person could still get a loan, and even if that person had other collateral. With that in mind:

Seizure of moveable property and assets, and other sanctions short of eviction, *would* be options.

True, but then why the charade? If the occupier has full veto power over his home/land's seizure, and it's other assets that will be seized in default, why is the home even considered in the loan contract? The bank would just ask for the other items as collateral. If on default, the borrower doesn't want to cede those items, but is willing to give up the home, he can just sell the home and pay off the loan. But as long as the borrower can indefinitely thumb his nose at evictors, with full support of the law, yes, the home certainly is worthless as collateral.

I addressed the question of how a house could be collateral under mutualist property rules at least as early as May 2002 in a Libertarian Alliance Forum yahoogroup discussion on mutual banking and property theory.

So, your position is that the proper place to resolve critical contradictions in your philosophy is on an obscure discussion board. That says a lot. I mean, I'll search for it, but let's not pretend it shows your beliefs well-conceived.

Published: June 22, 2006 8:45 AM
Keith Preston

Peter:

"A 'slavery contract' is not valid under an-cap law."

Why not?

"Nor is Armstrong's claim to the entire moon (or probably any of the moon, in fact)."

Why not?

"Neil Armstrong didn't swing a golf club. At least, not on the moon; I don't know whether he played earthbound golf. You're thinking of Alan Shepard."

I stand corrected.

TGGP:

"Here is a very good Walter Block piece against the concept of "inalienability" that justifies voluntary slavery, gladiators,"

That sounds like something Block would write, LOL!
For all I know, Block might be 100% correct if you want to take an-cap contract theory or property theory to its most extravagant extremes. I think this question is a good illustration of the principle of the "tyranny of ideology". There are reasonable exceptions to every rule. That's why most relatively functional legal systems have concepts like "mitigating circumstances", degrees of culpability, provisions for bankruptucy and so on.

"My problem with it is the sale of moral responsibility. I think it is really owned by everyone EXCEPT Block's seller, and only with all of their consent can it be given away."

Well, if I were on an anarchist common law jury, I'd probably just nullify such a contract (like I would nullify a prosecution for firearms posession or drug selling under the present system). Someone who signed such a contract would likely be under extreme duress at the time like a parent desparate to feed their child or a prostitute really strung out on drugs. Even if there was no direct physical coercion like holding a gun to someone's head, I don't know that such an action could reasonable be considered entirely rooted in one's free will, either. There's a such thing as moderation and balancing one's ideological interests with common decency and common sense.

Published: June 22, 2006 9:20 AM
Shawn P. Wilbur

Paul Edwards says: "The goal of private property is to allow conflict avoidance to be possible. My contention is that only one basic set of rules can accomplish this, and it is this set of rules and only this set of rules that we should think of when we mention the terms 'private property.'"

Paul, I won't try to speak for Kevin, but historically the mutualist position grew out of a sense, developed by Proudhon in his memoirs on property and by William B. Greene in his early economic writings, that all of the defenses of "private property" involved some equivocation or self-contradiction. Thus, Proudhon's "property is theft," which means that by its own terms the defense of "private property" involves a violation of the very rights it attempts to assert. In the face of apparently insuperable difficulties in establishing a coherent set of property relations, but still faced with the need to establish "mine and thine," Proudhon at first turns to the notion of "possession" (which most left anarchists take as their starting point), but later turns to an attempt to reconstruct "private property" as he puts it "according to its aims." Mutualist property theory is, thereafter, an attempt to produce a just system out of voluntary agreement. (This is less the case with Tucker, who was a bit unfaithful to his influences, and seems to have fallen back on egoism and faith in market forces, where both his predecessors and more contemporary mutualists seem to take that "mutual" notion a bit more seriously.) I take it that you have more faith in the defensibility of your "private property" system on more than just pragmatic grounds.

Published: June 22, 2006 10:47 AM
Yancey Ward

Kevin Carson,

It sounds to me that the mutualists are attempting to create loans in which no one actively abstains from consuming in the present. If I may, I would like to examine in detail the loan transaction in a mutualist credit house. Any are free to add to or correct my thinking.

Let us suppose that I wish to purchase capital equipment to work for myself in an auto factory. I live in a house on a piece of land. I go to the credit clearing house and obtain 1000 monetary units and pledge the house and the capital equipment I wish to purchase as collateral for the loan that I will pay off in installments over a 10 year period as I sell the cars that are the product of my labor. I take the 1000 monetary units and buy the capital equipment. These monetary units now circulate in the economy as the capital equipment makers buy the things they require to sustain themselves. Over the next 10 years, a portion of my product is used to pay off the loan to the credit clearing house at rate of 100 monetary units/year. At the end of 10 years, the monetary units are no longer circulating and have been retired.

Now with the above outline, I see two possible scenarios: (1) the credit house is a bank in the true sense that savers deposit hard currency that they have not spent, but have earned, and that they contract to allow the bank to loan to me and this would not be inflationary, and I nor no Austrian would have a problem with this (but I don’t think the savers would loan these funds at cost, and the interest charged would not approach zero); or (2) the credit house is not really a bank in the true sense and is simply a monetary-unit creation house and the value of their units is dependent on the acceptability of the units for transaction purposes. If (2) is the case, then, as Rothbard wrote in the essay that was reprinted in the JLS edition discussing your work, people would simply opt to use the hard currencies rather than the bank notes, unless each transaction applies a discount to the bank-notes, since the bank notes are only backed, at a given time, by assets concurrently seized from defauted borrowers.

Scenario (2) certainly seems like monetary-crankism to me, and I have yet to find a mutualist that clearly indicates that scenario (1), rather than (2), is the one he has in mind.

