As I have read countless analysts, including professional economists, offer “solutions” to the financial crisis, I have become more convinced of the importance of capital theory. You see this with the dichotomy people keep drawing between the financial markets and the “real economy,” a distinction that is useful for some purposes but which in this context often reinforces the idea that the stock market is really just a casino. FULL ARTICLE
Source link: http://blog.mises.org/8806/the-importance-of-capital-theory/
The Importance of Capital Theory
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Killmore,
In Hans Herman Hoppe’s paper “the economics of taxation” he outlines what taxation does regarding the “wealth effect”. He says taxation actually distorts the time preference of the population to higher time preferences. Credit injections and monetary inflation distort the signals of the actual time preference of the population, making it seem lower than it actually is. The inflation “robbery” happens in the long run, once the money runs it’s course. Think of the difference of the preferences and desires you encounter right after when someone puts a gun on you and asks for your money, versus someone giving you counterfeit money that you couldn’t tell was fake. You know you’re robbed right away so feel poorer in the former, but you feel rich until you realized you’re money is no good and got ripped off in the latter. Think about what happens when entire populations get robbed (taxes) or conned (inflation) and the differences become clear, even though the end result is the same (impoverishment) the process is different in each case.
What if it’s a race? The lowered interest rates are used to inject new money into the economy, and this new money is used to bid up prices of capital goods because capital goods haven’t increased to match the increase in money. Even if entrepreneurs know exactly what’s happening, they will try to get as much of the capital goods as they can before they run out, instead of letting others get them and leave them in the cold. I suppose the smart entreprenuer could create a scalable project, one that could be scaled back once they realize that more capital isn’t available. Not an easy thing to do, though. Even then, that’s no guarantee that consumers will support the end products of these projects, since they didn’t save for them–and capital redistribution has already occurred when businesses were busy bidding up the prices of capital goods.
Cowen’s objection is that he thinks ABCT implies that real income/consumption is countercyclical – less consumption during the boom, more during the bust. No one has really addressed this. At least I think that’s it – my big problem with this whole controversy is I am not sure what he is saying. Where is this coming from?
Funny, my expectation would be that credit expansion by the government would have more or less the exact opposite effect Murphy claims. That is, I would expect it to cause production to shift away from current goods and towards future goods.
daneli: I think the idea is that the government’s credit expansion encourages production of both current goods and future goods, rather than one at the expense of the other.
To Current and Som:
Some mainstream economist could point out the fact that price system is unable to transmit information about inflation without delay. This time lag, as it seems, is core of your argument. Consumer has been robbed of his money and yet he goes on spending without knowledge about his diminished wealth. But this is very strange notion I cannot comprehend. Logic of this robbery necessitates change of structure of production. Without such change thieves could not profit from their foul deeds, only if enterpreneurs serve them instead of former customers then their immoral goals are accomplished. Thus there can be no merry meantime when everybody can spend, when both robber and his victim do the consuming. Either production is redirected or not, either robbery took place or not.
Following example should throw more light on this problem. Lets say there are two groups, plum consumers and apple consumers. If one thousand former apple consumers shifted to plums, then increased demand for plums would have to raise their price (at least in short run). Vice versa, apples would be cheaper. No, says mainstream economist, prices are sticky (market imperfection is their favourite topic), therefore plum and apple prices cannot change fast enough. But this means that new plum consumers cannot get any plums while some apples are left to rot. Production scheme has not been altered at all because prices remain intact. Only through change in prices market can restore equilibrium, apple consumers must get their apples at lower price while plum consumers must pay more. This means loss for apple producers and gains for plum producers. It is very reason why some apple producers shift their production to plums.
Since there can be no change of production schemes without prior change of prices then there can be no time lag between robbery (inflation) and adjustment of consumer spending because the very act of robbery necessitates price changes.
So in your sushi model, the islanders decide to devote 5 people to motor maintenance, but the marginal product of using the motor is only 6 rolls of sushi (the increasing in output coming mainly from reallocation from boat and net maintenance to production). Why would they do that? What makes you think Krugman would ever advise making an investment with such a low marginal product, when the cost is allowing depreciation-replacing capital investment (net and boat maintenance) to fall below break-even? It’s not a very convincing argument – people do something stupid, and end up suffering – hence, er … what?. You have to show why traditional economic theory would ever suppose that the production process would be optimised by doing what Krugman advises in your story. [it wouldn't]
Kilmore: “Some mainstream economist could point out the fact that price system is unable to transmit information about inflation without delay. This time lag, as it seems, is core of your argument. Consumer has been robbed of his money and yet he goes on spending without knowledge about his diminished wealth.”
