What Is A Priori Science, and Why Does Economics Qualify As One?
There is nothing magical or mysterious about the a priori foundations of economics, or at least nothing any more magical or mysterious than there is about our ability to comprehend any other aspect of reality. All of our knowledge ultimately is grounded on our intuitive recognition of the truth when we see it. FULL ARTICLE
Comments (58)
Roger M
Very good explanation. It reminds me of the rule "correlation does not equal causation" in statistics. Still, people violate that rule constantly. Sound theory must precede any statistical analysis. I took a class in structural equation modeling once and learned some sophisticated tools for adjusting models. But research had shown that those tools usually produced very poor results. Then the text emphasized that sound theory is a better guide to adjusting the model than are statistical techniques. Statistics shouldn't be used to create theory, but to support and refine it.
Published: February 9, 2006 9:42 AM
Don Beezley
Good piece. Of course "365 - 1 = 364" means nothing if you don't have a conceptual understanding (quuantities, labels on those quanties, etc.) of the numbering system that underlies it. Without that, it is an isolated concrete of no value and, in fact, doesn't seem reasonable at all on the face of it--they are just meaningless squiggles on a piece of paper.
Published: February 9, 2006 9:56 AM
billwald
Mises assumed that people make rational economic decisions, yes? There is no evidence that is true. Years ago Michael Harrington described the social/economic situation in terms of "event horizon." People can't plan for the future if they can't visualize themselves existing in the future.
Published: February 9, 2006 11:09 AM
Paul Edwards
billwald,
Actually, i think he argued that even the insane ACT. By this, he would mean that regardless of how odd the ends chosen were, and/or how inappropriate the means to achieve these ends, the human, including the insane, always acts.
Action is the purposeful applying of means towards ends perceived by the actor to optimize his future state. It doesn't have to seem rational to anyone else, yet we can know at some level it always is.
As for the time or event horizon, it is true that people plan less into the distant future than they might. But they compensate for this by planning more into the near future, i.e. what tv sitcom will they watch tonight, planning this weekend's beer party etc. It's all action.
Published: February 9, 2006 11:43 AM
Yancey Ward
Billwald,
Mises only assmumes people act so as to pursue their goals. These goals only have to be rational to those who pursue them, and since you cannot get into anyone else's mind, it is inappropriate to gainsay them unless the pursuit has violated the rights of someone else.
At least that is my take.
Published: February 9, 2006 12:06 PM
Curt Howland
Billwald, examine the statements by Mises and you will see that he qualifies the statement "humans act so as to reduce their unease", often saying "as perceived at the moment the decision is made", "subjective", and the like.
I don't recall ever seeing any statement that someone always makes objectively positive decisions, or that it is even possible to do so. Second guessing and 20/20 hindsight, for example, are consistant across time and cultures.
The fundamental axiom of the critique of socialism is the fact that a central planner cannot have sufficient knowledge to choose more efficiently than the myriad individuals at the moment.
Often the entrepreneur is expressed as someone who "guesses better at future outcomes than others." How could someone say "guess" and then be construed to be saying that someone always makes objectively rational decisions?
Lastly, there is this statement: "The free market tends toward efficiency." If all decisions were rational, it would not be "tends" at all. It would be absolute and specific, as efficient as possible at every given moment. But humans are not always objectively rational. I'm sure that everyone here would be able to advise me on what I should be doing with my life, rather than posting here, each one convinced that their choice is more objectively rational than mine.
Published: February 9, 2006 2:14 PM
Paul D
A priori reasoning also leads Austrians to certain conclusions, does it not? After all, it is a fact established through reasoning and confirmed by observation that if you raise the price of a good and its value remains the same, demand will fall. Et cetera…
Published: February 10, 2006 5:31 AM
Vince Daliessio
Curt,
You are correct - humans as individuals do not always make rational choices. Even the successful entrepreneur making his guesses does not always guess rationally, nor does he always act rationally regarding his guesses.
But the fact remains that in a totally free market, irrational decisions usually have negative survival value, and are swiftly punished. The individual or entrepreneur that learns from this becomes better at making decisions.
Published: February 10, 2006 7:53 AM
Julius Blumfeld
The important thing about the axioms is not how they are derived but whether they are true! The next question is how we can ascertain whether they are true. The answer is that we cannot; but we can ascertain whether they are false by criticising them as best we can.
The thing to avoid, therefore, is elevating the axioms to a status beyond criticism. As long as Austrians encourage (self)criticism of their axioms, there is no problem.
Published: February 10, 2006 8:29 AM
Allen Weingarten
I commend Dr. Callahan for another fine article, and concur when he writes "It is only by pre-supposing that concepts like intention, purpose, means, ends, satisfaction, and dissatisfaction are characteristic of a certain kind of happening in the world that we can conceive of a subject matter for economics to investigate. Those concepts are the logical prerequisites for distinguishing a domain of economic events from all of the non-economic aspects of our experience..." I might add that this does not cancel what we obtain from empirical findings, for they too contribute to understaning. When we apply an a priori notion, such as 'increasing supply lowers the price' (ceteris paribus) we note what occurs in a given situation by a posteriori findings. Thus the a priori and a posteriori work hand in hand.
I do not fully agree with Julius Blumfeld that "The important thing about the axioms is not how they are derived but whether they are true! The next question is how we can ascertain whether they are true. The answer is that we cannot; but we can ascertain whether they are false by criticising them as best we can. The thing to avoid, therefore, is elevating the axioms to a status beyond criticism. As long as Austrians encourage (self) criticism of their axioms, there is no problem."