Published: June 22, 2006 11:05 AM
Curt Howland

Person, indeed *you* have to be careful when replying to me, because you have demonstrated a lack of ability to support your assertions when directly questioned on them.

You are correct that I "assume" my ownership of the property, subject as has been pointed out to the rent I pay to the government. You could have politely pointed that out, left it at that, and moved on.

Reading the discussion it's clear that there is far more argument about theory, especially labels, than I have the faculties to discuss.

I'm far more practical than that. The issue of who owns the land has already been thrashed out long before I came along, and I bought property on the assumption and generally agreed upon rules that existed at the time. The rules that I bought under seem the most effective to me, and I voluntarily participated in that purchase.

I like having the "mineral rights" and "water rights". It's not on theory, my reason is purely practical. People here are arguing grand theory about who owned what first. My owning the mineral/water rights reduces the complexity of the problem, it turns it into a practical matter of contract instead of Grand Theory (tm, reg us pat off).

On interest and credit: If it's unfair, then no one will enter into such a contract voluntarily. Since people do enter such contracts voluntarily, it is not the business of anyone else what the rates are (except for the purposes of competition!).

Different cultures are going to have different measures by which "private" property is recognized. Why does this seem like a surprise to folks? Whether it is right or wrong depends only upon coercion, thus the "hitting over the head with a bottle" in _The Gods Must Be Crazy_ is recognized by everyone involved, primitive and modern, as wrong. I also note that the big conflict in _TGMBC_ is not the bottle itself, but that there was only one bottle. Scarcity created a problem for a culture unaccustomed to dealing with that kind of scarcity.

In China, for example, land is not owned by private individuals. It is a commodity owned exclusively by the government, who rents it to whom it wants and takes it back at will. As such, by those rules, I would not buy property.

Published: June 22, 2006 11:56 AM
Vince Daliessio

AA points out a fallacious assumption about land under mutualism;

"As for your shovel, most mutualists don't consider personal, movable possessions as equivalent to real estate in this respect. Your shovel is your shovel. Land is a special case, because it's not a product of labor."

Could be true, in the case of unowned, unhomesteaded land, emphatically NOT true when the land in question has been purchased for dollars earned by the purchaser. The seller has mixed his labor (passive sometimes, usually active by building a house, improving the lot, etc.)

I stipulated that under our current system, no individual really "owns" their land, since their possession is dependent upon continued payment of a property tax, properly called an economic rent.

In other words, you mutualists are arguing for basically the same system we labor under now, except the rents are currently paid to a monopolistic municipal government.

Published: June 22, 2006 12:18 PM
RalphBorsodi

Curt,

"I voluntarily participated in that purchase"

You can choose which landowner to purchase from but you don't have the choice not to purchase (or be gifted) a location to occupy.

Thus, no right of self-ownership is possible.

"In China, for example, land is not owned by private individuals. It is a commodity owned exclusively by the government, who rents it to whom it wants and takes it back at will. As such, by those rules, I would not buy property."

In Hong Kong, they have very strong property rights around long-term leasing of land and the building on the land itself but the state claims the rental value.

Would you participate in Hong Kong?

Published: June 22, 2006 12:20 PM
Vince Daliessio

Further, tying into what Curt Howland said, the price we now pay for land is really only the cost of "improvements" (house, streets, police services, governments, etc)- we truly never own the actual, tangible land. Sounds like we already live under a kind of mutualism - certainly not a great advertisement in its favor.

Again, except for the payment of economic rents to a central local government, how exactly does mutualism differ (other than homesteading - essentially unimportant in most cases) from the sorry system we live under now?

Published: June 22, 2006 12:25 PM
Paul Edwards

Keith,

“Do you believe that a slavery or indentured servitude contract would be enforceable according to an-cap principles?�?

No, I don’t.

“What about a(n) [enforceable] contract between a white slaver and prostitute who is promised subsistence amounts of bread, water and heroin in exchange for turning tricks for perpetuity?�?

No, I don’t.

“What about a(n) [enforceable] contract between two gladiators and an entertainment company to fight to the death on pay-per-view television?�?

No.

“If I recall correctly, J.S. Mill made an argument against the legitimacy or enforceability of these kinds of contracts rooted in something to do with "alienation of the will".�?

I would argue against them on the basis that only costs uncured to the alleged victim claiming damages for the default can be recovered. So if the courts can find no damage, or the damage can be restored with payment, or by resorting to slavery as restitution, or for limited time-duration slavery as restitution, then this is the just result.

“If you accept the validity of contracts of this type, fine. If not, how is your rejection of these contracts inherently different from Kevin's approach to contracts for absentee landlordism?�?

My rejection of it is based on justification of enforcement of the contract, rather than justification of the contract itself. In general, as in the cases you cite, it is the reasonably expected damages inflicted due to default that is the issue, not that there is a contract per se. So if I contract to paint your house for $2000, and you don’t pay me, and I don’t paint your house, you are justified to sue me for any damages you could obviously be expected to incur for the breach, but assuming such a typically simple situation as not getting your house painted by me, there would be no damages and the contract is simply null. If I took your $2000, they you should be able to sue for being swindled, court costs, and either the painting of the house, or your $2000 back.

“Contracts themselves reflect an adherence to pre-existing sets of principles.�?

Contracts presuppose private property ownership of two self-owners who are free to voluntarily contract without fraudulent intent between each other. There is nothing inherently fraudulent about a rental agreement.

“As Kevin says, a system of property rights has to have rules determing what is legitimate property and what is not.�?

The rules are not inherently arbitrary; they must be decided with the fundamental purpose of allowing for conflict avoidance. Only the A-C norms provide for that. They can be modified according to covenantal agreements to suit a community’s taste. But at the root of all such covenants must be the A-C ethic.