That’s right. It is not just an argument of mainstream economists, but one of Austrian economists too.
Kilmore: “But this is very strange notion I cannot comprehend. Logic of this robbery necessitates change of structure of production.”
Exactly.
Kilmore: “Without such change thieves could not profit from their foul deeds”
No. No major changes in the structure of production are needed to suit them. Assuming they have similar tastes to others of course, which is not unlikely. What changes by theivery and redistribution is the direction to which production is put. Inflation though changes both where production is directed and the structure of production.
Kilmore: “only if enterpreneurs serve them instead of former customers then their immoral goals are accomplished.”
Yes.
Kilmore: “Thus there can be no merry meantime when everybody can spend, when both robber and his victim do the consuming.”
Yes there can be capital consumption gives the answer.
Kilmore: “Either production is redirected or not, either robbery took place or not.”
Production is redirected and the structure of production changes.
Kilmore: “Following example should throw more light on this problem. Lets say there are two groups, plum consumers and apple consumers. If one thousand former apple consumers shifted to plums, then increased demand for plums would have to raise their price (at least in short run). Vice versa, apples would be cheaper. No, says mainstream economist, prices are sticky (market imperfection is their favourite topic), therefore plum and apple prices cannot change fast enough. But this means that new plum consumers cannot get any plums while some apples are left to rot. Production scheme has not been altered at all because prices remain intact. Only through change in prices market can restore equilibrium, apple consumers must get their apples at lower price while plum consumers must pay more. This means loss for apple producers and gains for plum producers. It is very reason why some apple producers shift their production to plums.”
Your example economy has no capital goods, which is what is at question here.
Kilmore:”Since there can be no change of production schemes without prior change of prices then there can be no time lag between robbery (inflation) and adjustment of consumer spending because the very act of robbery necessitates price changes.”
No. The nature of capital means that changes are real.
To give an example. Let’s say we have two groups of people. Group A and group B.
Group B embezzle wealth from group A. They do this by persuading a central bank to issue money to them.
So, on day 0 each member of group A has £30000 and each member of groups B has £30000. The price level is stable.
On day 1 the central bank print the money and give it to group B. At this stage group A have £30000 and group B have £40000 each. Note no extra wealth has being produced.
On day 2 group B start spending their money. The price level begins to rise. Both groups have judged their future spending plans on the basis of the price level on day 0, making appropriate provisions for what likely future price increase. Long term spending, such as on capital equipment will be judged on this basis.
Only by day 150 does this work itself out. By this time the members of group B have spent most of their extra money. However the plans of both groups were based of thinking that they were richer than they actually were. As a result distortion of the structure of production occurred.
Once prices begin to increase people’s planning is shown to be incorrect. At this stage the recession begins.
Kilmore, the problem is that there are not enough capital goods to match the increase in money. Prices are bid up for capital goods, and the people that got the newly created money are able to redirect those capital goods to some degree, before prices correct and people realize that there aren’t enough capital goods.
Even if the new money went to everybody simultaneously, instead of to just some people, it would still take some time for the prices to be bid up. Since it does only go to some people and not everybody, those people are getting an advantage over others until the price corrections occur.
Luis Enrique,
are you suggesting that monetary inflation and interest rate manipulation does not cause capital consumption? You bring up depreciation. I suggest you read Reisman for a background on the effects of inflation and taxes on capital gains and the detrimental effect that these combined have on the capital stock under a fixed depreciation schedule. Traditional economic theory has a very limited understanding of the time structure of production. When you ignore the fact that production takes time, you can not account for the overconsumption which takes place when scarce resources are bid towards both consumption and capital goods as directed by the false price signal in the manipulated supply of loanable funds. It is quite obvious looking at historical business cycles that resources were misallocated, capital was consumed, and overconsumption did take place. If you have a problem with the reorganization as specified by Robert Murphy, it must be of degree and not of kind. Theory and History are against you on this argument.
A good article, although I had a hard time following the intro and the explanations of Krugman’s and Cowen’s views. The island sushi example and end-of-article conclusions were fantastic, however.