While that is true of a posteriori axioms (as Karl Popper has shown), it does not apply to a priori axioms. The latter are necessarily true, for to deny them is contradictory, and presupposes them. To say for example that 'to achieve an end, one must apply a means' is not a matter that requires criticism, but to state what must be taken as given. Were one to criticize it, he would be applying a means to achieve his end.
When Julius Blumfeld seeks to find what is true, he presupposes a difference between what is true and what isn't. How then could he find any evidence to dispute that a priori axiom? (Even if he tried, he would be presupposing that such evidence could in principle suffice; that is, he would be taking as given that evidence can lead to a conclusion.)
Some things must be taken as given, for that (ala von Mises) is built into the "logical structure of the human mind."
Published: February 10, 2006 9:28 AM
Hugh Roberts
Mr. Callahan needs to discover Aristotle's logic and Objectivism to see why "a priori" is an invalid concept, why measurement IS an empirical test, how Gödel operated on an empty set, and that Humpty Dumpty was a spokesman for Immanuel Kant.
Published: February 10, 2006 10:32 AM
Paul Edwards
Hugh,
Perhaps you could explain how the proposition "'a priori' is an invalid concept" avoids suffering from an internal contradiction.
The statement itself is of an a priori nature. If it is an a priori statement, then surely a priori is a valid concept, since you use the concept to put forward your proposition.
Yet if it is not a priori itself, then it is not necessarily true. If so, the statement says nothing substantial regarding the essence of a priori.
In either case, it is a contradiction. My impression was that Aristotle was not a strong proponent of such things.
Published: February 10, 2006 10:53 AM
Skye
The Master himself,
In the field of human history a limitation similar to that which the experimentally tested theories enjoin upon the attempts to interpret and elucidate individual physical, chemical, and physiological events is provided by praxeology. Praxeology is a theoretical and systematic, not a historical, science. Its scope is human action as such, irrespective of all environmental, accidental, and individual circumstances of the concrete acts. Its cognition is purely formal and general without reference to the material content and the particular features of the actual case. It aims at knowledge valid for all instances in which the conditions exactly correspond to those implied in its assumptions and inferences. Its statements and propositions are not derived from experience. They are, like those of logic and mathematics, a priori. They are not subject to verification or falsification on the ground of experience and facts. They are both logically and temporally antecedent to any comprehension of historical facts. They are a necessary requirement of any intellectual grasp of historical events. Without them we should not be able to see in the course of events anything else than kaleidoscopic change and chaotic muddle.
. . . .
It is impossible to demonstrate the validity of the a priori foundations of logic and praxeology without referring to these foundations themselves. Reason is an ultimate given and cannot be analyzed or questioned by itself. The very existence of human reason is a nonrational fact. The only statement that can be predicated with regard to reason is that it is the mark that distinguishes man from animals and has brought about everything that is specifically human.
- Human Action
Published: February 10, 2006 1:21 PM
Brian Drum
How is it even possible to make a decision that is not rational? Does not the very act of making a decision imply the use of reason?
I think it is a mistake to equate rationality with calculating, correct, etc. Yes, an actor may make a decision that is in error and the consequences of such an action will reveal it to be in error. However, it still requires the use of reason in order to make such a decision.
Action is, by definition, always rational. One is unwarranted in calling goals of action irrational simply because they are not worth striving for from the point of view of ones own valuations. -LvM EPoE p35
The assertion that there is irrational action is always rooted in an evaluation of a scale of values different from our own. Whoever says that irrationality plays a role in human action is merely saying that his fellow men behave in a way that he does not consider correct. -LvM EPoE p33
Published: February 10, 2006 1:50 PM
Vince Daliessio
Brian,
If you define "irrational" in a sufficiently vague or narrow way, it is possible to claim irrational action as impossible. If, however the definition includes behavior contrary to the actor's stated or implied desired result, or more broadly against his own stated or implied better interest, then we are on solid ground when we, while studying the action, call it irrational...
Published: February 10, 2006 2:54 PM
Paul Edwards
Vince,
Brian is really just re-stating Mises's position, which appears to be "Action is, by definition, always rational."
I remember arguing with a friend about action, and to win his point, he asked me if the insane act. I hadn't thought about it at the time, but ventured that possibly they did not.
Ah ha! He said, well i consider the actions of many people to be insane and therefore i can claim they also do not act. Hmmmm. He's good with his fallacies, but at any rate, he forced me to study the question further and realize that yes, sane or not, we all act, and sane or not from the observer's perspective, action is rational from the actor's perspective.
Published: February 10, 2006 4:31 PM
averros
Vince - the whole notion of "rationality" as opposed to "irrationality" is little more than some meaningless psychobabble, mere emotional labels.
By now it is obvious that there is no separation between conscious and unconscious, and there's an issue of limited computational resources and information in the brain, which makes purely rational decision-making plainly infeasible in any practical situation. The misguided idea of "rationality" as something achievable or desireable stalled the research in the Artificial Intelligence for 30 years, and most of the recent advances were facilitated by explicit abandonment of the goal of rational decision-making in favour of heuristics, compromises, and unpredictable self-organization.
I'm not sure what to make out of implied desired results (implied by whom?) - but people are known to lie to themselves with regard to their true values and goals. But, then, if you place "increase psychological comfort" as a goal, this kind of delusion often can be quite "rational".