“Likewise, a system of contract enforcement has to have rules determing what is a valid contract and what is not.�?

Damages caused by fraud and their restitution are the criterion for contract enforcement. Enforcement is based on restitution.

“If I understand Kevin's position correctly, all he is saying is that a contract for absentee landlordism is not valid because the landlord is not renting legitimate property in the first place according to the rules of property that Kevin would favor.�?

What I’m saying is that it is necessary that a mutualist covenant must be created on top of the A-C ethical framework in order to make the mutualist rules valid. There is nothing inherent about property and contract that naturally renders rental agreements unethical. Therefore, there must be an explicit voluntary agreement between community members that renting one’s property is ruled out.

“Let's say Neil Armstrong was able to con some sucker into paying rent on a plot of land on the moon where the sucker hoped to build a golf course once commercial space travel became feasible. Neil could justify this by saying he was there first ("homesteading") and mixed the moon with his labor (swinging a golf club). But if he actually tried to collect rent from the sucker, he would be laughed out of court on the grounds that the moon is not his valid property to rent given the established rules of property that courts tend to adhere to.�?

The presumption is that Neil does not own the moon or the part that he is attempting to rent out, so it is a good thing that the courts do not honor his fraudulent contract. But let us presume that he does own the property he has contracted to rent out, and the courts agree that he does, and even you and I agree he owns it. In this case, unless he has a contract with his neighbors or someone who could possibly show damages from a breach of this contract that he will not rent out this property, then the only valid ethic is the A-C ethic that says: it’s your property, contract with it as you wish, and this contract shall be enforced accordingly.

Published: June 22, 2006 12:45 PM
Curt Howland

RalphBorsadi, "You can choose which landowner to purchase from but you don't have the choice not to purchase (or be gifted) a location to occupy.
Thus, no right of self-ownership is possible."

Neither did I voluntarily choose not to occupy my mother, nor my family's house, nor the town I was born into.

This is exactly what I was trying to convey about different cultures considering property differently, and also why private property has no context where there is only one individual. Whether Robinson Caruso "owned" the island he occupied is irrelevant, it was not in contention. I like Mr. Kinsella's use of the word "rivalrus" in another discussion, it does indeed give the idea of scarcity a context.

I own myself because I claim to. The culture I live in, through its conventions, allows that claim to be asserted successfully. Whether I own the particular plot of land I live on, or if the state does, or if another individual does, is irrelevant to anything except the ownership of that particular plot of land.

I would do business in HongKong, because I would adapt to the conditions there. I would likely not buy land, because the value of ownership is higher for me than for other people. I have also happily rented both houses and apartments, in different states and countries, none of which caused me to forfeit my self-ownership.

Published: June 22, 2006 1:24 PM
Paul Edwards

Hi Shawn,

“Paul, I won't try to speak for Kevin, but historically the mutualist position grew out of a sense, developed by Proudhon in his memoirs on property and by William B. Greene in his early economic writings, that all of the defenses of "private property" involved some equivocation or self-contradiction.�?

The more variations on the concept of property that diverge from the A-C concept, the more I agree with his impression.

“Thus, Proudhon's "property is theft," which means that by its own terms the defense of "private property" involves a violation of the very rights it attempts to assert.�?

LOL. I’m a simple guy. “Up is down�? and “property is theft�? strike me both the same: as a false stab at being profound. If property is theft, then we should all denounce it right now. But in fact, the concept of theft being bad is derived from the concept that property is just. There is no contradiction in a correct view of property and I think this should become clear to anyone not intent in confusing the issue.

“In the face of apparently insuperable difficulties in establishing a coherent set of property relations, but still faced with the need to establish "mine and thine," Proudhon at first turns to the notion of "possession" (which most left anarchists take as their starting point), but later turns to an attempt to reconstruct "private property" as he puts it "according to its aims."�?

It is far from insuperably difficult to establish a coherent theory of property. It is simple once one puts in the forefront of one’s mind the purpose of property: to allow for conflict avoidance. This clarifies the end, and makes the only feasible means stand out clearly.

“Mutualist property theory is, thereafter, an attempt to produce a just system out of voluntary agreement. (This is less the case with Tucker, who was a bit unfaithful to his influences, and seems to have fallen back on egoism and faith in market forces, where both his predecessors and more contemporary mutualists seem to take that "mutual" notion a bit more seriously.)�?

The A-C ethic: self-ownership, acknowledgement of the homesteading principle and the institution of private property and voluntary contracts between property owners are the root set of norms that accomplish the goal of allowing for peaceful cooperation between men. Together they imply non-aggression.

All others not founded on them will encourage and foster conflict. Mutualist or communal communities can be voluntarily built based on the A-C ethic. But these communities must have the A-C ethic as their foundation. In contrast, the A-C ethic cannot be derived from other ethics because they are more restrictive and preclude certain voluntary and essentially ethical activities such as rental agreements.

“I take it that you have more faith in the defensibility of your "private property" system on more than just pragmatic grounds.�?

I do. I claim that the A-C ethic and only the A-C ethic is irrefutably correct, based on praxeological reasoning. The defense of it was first provided by Hans Hoppe several years ago. I recommend giving it a read. Google Hoppe Argumentation ethics.

Published: June 22, 2006 1:33 PM
Kevin Carson

Person,

I've made all the substantive arguments about houses as collateral for mutual banking, RIGHT HERE ON THIS THREAD. There is nothing significant on this subject in my debates in the libertarian alliance forum that I haven't already repeated here.