From a writing standpoint, I might suggest putting a a little more of your substantive argument nearer the beginning of the article. This will make your viewpoints much easier follow for readers not entirely familiar with the economic language of the various ‘schools’.
I am new to the Austrian school (~6 months), however I do have some insight into written communication.
To Current:
Even if thieves had the very same taste as their victims the need of price adjustment would not be undone. There is new demand if nothing else. Once prices are readjusted (and that must take place instantly after attempt to spend new money) all victims are aware of inflationary robbery because they cannot buy expected amount of goods and services. Why then should victims go on according to yesterday plans? They face impoverishment, therefore they must act upon new data, not to continue now inappropriate projects.
Of course some past projects are revealed to be unprofitable under new circumstances, thus they are abandoned. Consequently there is some “capital spending”, something is wasted during the transition period. But as soon as the inflationary scheme is firmly established, then new capital structure mirrors new consumer demand (altered original one). This means that central bank should not try to “tune” anything because any change of their policy is very costly, Friedman was right about this. However this is not business cycle, inflation alone cannot fool people. Yes, somebody might err for certain time, but such mistakes are always present, they would be present even under deflation. Yet we see error everywhere during boom periods. How is that possible? My attempt for explanation (I have already described it above) is somewhat different.
If you lent some money to your friend for next six months your consequent actions would be based upon some estimate of his trustworthiness. Lets consider following two cases, absolute certainty and only half certainty of pay off. If you are absolutely sure then you may plan to buy rare vintage car in six months + 1 day, you may even sign contract with its current owner. You would not sign it if you were only half certain about your friend’s trustworthiness. This simple example explains crucial role of risk assessment.
Now we have got lots of fractional reserve banks here and great part of money supply consists of demand deposits or another contracts. These banks are your friend from example above. During the boom period everyone is absolute certain about their trustworthiness, everyone acts as if there were no doubt about them (I mean every depositor). This means that many people based many decisions upon mere illusion, they plan to buy cars, houses, jewelry and so on on in “six month+1 day”. How can be they so sure? Because we all trust banking system, because there are printing presses running behind it, there is compulsory deposit insurance and there is of course government promising to bail-out every big enough bank.
This is the reason why consumer demand is too high during boom. We all think of our contracts with banks as of absolute certain ones. It is delusion, because bankers make many very risky investments. Why? Because risk is socialized. Each bank is induced to lend as much as possible because it can eat profits and throw risk on the whole system, thus bear only small part of it. It is well known tragedy of commons, every shepherd aims to exploit as much as possible without regard to capacity of “pasture”. These risky investments explain enthusiasm of enterpreneurs. To them it is fulfillment of all their wishes, consumer demand is high and interest rate low simultaneously.
Risk demands creation of pool of reserves, uncertainty must be met by redundant capacity (machinery, storage, more employees, unsold product, cash holdings and so on). Exhaustion of reserve reservoir brings abrupt end of boom. Consumers try to cut their excess spending, to recover their cash holdings, enterpreneurs must stop their business, everyone is forced to pay except bankers. They simply wait for goverment to pour money into their failing companies.
Thus business cycle is obviously hidden in very nature of our banking system, while inflation is merely convenient method of its funding. This system would run smoothly on any money, not only newly printed inflationary greenbacks. Moreover inflation is not the only scheme employed. Law prevents true competition and enforces compulsory deposit insurance while government is ready to fund banks directly if necessary.
This thread has gotten too long to follow logically.
Let me respond to the conflict between Kilmore and Inquisitor: I believe we have a semantic problem.
Kilmore said interest rates forced lower by the Fed are not artificial, because they are the real rate offered in the market. But they are also not natural as determined by free market forces, which is the price signal in Hayek’s model which leads entrepreneurs to decide how wise it is to borrow and build capital goods.
While the Federal Funds Rate is the real interest rate for its select market, it is a distortion of the true natural rate in a non-coerced market, and the driving force behind inflation and malinvestment. This govt-determined lowered interest rate sends the wrong signal to the business community, telling them it will likely be profitable to borrow money to expand their business, because the demand curve has shifted in their favor. In reality, it was not the demand curve that shifted, but the supply curve, because the Fed increased the supply. You have to look at Garrison’s powerpoint explanations of this model to see this. While the interest rate is real, the “signal” it sends to the market is artificial, distorted by govt intervention.