It is much simpler and consistent to treat observed irrationality of behaviour as a manifestation of observer's misunderstanding of the structure of the subject's utility function -- or even misunderstanding of what the "subject" is: biologists for a very long time wrongly assumed that the subjects of evolution and natural selection were organisms, when it turned out that the real subjects are individual genes (and this explained altruism and many other things).
Similarly, it may be worthwhile to consider human behaviour as driven not exclusively by internal needs of persons, but rather by the needs of the cultural replicators (aka "memes"). That'd certainly explain such displays of "irrationality" as religious fanaticism.
Published: February 10, 2006 4:33 PM
Vince Daliessio
averros;
"I'm not sure what to make out of implied desired results (implied by whom?) - but people are known to lie to themselves with regard to their true values and goals. But, then, if you place "increase psychological comfort" as a goal, this kind of delusion often can be quite "rational"."
I am quite prepared to yield the point that what is irrational (utility-minimizing) from my frame of reference may be rational (utility-neutral or positive) from yours. Yes, labeling actions rational or irrational can get us into subjective trouble. I simply point out that dependent upon the obsever's frame, another individual's actions can be either utility neutral, positive, or negative.
Published: February 10, 2006 5:00 PM
Hugh Roberts
Mr. Edwards, et al:
I understand "a priori" to mean known without any experience. This implies a Platonic Forms or "innate ideas" rationalism. You seem to think, as did Mises, that it means principles. But principles can only be derived from observation and experience guided by logic. That is, one observes human action or argument then derives general rules from the observations, which one can then codify into principles. Knowledge is not acquired by logic apart from experience or by experience apart from logic, but by the application of logic to experience. The concept of "a priori" eliminates both experience and logic, and makes of knowledge a mystical Platonic form or construct unrelated to experience or reality. Logic and mathematics are NOT "a priori" constructs; (Aristotelian)logic derives from reality and math derives from logic. Both are true i.e., they conform to reality, because we see that they do --not because they "a priori" descended on us from some ineffable otherworld. This is why "a priori" is an invalid concept. It refers to nothing in reality and cannot be reduced to anything in realtiy. The concept originated with Kant and the Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy, which split reason and logic from experience. Incidentally, and in that connection, there's no such thing as a "nonrational fact". Facts are simply facts, just as A=A.
Published: February 10, 2006 6:30 PM
KY Leong
Paul Edwards,
Does the insane “act�? I’d like to offer my take on this.
Your friend is confused. We are talking about praxeology – the study of the logic of human actions. In this context, actions mean behaviors stemming from reason, the basis or motive of rational behavior. Action, by this definition, therefore cannot include Any and All social behaviors, but only those manifestations of a rational mind.
When we say someone has lost his mind (gone mad, insane, nuts…) we know that someone is not acting with reason i.e. his behavior is not rational and therefore, not amenable to logical considerations. Dwelling into the “reasons� for irrational actions and trying to ascertain meaning into such “mindless� behaviors are beyond the scope of praxeology.
As Mises puts it:
“Human knowledge is conditioned by the structure of the human mind. If it chooses human action as the subject matter of its inquiries, it cannot mean anything else than the categories of action which are proper to the human mind and are its projection into the external world… All the theorems of praxeology refer only to these categories of action and are valid only in the orbit of their operation.�
So, to be fair to your friend, when you submit that the insane indeed “act�, you should qualify the context of your arguments. Otherwise, it would end up just another intellectual exercise in futility.
My two cents, KY.
Published: February 10, 2006 8:16 PM
KY Leong
Huge Roberts,
There are two major problems with your last post (to Mr. Edwards, et al).
1. Your understanding of apriorism is patently simplistic/naïve and incorrect. “A priori� is not a concept “descended on us from some ineffable otherworld�; it does not “make of knowledge a mystical Platonic form or construct unrelated to experience or reality� etc. etc.
Others in this thread have elucidated this concept of “a priori� quite exhaustively, suffice for me to reiterate here that apriorism is a distinct paradigm of the Austrian School (economics) – it rests on the premise that there are propositions the truth of which is grasped intellectually and not empirically. See Mises, Hoppe, Carl Menger, Maritain/Franz Brentano (Barry Smith), Steven Yates et al on this site for their extensive & thorough expositions.
2. You have described a methodology (in knowledge acquisition) we called Logical Empiricism, the central claim of which is that truth can only be arrived at by sense experience (via the process of hypothesis/tentative rules, experimentations, observations/measurements, verification/refutation and so on…). This doctrine suffers from the fatal flaw of “self-referential inconsistency� – the empiricist methodology cannot itself be validated by sense experience. Your assertion, for example, that “principles can only be derived from observation and experience guided by logic� cannot be applied onto itself without exhibiting self-defeating logic.
I hope you will spend more time on Mises.org to improve your understanding of these epistemological foundations of Austrian economics, and soon realize the fallacies (error in logic) of what you’ve posted so far in this thread.
Published: February 11, 2006 9:06 AM
Benjamin Marks
Ky Leong: It is oxymoronic to say "that someone is not acting with reason". I agree that one does not move with reason, but the very concept of action is defined as using means to go after ends. Those who act in a way you call "insane" are better known as possessors of bad ideas. Can you differentiate between someone who has bad ideas and someone who is insane? On what basis do you make this distinction?
Published: February 11, 2006 9:43 AM
KY Leong
Benjamin Marks,
You quote me out of context. Yes, "the insane can move without reason" if you prefer.
No, I would not call possessors of bad ideas insane. Karl Marx had some really bad ideas but I'd suggest he also had motives less than noble. Keynes developed really bad economic theories on the basis of his opportunistic traits, not from the lack of informed reason. And Adolf Hitler, can we exonerate him of all his atrocities by calling him a mad man? I certainly hope not.