You're the one who seems to place such great importance on whether or not I discussed it in the past, and how it affects your tactical position in this argument. You've also displayed a fondness for claiming that others who make an assertion have the burden of proof for backing it up. So if you wanna play "gotcha," and think whether or not I discussed something before is so important, do the digging for yourself. Now you expect me to do your homework for you. I don't think it's that important.

I'm making the arguments here and now, and you seem more obsessed with when I first made them than you do with actually addressing their substance. Arguing with you is really *weird*. For you, apparently, anyone you argue with is supposed to make the effort to repeat everything in the context of this aging comment thread, so you don't have the burden of looking anything up for yourself. You get to make assertions about who said what, and when, and push the work of digging up the evidence on others. At the same time, you get to make statements about what I wrote based entirely on a hostile review, without bothering to read the original material for yourself. In short a debate between you and anyone else requires effort mainly from the other person. Could it be that you're just *lazy*?

Paul Edwards,

On property rules, I take nearly the opposite position: more than one system is possible, and so long as they're enforced consistently, several are viable as alternate bases for a free market order. There is no one set of property rules that can be logically deduced from self-ownership.

Yancey,

The point is that a secured loan is not really a "loan" at all. The owner made the abstention from consumption in accumulating it in the first place--buying moveable goods, building a house, whatever. He's actually monetizing his own accumulated past labor. I agree that, when there's no collateral--when it's a genuine loan--there will likely be some interest.

Published: June 22, 2006 2:19 PM
quasibill

"emphatically NOT true when the land in question has been purchased for dollars earned by the purchaser"

So, if I buy the moon from Neil Armstrong for $100.00, I have good title to the moon?

It seems you're conflating two issues. For the mutualist, if the seller hasn't mixed his labor with the real estate, but merely held paper title create by the state, he doesn't own good title to sell to you. If he has mixed his labor, he has good title to sell to you.

And it seems pretty strange to claim that you have purchased better title than the seller actually possessed.

Just to be clear, I don't agree with the rule that Carson proposes. I think that there is some usefulness involved with holding non-homesteaded land - say, like a nature lover who wants a game preserve. That's just one of my objections. But it is foolish to claim that there is no rational basis for treating realty differently from personalty. There certainly is, which is why the common law did just that. It's rational to argue that you don't think they should be treated differently, too. Just not so well-supported by the historical record.

Published: June 22, 2006 2:39 PM
Yancey Ward

Kevin,

The funds (final consumer goods, like food, electricity etc.) to sustain the capital equipment makers has to come from someone. If I am not funding it from my savings, then it has to be funded in some way. My house, if I really wish to monetize it in the manner you describe, would have to be sold, not used as security in a loan agreement. In other words, my abstentions in the past funded the building of the house, and cannot be used to fund the building of the capital equipment of today. It would be the purchaser of my house that would be supplying the savings, and if I have not really sold my house, then whoever lends me the money is the one supplying the savings, and he is only doing under the condition that I pay him back in kind, and would almost certainly demand interest for his forbearance.

Taking your argument, I would have conclude that the mutualist bank is of the type (2) I described above, and in a free society, its notes would be worthless.

Published: June 22, 2006 3:21 PM
RalphBorsodi

Curt,

"Neither did I voluntarily choose not to occupy my mother, nor my family's house, nor the town I was born into"

Your parents have a positive legal obligation to provide your sustenance for you. One of those necessities being housing which is attached to land.

Do you not recognize that because being alive means occupying 3D space (simultaneously) that it is vastly different than the necessities to continue living that are all the result of human labor (the basis of property rights)?

Where can you stand unencumbered after emancipation to excercise your right of self-ownership?

How is a town any different than a landowner?

(hint: it isn't)

"I own myself because I claim to. The culture I live in, through its conventions, allows that claim to be asserted successfully. Whether I own the particular plot of land I live on, or if the state does, or if another individual does, is irrelevant to anything except the ownership of that particular plot of land."

How can you own yourself if someone other than you has a legal and monetary claim on your wages so you can occupy "their" location?

Published: June 22, 2006 3:23 PM
Vince Daliessio

Ralph asks;

"How can you own yourself if someone other than you has a legal and monetary claim on your wages so you can occupy "their" location?"

They don't. All the particular holder of the land you occupy can do is ask you to pay rent or git on down the road. There are an almost infinite number of other holders of property who will provide you with a space in which to stand at some price. If it is mutually agreeable, you have a place. It in no instance is equal to a claim on your wages unless you sign a lease to that effect (and you would be stupid to do so).

If for some reason you are such an objectionable or hideous creature that no landholder wishes to provide you with space at any price, there are vast unowned tracts of land that are immorally claimed by various governments. plus the vast unowned oceans, lakes, and rivers.

Bottom line is, the argument is spurious, and holding land creates no claim on wages. And most rent or mortgage paid by most people is not for existence-level space, but for a space that is at some premium due to location, location, location. This premium is created by the effort (labor) of others mixed with land. You shouldn't expect to gain this value premium for free.

Published: June 22, 2006 4:19 PM
Curt Howland

Your parents have a positive legal obligation to provide your sustenance for you.
I couldn't disagree more. I also couldn't object more, since positive legal obligations are an abomination, a source of endless abuse, and have nothing to do with freedom.
My parents took on a voluntary task, they could have unvolunteered at any time. I signed no contract.
Do you not recognize that because being alive means occupying 3D space (simultaneously) that it is vastly different than the necessities to continue living that are all the result of human labor (the basis of property rights)?
Everyone occupies a finite quantity of space, so it cancels out.
If I don't produce, I starve. That is my decision to make regardless of the social context. Is this what you mean by "necessities...are...the result of human labor"?
How is a town any different than a landowner?
A town is an artificial entity which exists by coercion, a vampire extracting its tithe by taxation. A town as a legal entity, by definition, has no more right to its existence than a cockroach. The sooner squashed, the better.