Also, this distorted signal to lenders, meaning those of us who put money into savings accounts, says it is not in our interest or profitable to save money in the bank. It changes out “time preference” for how we use our money, more toward consumption. So consumption goes up, which reinforces the artificial signal sent by the lowered interest rate, telling the markets that they are doing better than they are, and that they should expand, that businesses should borrow more money and build more factories to meet this demand.
It becomes a vicious cycle, with a lag in it as the capital goods get produced. Understanding this lag is key to understanding the Hayek model. By the time businesses realize that they were mistaken in their predictions of the future, they have borrowed and spent, and have to struggle to avoid bankruptcy (as the financial sector is doing now). Suddenly, businesses realize the true demand for what they hoped to produce does not match the signals sent earlier, and the market has to shrink to match reality. But the Fed and now Congress (via bailouts) do not want that to happen, so they continue distorting the signal by pumping in more money at an interest rate below the natural free market rate. Bubble, bubble, bubble….. Ohmygod POP!
Now who benefited from the artificial signal created by Fed manipulating the interest rate? Initially everyone did, because business was booming. But eventually, the ones who benefit the most, as we have seen in the past few months, are those who control the Fed, who get first crack at the new money as it gets pumped into the system, and thus get the biggest profits from it, and can better predict what will happen and when the bust will come (Goldman Sachs, whose chief economists predicted it a year ago when the Dow was peaking, and the other players at Jekyll Island), and then they can turn to the Fed and demand another infusion when they start feeling anemic. It is a too easily corrupted system, and Jefferson said so two centuries ago, in his struggle with Hamilton (see today’s Mises.org article).
Ron Paul predicted what is happening five years ago, based on his understanding of ABCT. The model is elegant, and has strong explanatory power, and does not rely on animal spirits to explain rational human action in the marketplace.
Mr. Murphy, you’ve done good. Real good.
Kilmore – “Once prices are readjusted (and that must take place instantly after attempt to spend new money) all victims are aware of inflationary robbery because they cannot buy expected amount of goods and services.”
In what magical world do you live in that all new money is instantly spent? The only way that prices would immediately adjust is if new money lent out was immediately spent by its first recipients, then immediately spent by its second, then third, then fourth, and so on until prices reached a new equilibrium based on preferences of all rational actors in the market. (Note: I don’t believe in price equilibrium, but you seem to, so…)
And you’re saying that takes place instantaneously? Are you deliberately ignoring reality? Using a broken model is worse than using none at all.
The point is this: Prices don’t adjust immediately, and even if they did (which they don’t) you’d still have to deal with the fact that people don’t realize that their incomes have gone down as much as they have immediately. The reason why is because many people are fooled by nominal income increases for a short period of time as they adjust to the new pricing reality. People don’t spend money equal on all things at all times or spend all day checking changing prices of all of the goods they will ever consumer, so there is no way for them to become completely aware of all price changes that will affect them in an economy instantaneously as you claim.
Instead, most people feel ‘richer’ with higher nominal incomes, and spend more.
So borrowers and other recipients of new money are spending it to bid up the price of capital goods and consume more consumption goods at the same time – they do this by decreasing their savings (ie through capital consumption).
If you insist on using assumptions that don’t at all fit reality you should be prepared to have your arguments attacked repeatedly.
Kilmore: “Even if thieves had the very same taste as their victims the need of price adjustment would not be undone. There is new demand if nothing else. Once prices are readjusted (and that must take place instantly after attempt to spend new money)”
Jeremy has dealt with this point. I agree with everything he has said. Prices do no adjust instantly.
Kilmore: “Yes, somebody might err for certain time, but such mistakes are always present, they would be present even under deflation.”
The errors though would not be systematic. Cental bank money issue causes systematic errors.
Kilmore:”This is the reason why consumer demand is too high during boom. We all think of our contracts with banks as of absolute certain ones. It is delusion, because bankers make many very risky investments. Why? Because risk is socialized. Each bank is induced to lend as much as possible because it can eat profits and throw risk on the whole system, thus bear only small part of it. It is well known tragedy of commons, every shepherd aims to exploit as much as possible without regard to capacity of “pasture”. These risky investments explain enthusiasm of enterpreneurs. To them it is fulfillment of all their wishes, consumer demand is high and interest rate low simultaneously.