Published: February 11, 2006 10:31 AM
Benjamin Marks
KY: But I, too, move without reason. By definition everyone does. Are we all insane!? I do not think that Paul Edwards has disagreed that praxeology is the study of human action and not human movement. He qualified his use of "insane" above. I think you just misread that.
Who would you call insane if not people with bad ideas?
Published: February 11, 2006 11:01 AM
KY Leong
Benjamin: Paul E said "...sane or not, we all act, and sane or not from the observer's perspective, action is rational from the actor's perspective."
My contention here is with his assertion that "action (sane or not) is rational from the actor's perspective". By definition, an insane actor cannot be said to be exhibiting reasoned behavior. And such a behavior is not amenable to analysis by the tools of praxeology. How did I misread?
If you "move" without reason and your movement/acting has no socio-economic consequence, we (as economist) would have no interest in your behavior except, of course, by your mere movement you've violated private property eg trespassing. In this context, I'd submit that the word "insane" would not be appropriate, and I'd have misread your earlier post.
For want of a better word, may I suggest such movements/actions simply as "unthinking" behavior?
Published: February 11, 2006 12:07 PM
Benjamin Marks
I think what Paul (from my reading) was saying is that insanity doesn't really exist, whereas what you are saying is that it does. Or, if you are no longer content to use the word "insane" and use "unthinking" instead, then you are talking about something different to (my reading of) Paul.
Published: February 11, 2006 12:21 PM
Brian Drum
What is meant by "moving without reason"? Does this refer to reflexes or twitches that the indivudal does not control? For example if during a physical a doctor strikes my knee and my leg kicks forward then I would agree that this is "moving without reason". But this is not an action. I have not chosen to kick my leg. It is a reflex and is of no concern to praxeology.
But if "moving without reason" is also meant to apply to a situation in which an actor is "mindlessly" walking about under his own volition, then I cannot see how one could say there is no "reason" to the movement. Such "mindless" wandering is always an action in the praxeological sense if the actor could choose otherwise, i.e to stop walking.
I don't really see what all the bickering is about. Have I misssed something?
Published: February 11, 2006 12:37 PM
KY Leong
Benjamin: If your reading of Paul E is as what you say, then we're all agreed. And yes, in that case, "unthinking" behaviors would not fall into our understanding of the categories of Human Action.
Published: February 11, 2006 12:40 PM
Allen Weingarten
Brian Drum views irrational action as behaving in a way that another does not consider correct. Vince Daliessio views it as behavior contrary to the actor's stated or implied desired result. Averros writes that "rationality" as opposed to "irrationality" is meaningless psychobabble, mere emotional labels.
*Perhaps we should first define our terms.* If “rationality� merely means the employment of (abstract) reason, then it includes what is called “irrational� behavior when someone employs reason, but excludes “rationality� when someone is driven by his bodily desires (in the sense that a bird catches a worm). However, this definition does not correspond to how people ordinarily employ the term, for rationality is then an unnecessary synonym for “reasoning�. If "rationality" means a difference of opinion, it is also a useless synonym that does not correspond to what people have in mind. If "rationality" means drawing the correct conclusion regarding one's interests, it excludes the brilliant analyses, which turn out to be mistaken. If "rationality" is merely babble, it means the very opposite of what is denoted and connoted by the term.
A lexical definition of "rationality" is not merely a preference, which differs from the preference of another, but an objective differentiation. Man is a hybrid, comprised of reason and passion. *When reason predominates (subordinating passion in its service) one is rational; when passion predominates (subordinating reason in its service) one is irrational.* For example, consider an alcoholic who argues that drinking is worthwhile (as he disregards its horrendous effects). It is his craving that leads to his conclusion, while his reasoning is a rationalization. Conversely, someone could reason, on the basis of the evidence that drinking will benefit him, which could be a mistake. However, his reason predominates, so he is rational.
This definition contains what people have in mind, when they refer to the lack of rationality when someone says that he didn’t lose his job or his wife by drinking, but by some farfetched explanation. It is not merely that someone has made an error in dealing with the evidence, but that what has driven him to do so is his enslavement to his passions.
I submit that although it is reason that constitutes man (whether or not he is rational) his destiny of being human requires rationality (while irrationality leads to his destruction). Consequently, the notion of "rationality" is not an empty word, but an important ideal.
Published: February 11, 2006 3:45 PM
KY Leong
zombie(?)
"you have a theory, but it says nothing about stuff humans usually care for"
Perhaps you could tell us a few "stuff" that humans care for that Austrian economics doesn't? This forum is always open to new and sensible ideas.
Published: February 12, 2006 5:53 AM
Gregory White
So is a priori the chicken or the egg? And which is empiricism? I hope this can be settled once and for all.
Published: February 12, 2006 8:47 PM
Paul Edwards
Benjamin,
Earlier in this thread I made two provocative statements, and attributed the ideas behind them to Mises:
“regardless of how odd the ends chosen were, and/or how inappropriate the means to achieve these ends, the human, including the insane, always acts.�
and
“sane or not, we all act, and sane or not from the observer's perspective, action is rational from the actor's perspective.�
When I made these comments, I truly was under the impression that I was merely re-iterating what I had read from Mises. However, I have been searching the entire net unsuccessfully for some Austrian quote somewhere making essentially my claim above. Since I believed I was merely restating something that Mises had in fact explicitly stated himself, I am very surprised to find that I can find no such statement anywhere. If I cannot find it, I shall be compelled to conclude that I inferred the conclusion from less direct comments. I’m a bit confused though, because it still seems to me that I read it such that I should be able to find a quote that says essentially the same thing.