Published: June 22, 2006 4:36 PM
Paul Edwards

Carson,

“There is no one set of property rules that can be logically deduced from self-ownership.�?

I don’t know what can be deduced from self-ownership. But when it comes to allowing for the possibility of avoiding conflict due to scarcity of resources, there is only one deducible and justifiable set of basic ethical norms and they are the libertarian A-C norms.

Published: June 22, 2006 4:37 PM
Paul Edwards

Curt,

RalphBorsodi: “Your parents have a positive legal obligation to provide your sustenance for you.�?

Curt: “I couldn't disagree more. I also couldn't object more, since positive legal obligations are an abomination, a source of endless abuse, and have nothing to do with freedom.�?

Stephan Kinsella presented an idea I hadn’t thought of that appealed to me regarding positive obligations that parents might have towards their children. It goes something like this, although i may not do it justice: If you perform an act that one could reasonably expect would put someone in a position to depend on you for their survival, you have obliged yourself to help them survive.

As an example, if you bump someone off the wharf and into the water, and find they can't swim. You are obligated to try to save their life. There is no contract, and it may have been an accident; but you bumped them off, and now they are drowning. You are obligated to try to pull them out or keep them alive. You're not just being a nice guy.

Another example is the plane owner inviting someone for a ride on this plane. This owner has taken on the obligation to get his guest off the plane safely, not at 30,000 feet with no parachute.

Similarly, the argument goes: if you have a kid, you knew he'd be dependent on you. Your minimum obligation is to keep him cared for until you can find someone willing to take over for you. Baring that, you've obligated yourself to several years of caring for a child.

Published: June 22, 2006 4:56 PM
Curt Howland

Paul, I'm not sure I would put childbearing and "negligence" into the same category. :^)

From a moral, ethical, even practical position I agree with you. Any child I create I very much feel an "obligation" toward. However, a legal obligation? Makes abortion look like a great idea.

However, bumping someone off the wharf is negligence. An "accident". There's even greater obligation morally speaking for a child since it's really really hard to create a baby without deliberately trying.

I simply object to a legal obligation, no matter how much I may poo-poo someone who abandons a child.

Published: June 22, 2006 6:18 PM
Paul Edwards

Curt,

“Paul, I'm not sure I would put childbearing and "negligence" into the same category. :^)�?

For some, I think the former amounts pretty much to the latter. But that is another discussion altogether. :)

“From a moral, ethical, even practical position I agree with you. Any child I create I very much feel an "obligation" toward. However, a legal obligation? Makes abortion look like a great idea.�?

It is actually the ethical angle from which I am approaching the question. The focal point is in the placing of a person in a position to depend on you for survival. Whether you do it through negligence, or by knowingly participating in an act that could potentially lead to this result, it doesn’t matter which, it is your act that obligates you. It is not the same as a parasite or leach attaching himself to you. It is a result of your action that creates their need for your assistance.

So I would argue your intuitive feeling of an obligation towards your children is also in accordance with the libertarian ethic.

“However, bumping someone off the wharf is negligence. An "accident". There's even greater obligation morally speaking for a child since it's really really hard to create a baby without deliberately trying.�?

Just so I’m clear on your view, do you think there is an ethical obligation to save the drowning man you bumped into the water? To me, if there is an ethical obligation, forceful retribution for not fulfilling it is justified.

“I simply object to a legal obligation, no matter how much I may poo-poo someone who abandons a child.�?

Just to be sure I’m clear, do you dispute the ethical obligation to the child, and if so, that would mean you feel a private court should not hold you accountable to such an ethical obligation?

I once held the Rothbardian position myself not that long ago, based on the parasites can’t ethically force me to support them premise. And yet, like you, the thought of allowing a child to die seemed outrageously morally reprehensible. But I now hold the view that there can be no justification in allowing a baby to die. The parent, not the child, has put the parent in the position to be obligated to the child, and must at least take care of the child while finding someone else to care for and adopt the child.

Published: June 22, 2006 6:51 PM
Curt Howland

Paul, just to make absolutely clear: I feel an obligation toward those folks, be it negligence or giving in to the heat of the moment.

What I do not like is forcing my feelings on others. Just because I feel that way, does it mean I can impose my feelings on third parties, that they must live as I live?

No matter how ethically clear it may seem, I try very hard not to set any limits in stone lest they be used against me in the future (such as search and seasure, with a court order, so the government sets up a special secret court that almost never turns them down).

One of the reasons that I prefer civil to criminal courts is because every case is considered separately.

Published: June 22, 2006 7:02 PM
Paul Edwards

Curt,

Slow down a bit, you’re leaving me behind. Let me catch up. :)

“What I do not like is forcing my feelings on others. Just because I feel that way, does it mean I can impose my feelings on third parties, that they must live as I live?�?

I think we’re not connecting. We don’t consider disallowing murder and theft to be forcing our feelings on third parties do we? What we, as peace-loving people do rather, is through logical argumentation, and proposition making attempt to come up with justifiable norms that allow peaceful cooperation and avoidance of conflict, etc etc, in a world of scarce and valuable resources. Upon enough debate, we do come up with the libertarian non-aggression axiom, and a set of rules consistent with and implied by this axiom.

