There are two axioms common to all state intervention. The first holds that a title or office confers expertise upon the holder. The second holds that in any given situation, ceteris paribus, violence is superior to voluntary action. Neither axiom can be denied without destroying the justification for the intervention. Likewise, there is no way to accept any amount of state intervention without validating both statements.
Source link: http://blog.mises.org/9799/anti-praxeology/
Anti-Praxeology
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Indeed, and if the state will not violently intervene on the behalf of citizens providing protection from the predatory economic practices of banksters then where is its legitimacy?
I disagree with this reasoning, though not necessarily with its conclusion. The first premise, that holding a certain public position confers expertise on the official who occupies it, is a necessary antecedent to state intervention, and it is of course an absurd notion. However, the second premise, that violence is superior to voluntary action, ceteris paribus, is NOT the presumption in government intervention, because even most statists would probably agree with you on that point. No, their point would be that in CERTAIN situations, all things NOT being equal, violence is, not necessarily superior, but required because voluntary action would either be absent, insufficient, or somehow counterproductive, and therefore the occasional deus ex machina, if you will, of the state HAS to occur in order to perform a correction of some kind. I by no means am defending state intervention, but I think the argument is a little subtler than that.
The state’s raison d’être
Premise 1: Human relations — absent “corrective” state violence — are brutal, Hobbesian, and corrupt.
Premise 2: Free will and morality are inadequate compensation for the inherent exploitative tendencies of the unrestrained individual.
I would argue that in elective systems, the first axiom is that title or office designates expertise, in the opinions of the voters. The title doesn’t grant expertise, but rather is reserved for those who already possess it.
Not that I agree with the axiom, but it is less vulnerable to attack than the axiom stated in the post.
Barbarossa: “… in CERTAIN situations, all things NOT being equal, violence is, not necessarily superior, but required because voluntary action would either be absent, insufficient, or somehow counterproductive, and therefore the occasional deus ex machina, if you will, of the state HAS to occur in order to perform a correction of some kind.”
I think Barbarossa did a fairly good job of framing the argument in favor of legitimate, limited, and judicious use of force upon the part of governing institutions against those willfully harming others or others’ property. Such an argument does not necessarily preclude rightful self-defense on the part of private individuals or institutions as some imply, either, although some governing institutions have (unwisely) chosen that route.
Furthermore, providing numerous examples in which governing institutions have used the force available to them in illegitimate, unlimited, or injudicious ways does not negate that argument any more than the fradulent, manipulative Madoffs of the world can be held up as disproofs of the legitimacy of honest capitalism.
Premise 3: The state’s violence — purified by democracy — is never never the problem, but always the solution (irrespective of the individual “experts” or “planners” or “strategists” i.e., politicians).
“I think Barbarossa did a fairly good job of framing the argument in favor of legitimate, limited, and judicious use of force upon the part of governing institutions against those willfully harming others or others’ property.”
Provided it does so without forcing its fees on its clients and only “intervenes” in that scenario, it’s fine. Otherwise, it is merely playing god.
1. The economy would be worse if the state didn’t make multi-trillion dollar welfare transfers from the taxpayers to failed banks.
2. It is for the benefit of all people that the state forcefully takes money from people
3. Politicians are really good at controlling society and the economy
4. Politicians are good at fixing problems in general
5. State protected banking cartels benefit all of society
6. Forcing people into systems that they disagree with is OK as long as the government is doing it
7. If we give enough power to the government(s) in the world then they can fix global warming
8. In the United States, it is good to have a central authority with an uncontested monopoly over the administration of justice
9. The monopoly over justice provision must be enforced by an authority which also possesses a monopoly on violence
10. People have rights because the government gives people rights
This is not anti-praxeology. State intervention is within the scope of praxeology, b/c in the end it’s just human action all the same (it has means ends, choice, value scales etc etc). B/c state intervention is within praxeology’s scope we as adherents of the method and epistemology can analyze state invention in a rigorous fashion, just as Oliva did above.
It depends whether you see objective ethics within the sphere of praxeology or not that you can deem the axioms as invalid or incoherent (or not).
@ Barbarossa –
“However, the second premise, that violence is superior to voluntary action, ceteris paribus, is NOT the presumption in government intervention, because even most statists would probably agree with you on that point. No, their point would be that in CERTAIN situations, all things NOT being equal, violence is, not necessarily superior, but required…”
I agree that interventionists tend to frame their arguments this way, but I think it’s a deduction from the axiom I presented, not the other way around. You’re essentially stating the “market failure” argument, which is a subset of intervention itself.
Intervention doesn’t always take the active form. It’s also passive and pervasive. The state can intervene merely by asserting a right to control something even if it doesn’t actually displace voluntary action. If the interventionist happens upon a functional voluntary relationship, he can say, “You may continue, subject to my right to stop you at any time.” I would argue this derives from the axiom I stated above.
Isn’t this all a fancy way of saying might makes right or rather non-enforceable rights are non-existent rights?
In practice and principle, the state’s characteristic rights-claims oppose the individual’s rights-claims, be they to voluntary action or otherwise.
Is a right any more than an enforceable claim?
Isn’t this the root of the state’s conceit?
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