But you have drawn from my own comments, what I had not grasped until after you made the observation: “Paul (from my reading) was saying is that insanity doesn't really exist� You are correct, that is the logical conclusion of my statements. I have not given such thoughts any consideration ever before, and I’m slow to see some things, including that.
Anyways, in my search for a quote, I came across some very interesting articles by or in reference to one Thomas Szasz. He references Mises when he discusses the condition of psychiatry and is very much in agreement with the idea that human action is always rational and he concludes from this that therefore, “mental illness is a myth�.
An interesting article: “MISES AND PSYCHIATRY� BY Thomas Szasz
http://www.szasz.com/mises.html
And also here
http://www.escuela.von.mises.net/misesreview_detail.asp?control=265&sortorder=issue
“Szasz finds very much to his liking Mises’s contention that all action is, from the point of view of the actor, rational: praxeology has nothing to say about the rationality of ends, and a person always chooses means he thinks best fitted to attain whatever ends he has. "If all human action is rational, then no action is irrational or, as psychiatrists and their admirers like to put it, ‘senseless.’ It is only a short step from Mises’s assertion that human action is always rational, to my [Szasz’s] assertion that mental illness is a myth" (p. 152). Unfortunately, Mises sometimes fell from grace by speaking of mental illness as though it were real; but he was a great man nonetheless.�
The study of a priori truths takes us from geometry, math, engineering, to praxeology, ethics, and now, to what? Psychiatry? My oh my, I had no idea the implications of a Misesian epistemology could have reached so far.
This just keeps getting more interesting by the day.
Published: February 12, 2006 11:01 PM
Paul Edwards
The second article is "Szasz on the Liberal Tradition" by David Gordon in the Mises Review.
Published: February 12, 2006 11:05 PM
Fernando
If Praxeology is in the same realm as Logic and Math then it should use a formal language to express its proofs.
Natural language isn't very well suited for this kind of reasoning.
Please, read Copi about the problems you face when using natural language for logic reasoning.
"This statement isn't provable in Praxeology".
Is Praxeology inconsistent or incomplete?
Published: February 15, 2006 2:11 PM
Paul Edwards
Fernando,
I couldn't understand your logical reasoning because you seemed to be using natural language to express it (kidding).
Or are you suggesting your use of natural language should have been adequate in this situation. If so, on what basis did you conclude this? And in connection with praxeology, on what basis would you conclude the opposite?
Published: February 15, 2006 2:28 PM
Fernando
Paul
On this basis:
Copi&Cohen in Introduction to Logic:
“arguments presented in natural language are often difficult to appraise because of the vague and equivocal nature of the words used, the ambiguity of their construction, the presence of misleading idioms or confusing metaphor, or the distraction of emotional impacts. To avoid the difficulties of natural languages, it is convenient to set up an artificial symbolic language, free of linguistic defects, in which statements and arguments can be formulated with precision�.
Published: February 16, 2006 6:29 AM
Paul Edwards
Fernando,
Assuming for a moment you and i are both able to understand and even agree with the author's point, wouldn't that suggest the author is able to present his argument in a straight forward manner using natural language?
Let's assume his statement is in fact correct. Why then did he choose natural language rather than an artificial symbolic language to convey it? Is his argument not a logical one? The reason he did not is because even he presupposes that for some forms of logical argumentation, natural language is in fact the most direct and most convenient to use. The author, in using natural language to make his argument, refutes it.
If i am wrong, it would follow that the author presented and used an artificial symbolic language throughout the rest of his book to enhance the clarity of his arguments and propositions. He didn't do that did he.
Published: February 16, 2006 10:33 AM
Fernando
Paul,
No.
Neither the author nor me is saying that natural language is a sure way to reach false conclusions.
We are talking about levels of precision.
Whenever we use natural language we are a lot less precise, even plain wrong sometimes.
When you use an artificial language the probability of bad reasoning is reduced (not eliminated, of course).
Imagine, same meaning for all the concepts and operators.
In computing a good example is the Z language for specifing requirements.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Z_specification_language
To express something in an artificial language you must agree on that language first.
Have you proved some mathematical or logical theorem using a formal language? You'll see my point then.
Published: February 16, 2006 8:53 PM
Paul Edwards
Fernando,
I'm an electrical engineer working in the software industry, so i have had some exposure to math, logic and computing languages. i have also recently studied some praxeology and a bit of Aristotelian logic now as well. Based on my sampling i can tell you that to me anyways, natural language seems optimal for the study and analysis of human action.
On the other hand, i have lots still to learn, and for all i know, you may turn out to be right. But i would suggest you read Mises's Human Action and Rothbard's MES and then decide if you still think the rigor of their arguments is unacceptably diminished by their use of English rather than an artificial language. I think you'll conclude it isn't, but i'd be interested to hear back either way.
Published: February 16, 2006 10:28 PM
Fernando
Yes, I have read some of the Mises and Rothbard's works in this site.
There is an article by Rothbard where he says that formal logic is not necessary. As far as I know he doesn't give any sound argument for that being that way.
What do you mean by "exposure"? I'm not talking about the derivative of some function but, for example, proving that the cardinality of Reals is bigger than Naturals.
If you work in the software industry then you have to deal with requirements.
How many times you or your user misunderstand something because that thing was, apparently, understood, to realize, much more later, that you or your user have been using different meanings about that thing?