From this line of thinking, we come up with, for instance that theft, murder, aggression, coercion, torture etc are all unjustified and are ruled out of court. The question we are discussing is how, if at all, does caring for a child fit into all of this. What I’m saying is, by my analysis, I think I am showing that just as theft is unjustified, so is allowing ones child to die of neglect also unjustified. I am not saying it is just immoral like an extramarital affair might be viewed and should therefore be considered illegal. I’m saying from a libertarian perspective, child neglect causing death or torture is unjustified. And I think I can come to this conclusion with help from the insight that Kinsella provided.

“No matter how ethically clear it may seem, I try very hard not to set any limits in stone lest they be used against me in the future (such as search and seasure, with a court order, so the government sets up a special secret court that almost never turns them down).�?

So all I’m saying is we agree theft is unjustified and don’t mind saying so, it appears also that, so is child neglect similarly unjustified.

“One of the reasons that I prefer civil to criminal courts is because every case is considered separately.�?

On this question I’m pretty ignorant.

Published: June 22, 2006 7:42 PM
Curt Howland

"We don’t consider disallowing murder and theft to be forcing our feelings on third parties do we?"

While I also consider these things wrong, I don't think prior restraint is a good thing.

And if that again sounds like something completely unrelated, I will gladly blame the hour and the lack of sleep, and bid the discussion a good night.

Published: June 22, 2006 10:57 PM
Keith Preston

Here's a question I want to throw out and see what anyone here has to say about it:

It's obvious that those of use who have been participating in this thread disagree considerably among ourselves, even to the point of hostility. That's in spite of the fact that all of us probably think of ourselves as "anarchists" or "libertarians" of some denomination. And it's also in spite of the fact that at least some of us have spent years studying anarchist and libertarian political philosophy and theory. So the question is: What are the implications of this for the broader society at large or a future libertarian nation or civilization?

Let's say Paul, Curt, Person, Quasibill, Kevin, myself and others here are appointed to the Supreme Council of the Anarchist Peoples' Common Law Court for the sake of revising property and contract law. There would be just as many divisions as there would be on any statist court like (like the USSC). Probably more.

The above exchanges between Curt and Paul over child support law is interesting. This is yet another area where libertarians, even the most hard-core libertarians, disagree. Would there not be a need for maintaining a means of reconciling these differences in a libertarian meta-system? And what about "irreconcilable differences"? It seems to me the only possible solutions are either decentralism, separatism and mutual self-segregation or pluralism and polycentrism. What about disagreements between contending libertarian courts over an issue like child support? Would not a third court need to be called in as an arbiter? If so, how is this different from the way conflicts between contending parties are played out in a more conventional legistlative or judicial process? And does this not blur the distinction between "anarchist" and "minarchist" versions of libertarianism a bit?

Just some thoughts.

Published: June 23, 2006 8:35 AM
Roger M

Keith, Interesting thoughts about how anarchism would hand disputes.

Published: June 23, 2006 9:00 AM
Vince Daliessio

Keith asks;

"What about disagreements between contending libertarian courts over an issue like child support? Would not a third court need to be called in as an arbiter?"

Since marriage would be privatized in a full anarchist society, the disposition of custody would be a matter for inclusion into the marriage contract. Those who did not marry but had children anyway would find themselves in the quandary you propose above, but so what? Very quickly people would figure out that a good marriage contract would be an easier and cheaper way to guarantee parental rights, AND support the welfare of children - certainly far superior to the tripartite, terms-undefined state marriage contract / social welfare system we have now.

Published: June 23, 2006 9:50 AM
quasibill

"Very quickly people would figure out that a good marriage contract would be an easier and cheaper way to guarantee parental rights, AND support the welfare of children - certainly far superior to the tripartite, terms-undefined state marriage contract / social welfare system we have now."

Cue smoky bar scene. After his 5th drink, and perhaps some "green", Stud Muffin approaches Kitten and buys her a drink. After the couple hit it off (meanwhile imbibing quite a bit more), Stud asks Kitten if she'd like to go somewhere more private, to which Kitten responds by tapping the well dressed man next to her at the bar, conspicuously drinking only diet sodas "Larry, I need you to knock out a pre-nup agreement with Stud's lawyer in the next 30 minutes before we leave the bar..."

Not every decision is made with consequences fully in mind. I think this arena is especially subject to irrational and spur of the moment decisions, especially among the young. You have to have some default rules in place where the parties don't have an explicit contract dealing with every conceivable issue. These default rules are the kinds of things Keith is talking about having to have mediated between "FemPower, Inc." and "Libertine Associates".

Published: June 23, 2006 10:23 AM
Vince Daliessio

Quasibill said;

"Not every decision is made with consequences fully in mind. I think this arena is especially subject to irrational and spur of the moment decisions, especially among the young. You have to have some default rules in place where the parties don't have an explicit contract dealing with every conceivable issue."

You are perhaps forgetting the term "moral hazard". The current dual / monopolistic system of state marriage and state welfare, being the default system, supports the type of irresponsible behavior you posit.

And if you are not one of the people who quickly "get the picture" in a privatized system, you will have to deal with the consequences, including being lawyered into the poorhouse.

That does NOT create a financial / government obligation on the part of the rest of the public, nor a claim on their income, both features of the current system. The stubborn few who will not get the picture no matter what will be amply served by private charity.

But more to the point, why should I even have to make the utilitarian case? Austrian economics, though profoundly utilitarian, is supposed to be value-free.

We who believe Mises and Rothbard were onto something also largely believe the moral nature of anarchocapitalism is sufficient, and do not need a utility justification for it.Which is why I think the overemphasis of some on the "dilemma" of unwanted children is a largely misplaced concern.