Risk demands creation of pool of reserves, uncertainty must be met by redundant capacity (machinery, storage, more employees, unsold product, cash holdings and so on). Exhaustion of reserve reservoir brings abrupt end of boom. Consumers try to cut their excess spending, to recover their cash holdings, enterpreneurs must stop their business, everyone is forced to pay except bankers. They simply wait for goverment to pour money into their failing companies.
Thus business cycle is obviously hidden in very nature of our banking system, while inflation is merely convenient method of its funding. This system would run smoothly on any money, not only newly printed inflationary greenbacks. Moreover inflation is not the only scheme employed. Law prevents true competition and enforces compulsory deposit insurance while government is ready to fund banks directly if necessary. ”
No, you are misunderstanding the problem. To give an example, in my home country of Britain the banks once used the gold standard. They also had a central bank that acted as lender of last resort, The Bank of England.
In that banking system there were socialized losses but no inflationary money issue. It’s problems were quite different. There could be no money printing boom that to make people feel richer. However, there was still a cartel of lenders.
The presence of this cartel didn’t mean that risk was particularly high. More that banks had an advantage over other organizations.
You say: “Each bank is induced to lend as much as possible because it can eat profits and throw risk on the whole system, thus bear only small part of it”
In the past a bank that lost on high risks would be bailed out, but would not be able to make profits because of the high cost of the bailout. So, each bank did not bear only a small part of the risk, they bore most of it. So, each bank had an interest in lending responsibly even though it was not as strong as it should have been.
The problem though was that the central bank gave them a special privelege in acting as lender of last resort. It was not like the tragedy of commons, but rather more like a welfare system and had similar issues.
Things are fundamentally different when the government control the interest rate and influence the money supply.
Rubén Rivero: “…why is the Austrian school considered obsolete?”
If you want to see an example of how badly off mainstream macro is, visit Arnold Klings comments today over at econlib.org under the heading “A Pat on the Back for Macro.”
To Jeremy:
The very act of inflationary theft requires price change. Without such adjusments production structure would not change a bit and therefore thieves would not get their desired goods and services because enterpreneurs would still serve to original customers. Thus it is impossible to separe price adjustment from inflationary theft, they occur in the very same moment, there is no time lag between them, the word instantly was not misplaced. Moreover price adjustments are prior to production adjustments (because prices govern production and not the other way around). Thus thieves must FIRST announce their robbery to get what they wish.
To Current:
I just cannot agree. If central banks did nothing else than printing of new paper (I mean really printing) then there would be no business cycle at all. Similarly gold mining does not cause business cycle. The reason is not as some suggest relatively small amount of mined out metal. Even swift inflow of gold into economy would not cause any cluster of errors.
One serious problem of your example (Britain under gold standard) is the fact that it supports my position, not yours
Though it was impossible to create money per se, for it was impossible to print gold, business cycle was present. This is exactly what I say. Socialized banking system must always cause boom-bust, inflation is only easy way to finance it. Interestingly some Englishmen recognized the problem and its link to banking system, see currency school. Mises was inspired greatly by their views.
If government imposed tax on tax holdings, for example three percents, and then gave this huge sum to central bank thus enabling it to lower interest rate what would be the difference between such scheme and inflation? None. Yet you would be rather unwilling to relate taxation with business cycle.
That’s it. Inflation is just another tax while structure of our banking system is real menace causing cycle.
This stance has got many many advantages. I have already mentioned its compatibility with free banking some few posts above. If mere printing of money cannot cause business cycle then there is no reason to enforce full reserves. Thus there is no need to supress any forms of contracts, not even fractional reserve ones. Another advantage has been mentioned in this post, there is no problem with gold mining, it cannot cause no matter how successfull it might be. Moreover there is no need to be “golden bug”, to fight for restoration of that “barbarous relic” as mainstream economists view it. We could finally convince mainstream if we were for free banking and not for gold. (of course it is disguise, free banking would re-introduce gold)
“The very act of inflationary theft requires price change. Without such adjustments production structure would not change a bit and therefore thieves would not get their desired goods and services because enterpreneurs would still serve to original customers. Thus it is impossible to separe price adjustment from inflationary theft, they occur in the very same moment, there is no time lag between them, the word instantly was not misplaced. Moreover price adjustments are prior to production adjustments (because prices govern production and not the other way around). Thus thieves must FIRST announce their robbery to get what they wish.”