Why do you think it is necessary a language like Z? Of course, it is not always necessary but for mission critical software, sure it is.
If Mises' pretension that Praxeology belongs to the same realm where Mathematics and Logic are then why will you use natural language with all of its pitfalls ?
Are you saying that natural language doesn't have any?
No logician or mathematician would attempt nowadays to demostrate a theorem in plain English!
And we are talking about the entire science of Praxeology!!
Doing that is keeping Austrian economics in the island where it is now, very far from Economics and scientific mainstream.
Published: February 17, 2006 7:15 AM
Paul Edwards
Fernando,
“What do you mean by "exposure"? I'm not talking about the derivative of some function but, for example, proving that the cardinality of Reals is bigger than Naturals.�
You are correct that I have never proven that the cardinality of Reals is bigger than Naturals. I wouldn’t even know where to start. I have proven from first principles, that the slope of a function is its derivative, but I am sure that this would not help me convey economic truths to anyone, including myself.
“If you work in the software industry then you have to deal with requirements.
“How many times you or your user misunderstand something because that thing was, apparently, understood, to realize, much more later, that you or your user have been using different meanings about that thing?�
True. But the problem would only be magnified by some horrible factor if requirements had to be expressed in some artificial language. And our customer would be unhappy with our unwillingness to express requirements in English.
“Why do you think it is necessary a language like Z? Of course, it is not always necessary but for mission critical software, sure it is.�
You’ve got me there.
“If Mises' pretension that Praxeology belongs to the same realm where Mathematics and Logic are then why will you use natural language with all of its pitfalls ?�
Perhaps you would be willing to perform this exercise: using natural language, make a valid argument that humans act. Then do the same thing next to it, but in a more optimal artificial language. Run it past the blog here and see which is more obvious to the readers.
“Are you saying that natural language doesn't have any?�
Nope. I’m saying that natural language is optimal in this realm. This also explains why you are using a natural language presently to make your case. You implicitly realize it is the best approach to present your argument (and you don’t even have to think twice about this assumption).
“No logician or mathematician would attempt nowadays to demostrate a theorem in plain English!�
I’ve heard some pretty convincing logic expressed in plain English. And I have also (very recently) seen a very glaring example of a performative contradiction in plain English. Yours.
“And we are talking about the entire science of Praxeology!!�
Yup.
“Doing that is keeping Austrian economics in the island where it is now, very far from Economics and scientific mainstream.�
I’ve seen a few interesting theories of what keeps AE out of the mainstream. I’ll add this one to the list.
Published: February 17, 2006 9:57 AM
Fernando
You don't understand what I'm saying.
If BOTH user and analyst KNOW Z language the communication will be MORE precise.
The situation that you describe is you expressing something in a language alien to the user. That's nonsense. You're mispresenting my arguments.
You can hear or think what you want. No mathematician or logician would try to prove something without using a formal language.
All your arguments doesn't change the facts that
a) Natural language lacks precision
b) Formal languages enforce precision
c) Praxeology is a deductive science that uses natural language to prove statements
Praxeology expressed in natural language suffers from all the pitfalls described in one of my first posts (citing Copi).
Try proving some theorem. Read about Logic and computability, read about formal language
.
You can expand your knowledge. It's your choice.
Published: February 17, 2006 10:30 AM
Paul Edwards
Fernando,
I will concede that one of us doesn't understand what the other is saying, but i'm not convinced it is me doing the misunderstanding.
I see it is this way:
1. In all likelihood, you do not even grasp the argument that the proposition that "humans act" is indisputably true.
2. Even if you did, you still couldn't come up with a better way to prove it than via a natural language justification.
3. The rest of your argument merely confirms statements 1 and 2. When you overcome problem 1, i assert that you will realize situation 2. If i am wrong, i am interested to see you show me. I think you are very far away from proving me wrong when you lack even a basic grip on praxeology and sound argumentation.
Finally, i don't see you answering my accusation that your argument is a performative contradiction. I presume that is because you don't understand what a performative contradiction is. If you did, you might have more faith in natural language as a tool of expressing logic.
You use natural language to support the very propositions that suggest natural language is inappropriate for such a use. When you see the internal inconsistency of your proposition, you will be further along. You can expand your abilities with logic. That is your choice.
Published: February 17, 2006 11:08 AM
Fernando
It's not a contradiction of any kind.
You see it as a contradiction.
I repeat. I'm talking about precision. See? We can't even agree in simple "facts", because you think I think something else.
A formal language would reduce this kind of pitfalls.
In order to "talk" in a formal language you must first specify one and that language has to be shared and understood by anyone who is going to engage in a "conversation" with you.
That isn't a contradiction of any kind.
For instance take PI.
3.14 is EXACT to a precision of 2 digits.
3.1416 is EXACT to 4.
Both are "PI" but their levels of precision are different.
If you are helping your child in doing his homework you'll probably will use 3.14
But if you are calculating the path of a space probe you better use more precision, beacuse you can miss the planet, literally.
If we are talking about science better to be precise enough.
I have a question for you:
Do you think natural language is less precise than a formal one or not?
Published: February 17, 2006 12:24 PM
gene berman
All of you guys within the sound of my keyboard:
I can't believe you get involved in answering Billwald's childishness. Since I first noticed him here about 6 months or so ago, he literally NEVER asks a question or poses a thought that would even be possible if he'd ever read even a few sentences. Yet he is continually able to seduce many who should know better to waste their time in engaging his simpleton-like queries.