I think Rothbard MEANT to say (or should have - it would have been perfectly consistent) not that there would (or should) be a large class of abused, exploited children; he failed, also, to point out that the CURRENT system has resulted in exactly that, and that an Austrian or an anarcho-capitalist order would reduce or largely eliminate that. Children would have increased social value under an anarchist or voluntary order. Trying to achieve this by some kind of force is like pushing a rope, in Eisenhower's phrase.

Published: June 23, 2006 11:14 AM
quasibill

Vince,

Again I agree, but I think you're missing how thinks play out in reality. Even in a Rothbardian AnCap insurance provider scenario, people are going to buy "package deals" of laws, and that create default rules governing certain situations. Child support would likely be one - many people believe, like Curt, that there is an obligation on the part of parents to take care of their children, at least until they have successfully transferred custody to another person. The true outlier, who doesn't belong to any insurance scheme will be immune to such rules, of course, but I would posit that large parts of most communities will agree to certain basic default rules, based upon their values.

I'm not arguing about creating state incentives (or even a state!) - but to think that 16-26 year olds are going to keep their pants on, and/or have pre-nups with them when out clubbing, is being a little naive to me. There will be default rules of who is liable for what outcome, just like the common law evolved governing contracts, because even the most diligent person can't foresee every possible future occurrence and explicitly contract for it.

Published: June 23, 2006 12:25 PM
Paul Edwards

Keith,

“It's obvious that those of use who have been participating in this thread disagree considerably among ourselves, even to the point of hostility…. What are the implications of this for the broader society at large or a future libertarian nation or civilization?

Great question.

“Let's say Paul, Curt, Person, Quasibill, Kevin, myself and others here are appointed to the Supreme Council of the Anarchist Peoples' Common Law Court for the sake of revising property and contract law.�?

Let me reformulate a bit because, at least at the outset, there is going to be no appointing to a supreme council, but rather completely voluntary offerings of such services. I presume the reason we have chosen anarchy here is to avoid state-like institutions.

So in this case, let’s say we each go into the business of offering court and protection services in conjunction with insurance. I would offer libertarian A-C court services that acknowledged the basic libertarian norms: self-ownership, homesteading, private property and contracts which implicitly included rental, lending and employment contracts. This would be the plain Jane non-aggression kind of court. Someone else might offer a mutualist variation that excluded the ability to enter into land rental agreements. Someone else might offer similar services but stipulate that they do not acknowledge lending and borrowing contracts. Another could offer courts that stipulate that employer/employee contracts are not enforced. Still others would stipulate that it is ok to employ people as long as one doesn’t earn a profit in the process which is a crime.

My thinking is this: only the first, the A-C courts would be popular to court and protection consumers, and so only it would prosper and by economic law, in the long run, would become what is supplied also by my competition. The others would either find small niche markets, or just die.

Capitalists and employees, lenders and borrowers, landlords and renters would like the A-C services, and they would be dubious of the odd and unnatural seeming restrictions offered by the competition. On the other hand, mutualists could be very happy also with the A-C services as they could quite legitimately enter into mutualist or communal covenants which would be enforced with enthusiasm by the A-C courts because this court recognizes contract, while never ignoring private property as the foundation of these agreements. The market would decide, and the state never rears its ugly head.

“There would be just as many divisions as there would be on any statist court like (like the USSC). Probably more.�?

I think, because of human nature, the market would settle on a particular norm, the libertarian ethic; the one that strikes the most people as inherently just.

“The above exchanges between Curt and Paul over child support law is interesting. This is yet another area where libertarians, even the most hard-core libertarians, disagree. Would there not be a need for maintaining a means of reconciling these differences in a libertarian meta-system? And what about "irreconcilable differences"? It seems to me the only possible solutions are either decentralism, separatism and mutual self-segregation or pluralism and polycentrism.�?

Let’s say my court said that having a child implied the obligation to care for the child until an alternate guardian could be found. And although this view was popular, there was a competing popular court that said the child had no right to expect to survive if the parent chose to neglect the child. Then, there would be required a final arbitration from a third court to make the final call that was on the arbitration list of both courts. In these sticky cases, it could go either way.

“What about disagreements between contending libertarian courts over an issue like child support? Would not a third court need to be called in as an arbiter? If so, how is this different from the way conflicts between contending parties are played out in a more conventional legistlative or judicial process?�?

It’s different because it is voluntary. Everyone involved is in agreement in advance of the process and the arbitrator’s decision.

“And does this not blur the distinction between "anarchist" and "minarchist" versions of libertarianism a bit?�?

Anarchists are very keen on law and order, courts, enforcement, restitution. It’s just that all this can and should be provided without a state via a free market. They are against coercive monopolies of any sort.

Published: June 23, 2006 12:27 PM
Vince Daliessio

Quasibill said;

"There will be default rules of who is liable for what outcome, just like the common law evolved governing contracts, because even the most diligent person can't foresee every possible future occurrence and explicitly contract for it."

But it seems like you are implying a need for someone to enforce such rules, outside of a spontaneous order or voluntary protection agency.

The value of a private contract in a voluntary society is that the final arbiter of all disputes will be specified, that there will be no appeals to authority, and that this will be self-policing since remedies will be restricted to those specified, and remedies that impinge upon self-ownership not enforceable.

Will this mean some retrenchment or cooling of, say, the extension of unsecured credit to individuals? Sure - but wouldn't that be a "good" outcome?

Published: June 23, 2006 12:49 PM
Curt Howland

many people believe, like Curt, that there is an obligation on the part of parents to take care of their children, at least until they have successfully transferred custody to another person.
Ah! I said I believe there to be a moral obligation, in part because I accept such an obligation myself for my own offspring. I object to there being enshrined any kind of *legal* obligation.
I also agree with Vince that there would be a serious shaking out period if government were to bow-out. Not violent, or at least no more violent than the combination of criminals with and without badges that we have now, just the final recognition that people who cannot take care of themselves (or find someone to voluntarily do so) will get into trouble.
Even though this same argument, "falling through the cracks", is used to justify the entire welfare state, the number who actually do will be quite small as all that mental energy spent figuring out how to milk the system is directed instead to creating wealth.