Sure prices adjust after new money is spent – the point is that this process is gradual, as that money is not spent once but many times.
The other thing is it is impossible for most people to distinguish between regular price fluctuations and changes due to new money being spent by the recipients of new money.
“Even swift inflow of gold into economy would not cause any cluster of errors. ”
You’re wrong about this – there have been business cycles that were entirely due to influxes of new sources of gold & silver (I don’t remember the name of the book but it’s somewhere here on Mises.org). The difference being, of course, that such influxes are rare and non-continuous. Printing of money and spending it would cause a business cycle just as fractional reserve banking does – minus the demand deposit bank runs.
The reason why is any significant increase in the money supply has the effect of lowering interest rates below what would prevail in the absence of the new money. It isn’t direct like central bank intervention or fractional reserve bank lending, but indirect in that because an increase in the money supply leads (sooner or later) to an increase in the amount of money available to lend – that pushes the price of lending money down.
It is this distortion to the interest rate that causes entrepreneurs and top level management to make investments they wouldn’t otherwise make – it is also this same distortion that increases consumer spending (money is cheaper, after all) – these investments and excess consumption (often funded by debt) are malinvestments in the truest sense of the word.
There wouldn’t be bank runs under such a system (after all, your demand deposits would be safe and separate from the rest of the assets of the bank – they couldn’t claim them as their own assets), but there would still be tons of bad loans made by banks with time deposits.
Kilmore: “I just cannot agree. If central banks did nothing else than printing of new paper (I mean really printing) then there would be no business cycle at all. Similarly gold mining does not cause business cycle. The reason is not as some suggest relatively small amount of mined out metal. Even swift inflow of gold into economy would not cause any cluster of errors.”
I disagree. A swift inflow of gold would perhaps not cause problems if the money holding public knew about it. The problem though is information. You say that if central banks only printed money then there would be no business cycle. I fail to understand why.
Holders of money do not know how the central bank will behave, they cannot make plans for it. A business cycle is inevitable.
Kilmore: “One serious problem of your example (Britain under gold standard) is the fact that it supports my position, not yours
Though it was impossible to create money per se, for it was impossible to print gold, business cycle was present.”
There were crises under Britain’s gold standard. However they were linked to wars, foreign events and devaluations.
Kilmore: “Socialized banking system must always cause boom-bust, inflation is only easy way to finance it.”
You keep saying that, without presenting an argument for it. Why?
Kilmore: “If government imposed tax on tax holdings, for example three percents, and then gave this huge sum to central bank thus enabling it to lower interest rate what would be the difference between such scheme and inflation? None. Yet you would be rather unwilling to relate taxation with business cycle.”
I think what you are suggesting is that the government impose a tax on money holdings. Let’s consider what would happen if they did this. A large amount of money would leave the accounts of money holders. This would obviously drive up interest rates as financing becomes more scarce.
That money would then be transferred to the central bank. Now, how would the central bank decrease interest rates? To do so they must lend out what they have taken from taxes and increase money supply. In your scheme it is unlikely if the interest rate could actually be changed. To change the interest rate requires money issue or destruction of money.
I think Robert Murphy unwittingly pointed out a little shortcoming of the ABCT. Please find my views on this issue here:
http://www.economicsjunkie.com/austrian-economists-
need-to-get-their-business-cycle-theory-straight/
Let me just point out: I did not say that the ABCT (in its commonly known form) does not account for increased consumption spending. I say that it does not explain why producers actually produce more consumption goods than before. I do understand the tug of war concept, and the increased demand for consumer goods. However, I maintain that it does not sufficiently explain why the entire structure of production during the boom is being aligned to actually respond to this increasing demand by PRODUCING more consumer goods and NEGLECTING the procuction of capital goods.
Robert Murphy’s Sushi is actually a perfect example for what I propose to call the consumption business cycle. In his example, more resources are allocated to the production of consumer goods (gathering rice, catching fish), and fewer are being allocated to the upkeep of capital goods (maintenance of boats and fishnets).
During the equilibrium state 25 people were employed in the capital goods industry. After Krugman’s advice it’s only 10 people, out of which only 5 perform the criucial task of boat maintenance. He perfectly explains the phenomenon of increased consumption and corresponding production of consumer goods, but it does not occur due to a channeling of resources away from short term projects toward longer term projects. In fact, it occurs due to the exact opposite. Resources are taken from projects that yield an output at a later point in time (maintaining boats), and are directed toward projects that yield an immediate output (collecting rice, fish, and combining the two).