Published: February 17, 2006 1:49 PM
Paul Edwards
Fernando,
You started at the top with this statement:
“If Praxeology is in the same realm as Logic and Math then it should use a formal language to express its proofs.�
But you qualified that with
“Neither the author nor me is saying that natural language is a sure way to reach false conclusions.�
And although by that you concede that using natural language does not necessitate false reasoning (it is merely potentially less precise), you simultaneously attempt to cast doubt on Rothbard’s contention that a formal language for praxeology is not necessary:
“There is an article by Rothbard where he says that formal logic is not necessary. As far as I know he doesn't give any sound argument for that being that way.�
When you ask
“If Mises' pretension that Praxeology belongs to the same realm where Mathematics and Logic are then why will you use natural language with all of its pitfalls?�
you fail to see that you have answered your own question with
“To express something in an artificial language you must agree on that language first.�
When I press you for an example of, or to just go ahead and use an artificial language that would work better for praxeology than natural language, you are unable to do so. This is part of my point. You can’t. At least not one that would be comprehensible to nine-tenths of those interested in praxeology. The very reason you do not attempt to show the validity of your propositions using some other artificial language that would be more suitable to this discussion is because you know of none that we both would understand and find useful.
Praxeology is not math, geometry, or physics. It is the scientific study of human action. It is logical and it is it is well suited to rigorous logical (and precise) argumentation. That an artificial language was unnecessary to prove its conclusions is no strike against it. In my view, that’s one of its charms. Anyone can wade into it with a critical eye and see for themselves its truths, without first investing two years of study in a new artificial language. Such a requirement would violate the law of not adding unnecessary complexity to an issue. The Austrians like it as simple as possible. Not simpler than possible, but certainly no more complex than necessary either.
Published: February 17, 2006 2:26 PM
Fernando
Maybe I fail to see that.
But you fail to see that I'm casting a doubt because that's what every logician says about the shortcomings of natural languages.
I'm unable to put that in a formal language because I lack the time and the spirit to spend in such a task. That's why I talked about Z language, a language to model real world requirements in a formal way. Your conclusion that I'm wrong because of that is a non sequitur.
I've shown you that it is possible to express thinking in a formal manner.
My point is that by being precise you'll discover the hidden truths behind natural language pitfallas.
For example what do you think of this sentence?
"The whole is bigger than the part"
Yes or no?
It's all in natural language the way that Austrians like it.
Praxeology is LIKE Mathematics an Logic because it is a DEDUCTIVE science, please read Mises about that.
That you and nine tenths of Praxeology followers PREFER not to use formal tools, it's not my problem. Certaintly it is all yours.
But you didn't answer my question.
Do you think natural language is less precise than a formal one or not?
Published: February 17, 2006 3:31 PM
Paul Edwards
Hi Fernando,
I agree with you, formal languages can be more precise than natural ones. Or I would put it, one can abuse natural language more easily.
But I think we’re coming to the crux and agreement with your statement: “I'm unable to put that in a formal language because I lack the time and the spirit to spend in such a task.� Lacking time, inclination, and ultimately the need to do so, most are very grateful that Mises used natural language to elaborate his ideas.
----
I think the sentence "The whole is bigger than the part" is incoherent. Meaning it is false. But your point is one can be sloppy with language, and I agree. One can also choose to be, and insist others be, precise and rigorous.
Your statement "That you and nine tenths of Praxeology followers PREFER not to use formal tools, it's not my problem. Certaintly it is all yours." is funny. As i meant to point out somewhere in this discussion, it is in fact, no problem at all; except to you.
But the great thing is we can both agree to disagree, and that fact alone is very satisfying to me.
Published: February 17, 2006 4:45 PM
Fernando
Why it is incoherent?
Why it is false?
Why do you think something being incoherent means "false"?
-------
Then formal languages are more precise that natural ones. Ok.
This doesn't apply to praxeology?
Then, why to use a less precise language for reasoning?
Why sacrifice correctness in the altar of... clarity?
Published: February 17, 2006 5:31 PM
Gene Callahan
Fernando,
Formal languages have their uses, but also their limitations. For one, they are empty of meaning. For another, no complex formal language can be both complete and consistent. They are good for some things and not for others. That's why we don't go around talking in them all the time.
The fact that not being formalized might be keeping Austrian economics out of the mainstream is no argument at all. Suggesting the sun was at the center of the solar system kept Copernicus out of the mainstream -- so what? The mainstream is often wrong.
Published: February 17, 2006 7:09 PM
Fernando
Gene,
Semantics and syntaxis could be equivalent. Every course on theory of languages teachs that.
I'm affraid you're wrong. Euclidean geometry is both consistent and complete and is expressed in a formal language.
Being complete or/and inconsistent are not necessary attributes of formal langauages.
"This statement is not provable in Praxeology"
Suppose that statement is provable. Then it is true. Hence it is not provable. So, it is not
provable. But then it is clearly true, and hence its negation is not provable.
Then Praxeology IS incomplete or inconsistent.
Why do you think Austrian economics have been OUT of the mainstream for so many years?
Published: February 17, 2006 7:47 PM
Fernando
Better stated:
Let A="This statement is not provable in Praxeology"
Suppose A is provable, then what it says of itself, that it is not provable, is not true. But this conclusion is contrary to our supposition, so our supposition that A is provable must be false. Suppose the contrary that A is not provable, then what it says of itself is true, although we cannot prove it. Therefore, there is no proof that A is provable, and there is also no proof that its negation is provable (i.e., there is no proof that it is also unprovable). Whence, Praxeology is incomplete because it cannot prove all truths, namely, (A) and its negation.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liar_paradox
Published: February 17, 2006 8:28 PM
Gene Callahan
Fernando,
"I'm affraid you're wrong. Euclidean geometry is both consistent and complete and is expressed in a formal language."