Published: June 23, 2006 1:13 PM
quasibill

"But it seems like you are implying a need for someone to enforce such rules, outside of a spontaneous order or voluntary protection agency. "

Dear God, no. I'm merely making the argument that there will be default rules governing certain aspects of behavior, and that in many, if not all instances, these rules will be arbitrary. As people keep pointing out, the classic hypo is infidelity between Garcia's Commune and the New Faith Covenant agencies. There is no objectively right answer which one is right, and I don't have the Randian faith that some do that all people will come to have the same values and beliefs, and therefore uniform legal systems, if only the state were removed. So there will still be disputes, and in these disputes, one of the people ostensibly won't get the result they contracted for.

Further, a truism about contracts is that even the best drafter can't foresee all possible issues, and even more true that even if you can, you don't always have the time or inclination to spell them all out in an explicit contract. People will agree to certain default rules that govern "handshake" deals, just as a matter decreasing transaction costs. However, as noted above, the default rules may themselves be different, which will lead to a conflict.

My personal feeling is that people won't get too involved with all the intimate details of their legal provider - they're going to make decisions based upon a few salient points seen in the context of an overarching philosophy followed by the provider. So some will prefer the Hoppe Agency, while some will prefer the libertine agency, and still others will prefer, as one example, sharia law agency. The agencies will have pressures to make their packages uniform to a great extent, for marketing and branding purposes.

So I don't see all this legal negotiation on every aspect of daily life - people don't work like that, in my experience. The opportunity costs will be too high.

Published: June 23, 2006 1:15 PM
quasibill

Curt,

But the question is - in a free market, would choose legal provider A, which has as a rule that a parent has a legal obligation to support their child until maturity or transfer of custody; or B, which rules that parents can safely neglect their children with no legal repercussions?

You won't be imposing a legal obligation on someone else by going with A - it will only be voluntary by those who subscribe to it. But it seems to me to be a moral failure to subscribe to B when you believe that there is a moral obligation. And I'm not very religious, so I would assume that there are people who will be even more strongly inclined to have this duty codified into law.

Published: June 23, 2006 1:48 PM
Devon

While the mutualist position is flawed, I wouldn't be too hard on them. Mutualism is a bridge to anarcho-capitalism. Anarchists who start out as communists realize how patently absurd it is, then move to mutualism hoping to hang on to a shred of anti-capitalism even though the mutualists support markets. Eventually, the mutualist realizes the "occupancy and use" thing doesn't make much sense and the labor theory of value is flawed. From that point they either accept anarcho-capitalism or they sit in bafflement wondering what philosophy is available for them that will allow them to label themselves anti-capitalists and anarchists at the same time (a contradiction).

Published: June 26, 2006 2:31 PM
Curt Howland

But the question is - in a free market, would choose legal provider A, which has as a rule that a parent has a legal obligation to support their child until maturity or transfer of custody; or B, which rules that parents can safely neglect their children with no legal repercussions?
Exactly. The only people who would choose B are the ones who already ascribe to that philosophy.
But under a non-free market in governance, such a "moral majority" gets to impose its opinions on others by force of law. It is the very nature of pre-emptive law enforcement, especially in a "democracy", that the minority views get squashed. By law.
I lean very much to the an-archist side of this libertarian thing. I don't even want laws I think are a good idea.

Published: June 26, 2006 3:22 PM
Devon

Mutualism does not allow parks. Mutualists would not allow a generous individual to purchase land from, say, a farmer, and then convert it into a open space for all humanity to enjoy for recreation, picnics, etc. This is because anyone could legally come along and start bulldozing it up and build anything they want on it. Of course, they couldn't kick people off who were having a picnic, but they could work around them. If they wanted to destroy the whole park, they could simply come in the middle of the night when no one was using it. Mutualism is definitely not the philosophy for anyone that likes parks.

Published: June 26, 2006 11:07 PM
anon coward

Curt Howland said: "I don't even want laws I think are a good idea."

I'd say you haven't much regard for good ideas whether or not they are codified as law.

Fortunately, there are lots of people with sticks and guns to keep you from enforcing your "law of no laws" on the rest of us.

Published: June 28, 2006 7:29 PM
Jay

If you look historically anarcho socialists were the first to use the term libertarian. Libertarianism simply refers to anyone who opposes government coercion and also supports the maximization of freedom. Neither socialism nor capitalism are inherently opposed to libertarianism. Unfortunately groups like the Libertarian Party, USA have attempted to hijack the term and say it only applies to Libertarian Capitalists.
Mutualism by definition is voluntary and thus there can be no force by Government to impose anything. Yet, you seem to imply that the government should by force protect a large landowner who hordes land to the determent of others. Even within our current legal system we have adverse possession laws which allows people to acquire unused land by landowners via adversely possessing it. So the concept is not foreign.
Mutualism is the perfect solution to capitalism vs. communism because it provides for a voluntary, free market economy that respects private property for personal use, like capitalism, but avoids much of the concentration of wealth in the hands of just a few. Like communism it is inherently more democratic, but unlike communism it doesn't totally put the individual at the will of the majority. Mutualism supports cooperatives in large industries over that of the corporation. Cooperatives are owned by member workers rather than shareholders. Thus wealth is more equally shared by all and those that do the labor within the industry are given a voice.

Published: September 13, 2009 10:47 PM

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