Question: What are some examples of intermediate goods that we’ve seen neglected in this (and/or past) recession(s)?
Thanks for an excellent post!
I like this article very much but did I miss something? The island economy seems to lack money. They do have division of labor which is altered by Krugman’s interventions but there is no analogue of a Fed creating “fake warehouse receipts”.
“Finally, we predict that during the period of transition, some islanders will have nothing to do.”
Seeing as the “mystical unemployment” criticism is a large part of Krugman refutation, I’m not sure why Murphy’s article only leaves this bare assertion as the attempted rebuttal.
@LibertyHater – Precisely. The vast majority of the example is devoted to showing us how malinvestment (or rather, lack of investment in infrastructure) can ultimately bring about a fall in production, which is transparently obvious and not disputed by anybody. Then the crucial question of “But why does this lead to unemployment?” is dismissed with a handwave.
Specifically, why would the excess workers not be put to work on boat and net production? You don’t have to use them to build more boats and nets. They can instead produce the same number of boats and nets faster, and the island can go back to normal that much sooner. There is of course a limit to how much you can accelerate production by throwing more workers at the task; but there is nothing in the example to indicate that the islanders have reached this limit, and if the excess workers accelerate production even a little bit, everyone will be better off.
Can I then take it that Mr. Murphy is advocating massive new infrastructure investments, since the present bust is apparently the result of allowing our infrastructure to decay?
It gets even worse than that.
While Murphy claims to be describing an economic boom by analogy in this writing, there actually isn’t even an identifiable boom in the story. Unlike actual booms which are related to product demand, Murphy’s sushi boats fall into disrepair and crash the market even though demand for sushi remains high [as made evident by the comment that "each roll has less fish in it. The islanders are furious"].
Murphy also states that “eventually the reduction in boat and net maintenance begins to affect output. With only 5 islanders devoted to this task, instead of the original 25, something has to give.” He says “something has to give” as if it is inevitable and common knowledge that maintenance would become a problem. If it is such an obvious problem, then the sushi producers should also have known that “something would have to give”, thus, in effect, the sushi producers inexplicably made a decision to engage in actions that would reduce their medium to long-term output. Again, this is nothing like a real boom, wherein producers pursue actions with the expectation of increased output (all other factors outside of their direct control remaining equal).
In the end, this sushi story seems to be nothing more than a false analogy with little resemblance to a real economic boom.
Thanks very nice topic
Your very long example doesn’t really illustrate anything, because you assume that labor is fully engaged, and that the economy truly is capital constrained. If you wanted your example to hold up, you should have added 10 idle workers who were fired from their jobs as fishermen and sushi makers, and 10 more idle folks who had been out of work for more than a year from their previous jobs as boat maintainers and rice gatherers.
But you are assuming that the economy is already at full capacity and that Krugman is simply advising them to shift their allocation of resources. That is not the situation we are in today, nor is it the one Krugman and his camp are discussing. Today, I think it’s pretty clear that the economy’s not operating at full capacity (and if you dispute that, I’d love to hear your argument), and the question is not only why that is, but also how we can get it back on track.
Interesting article. The story seems ends up in a state where it’s supply side constrained. That is – no amount of reshuffling of resources can fill the stomachs of the island’s population because there’s just no more sushi that can be produced.
In as much as this story is supposed to reflect what happened post-recession – it does not seem to line up with the evident observation that our economy has no problem of supply. If people are going hungry – it’s not because that there’s not enough food being produced – but simply that they don’t have enough money. This is even more so true for other everyday wants – clothes, cars and so on. Govt. credits for buying efficient autos post-recession produced an instant supply of cars from under-utilized factories.
So can you please help educate me how this story explains what happened during the recession post-2008?
(I am not an economist, nor do i subscribe to any particular school of thought – i simply want to understand the phenomenon i see around myself. i work in the Silicon Valley – where part of this analog evidently holds true – that yes it takes time for new (job creating) industries (like the Internet or smartphones) to be created. but as any Valley person would tell you – there’s nothing systematic about how these come about . they don’t happen just because of or lack-of investment. The company i work for (Facebook) prospered right through the recession (and many new category-busting companies like Groupon were born right during the recession).
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