This is not some nutty little idea I just thought up. It's called Godel's Theorem, and has been universally acknowledged as proven true since the early 1930s. If a formalization of Euclidean is not complex enough to be able to formulate a Godel statement, then it is not a counter-example. (By the way, I believe the original development of Euclidean geometry was done in Ancient Greek, which is not, as far as I know, a formal language.)
Being devoid of meaning is part of the definition of being a formal system!
"This statement is not provable in Praxeology"
This whole section is silly, and shows you have not understood what Godel did -- he expressed the Godel statement in the formal system, so that although informal reasoning could see its truth, the system itself cannot demonstrate it. The statement you made is not a part of praxeology at all, since the subject is not about the truth of English sentences, and all you have shown is that you can generate paradoxes in English.
"Why do you think Austrian economics have been OUT of the mainstream for so many years?"
Why do you think Copernicus was OUT of the mainstream for so many years?
And what's with all the white space in your posts?
Regards,
Gene Callahan
Published: February 17, 2006 8:33 PM
Fernando
From
">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorem
"Misconceptions about Gödel's theorems
Since Gödel's first incompleteness theorem is so famous, it has given rise to many misconceptions.
They are refuted here:
The theorem does not imply that every interesting axiom system is incomplete. For example, Euclidean geometry can be axiomatized so that it is a complete system. (In fact, Euclid's original axioms are pretty close to being a complete axiomatization. The missing axioms express properties that seem so obvious that it took the emergence of the idea of a formal proof before their absence was noticed.)"
...............
English is the (natural) language used to demonstrate statements in Praxeology. In fact praxeology, not using formal grammars and not defining terms becomes fuzzy, leaving room for anything.
A formal system is a formal grammar. Formal grammars have a syntactic expression and a semantic one that are equivalents.
Blanks? I didn't want to make you nervous!
I don't know about Copernicus. How much time do we have to wait for Praxeology becoming mainstream?
"Informal reasoning seeing truths"? Please, suggest any logician to use informal language to see truths.
Published: February 17, 2006 9:20 PM
tz
One of the mystery - sci-fi plot lines involves hypnotizing someone to think his friend is a bear or some other dangerous animal such that he shoots his friend.
Within the system of the compromised data, the act of shooting a dangerous animal attacking you is perfectly rational.
The problem is that you are actually shooting your friend.
"Irrationality" falls in and out of these categories. It sounds like what Catholics mean when they say you must inform your conscience - you can't go off willy-nilly deciding on what is good or evil yourself, there is a body of rational natural law, and others have gone down the roads to determine what should be done.
Reason is subject to the will. Anyone can use it to justify their actions, but it works best as an independent counsellor, not a toady (consider the Intel services as they have become politicized).
And we wouldn't accuse the master thief or the mad scientist of being without reason - they must possess and use their rational faculties more than the average person. But they use it for evil and not for good.
And in that the market is still the product of rational beings. It cannot prevent itself from being used for evil. It is of great power, but in the same sense as nuclear energy - either as an efficient source to help us, or as a bomb to destroy us. Neither heavy nucleii nor the market has a conscience of its own.
Published: February 18, 2006 10:27 AM
averros
Well, in fact, market functioning does not require rationality, neither does it require presense of consciousness of participants.
The value of free market as a distributed algorithm for optimizing resource allocation and productivity of the population of actiors was demonstrated by Eric Baum (author of "the Hayek machine") which have shown how previoulsy intractable (due to the size of search space) evolutionary problems are reduced by the use of market to the search of much smaller modules which can together achieve what simple Darwinian evolution cannot. In his work, the market participants were simple strings of computer code, which couldn't have anything resembling thought process of any kind (rational or irrational).
He has also demonstrated that the efficiency of market algorithm is seriously reduced if property rights are violated. In fact, none of "compromised" market variants he tried were able to find the solution to the model problem.
Actually, molecular biology has a market of its own, with its own hard currency - the energy bound in the chemical links within and between molecules. This hidden market allows biological evolution to work at the level of individual genes instead of the whole genome.
Published: February 18, 2006 12:51 PM
fabio
i don't know for inconsistent but it seems obvious that praxeology is badly incomplete as a theory, half the story at the very best...
would Mises say that action = reaction is a valid indentity? i am asking because i do not believe it is... to keep this short, reaction belongs more to a darwinian view of the world, therefore it itself could form the basis for a SEPARATE axiom to Mises' 'homo agens' postulate.
nothing wrong here, if mathematics and logic are any guide, it is possible to construct as many separate axiomatic-based theories as one wishes. and then, possible to find applications for some (perhaps all) of those theories to help acquiring an ever-better understanding of 'the real world'.
however unless someone proves or even postulates the afore-suggested action = reaction identity, or suggests, better, proves that 'homo reactens' is a false premise, isn't the whole theory of praxeology missing a big chunk of the... action?
how about a new theory recognizing that action differs from reaction in profound ways, and having both 'homo agens' and 'homo reactens' as axioms... a yin yang type framework if you will?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yin_yang
Published: July 24, 2006 3:50 PM
Paul Edwards
fabio,
You got a couple of responses to this here:
http://blog.mises.org/archives/004878.asp#comments
Published: July 24, 2006 5:20 PM