A Generalization and Critique of Hoppean Ethics by Andrew Young (University of Mississippi)
In this paper I examine Hoppe’s unified ethics and generalize it by arguing that self-ownership is not the only permissible ethic based on its presuppositions. Rather, I argue that self-ownership is one specific and permissible ethic amongst a general class of permissible ethics. As such, libertarianism becomes a permissible solution to the problem of social order but not the permissible solution.
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I don’t see how your “each person owns an equal share of everyone else, but a controlling share of him or herself” makes any bit of sense at all. It brings up questions like “what part of everyone else does a person own?” and “when does that person gain ownership of that part of others?”. Further, how is it even possible? By our own homesteading and autonomic systems we control ourselves. What is it that allows us partial ownership of others? There’s no method. It’s much like “In space, no one can hear you scream” Why? There’s no method for transmission. Similarly, I can see no method or justification for each person having equal (partial) ownership of others.
Right. Such collective quotal ownership simply fails logically and cannot actually be put in practise even if we accepted it as an ethic.
To Andrew Young: I’d like to read your paper, but i am unable to open the file on my deficient computer. Perhaps you might e-mail the paper to me?
One criticism occurs to me based on your brief summary. The idea that there can exist more than one “permissible” ethic is logically incoherent. Ethics is a subset of moral principles, that applies specifically to relations between individuals. The principles that define how people ought–or ought not–to treat each other are derived from human nature. That is, morally appropriate behavior–in the area of ethics, or in the area of personal choice–ought to be consistent with the requirements of one’s nature as a human being, as well as the requirements of one’s nature as a uniquely individual human.
Those requirements of life appropriate to all humans are not plastic, nor optional, nor subjective. A horse needs air, and sunlight, and grass and water and space to move around to instictively acquire these values. Plants need air and sunlight, water and soil, certain temperatures, etc., all of which the plant automatically integrates into the process of living. Human beings also ahve particular requirements by nature, to live and flourish; but those requirements stem from the unique human capacity to think conceptually and by choice.
Man’s distinctive capacity to reason and to choose implies definitive values–moral values–necessary to human life and flourishing. As such, there is no such thing as several “permissible” ethical systems. There is only ethics–the moral principles appropriate to man’s distinctive nature as a thinking choosing creature.
What I think Mr Young means is systems based on the socialist ethic etc. If one is of the view that the natural right (ie libertarian ethic) is the only correct one it is natural that they’d conflate the ethical system with this – but it still does not mean Mr Young cannot use the terms that way, since the question is essentially which ethical view is correct.
I believe his analogy to equal shares in a corporation falls apart when exploring benefits. Since in a corporation, each holder of a share of ownership shares proportionately in the gains and losses of the company.
However, in the realm of general actions of an individual, it is impossible to make any statement whatsoever regarding the gains and losses of equal possessors of A.
I would certainly expect that there is some proportional tendency for gain or loss and the proximity to an individual who acts to be related, and the situation of those far away is relatively unaffected. But even this statement is nonsensical due to the incomparability of inter-personal utility.
Thus, since each share of ownership in a person cannot be claimed to generate neither equal benefit nor equal loss -in fact there is no possibility of saying what it generates in the way of gains and losses- the analogy between a corporation and this form of shared ownership must be incorrect.
I think the author has also overestimated his contention that action would be permissible in his ethic. He contends that naturally I own a controlling share of my body, but others own an equal share that is less than my controlling share. The only way for my controlling share to be overcome is by a majority overrule. But, in order to ‘act ethically’ wouldn’t I still have to consult each member of society before acting?
I think action would be paralyzed no less in this ethic than in the communistic ethic. It could be argued that not all actions may need societal permission. Actions such as, walking to my kitchen for a cup of coffee may seem to only need the permission of family members. But, this action has to arise from other actions which would have required societal permission: How did I receive permission to ethically acquire the house in the first place?
If I’ve read the author correctly, then there are two problems which immediately come to mind. First, he does not provide a rigorous and convincing explanation of his distinction between “majority ownership” and “controlling ownership”. How is it possible for one to have a controlling interest and yet not be a majority owner. For example, in order to argue in the manner that Mr. young does, he must necessarily have controlling interest whereby he does not need the approval of other “shareholders” to take action. Yet in the case of company stock a twenty percent owner of the company cannot act with impunity without at least the passive acceptance of the other shareholders. That is why he is not considered to have controlling interest in the company until he acquires a majority stake. The second problem is related to his understanding of the categorical imperative. A norm qua norm must be universalizable, otherwise it simply fails to qualify as a norm. Thus, coercion can never be considered a justifiable norm, as attempting to unversalize coercion/aggression would imply a contradiction, in the same way as lying does. All this can be said without referring to any assumptions made during the course of argumentation, such as self-ownership. The self-ownership presupposition illustrates the positive ethical rights implied in propositional exchanges. Yet the author’s “permissible ethical system” fails as a categorical imperative and thus can never be justified/made universal.
Mr Young, it would be of use to you to read up on Nozick’s “Demoktesis” in his Anarchy, State and Utopia where he analyzes the idea of shareholding in individuals. It runs parallel to ideas expressed in your paper, though Nozick concludes it will lead to a class A with powers over a class B.
so suppose the external ‘stockholders’ have sufficient weight to overide an individual, in any action. (the essay you wrote seems to allow this wide position, which may need narrowing?)
then suppose a stock-constituted-’individual’ faces a ‘Hoppian-Arguer’ .
Stocky says: ‘i dont have complete sovereign control over myself, i am allowed to express this as the other stockholders have allowed this to pass as permissable, and the stock holders do not allow my holding another position on this subject as true, (perhaps as they hold that i cant knowing lie?), therefore you are seeing me arguing as sovereign, but me arguing as a stock-constituted individual’
yet the Hoppian Arguer says
‘well im under no influence of any stockholders’ then it would seem, unless we are constituted differently, the stockholders have entered a contradiction in what they that allow.
“But what remains? Well, A and B obviously. Scenarios A and B can both be categorical imperatives, but B – communism – is problematic in a different sense:
“Can we picture a world in which no man is free to take any action whatsoever without prior approval by everyone else in society? Clearly no man would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly perish (Rothbard, 1998, p. 46).
“In a hypothetical world of two, three, or even ten men, perhaps this observation would be of little import.â€
How so? Proposition B is equally problematic in a room and world of two people, as it is in a world of two billion. If the rule that is strictly followed is that no man can take action without the approval of everyone else, whatever the number, then it is obviously impossible to even take the single action of asking for or giving this approval. It is impossible to act at all. Only by violating the rule before one even gets started can one have a hope of survival. An actor following such an ethic should, in principle, die in the time it takes to suffocate, since he cannot obtain approval to even breathe, let alone sit, stand or utter a single sentence.
“A GENERAL MAXIM INCLUDING SELF-OWNERSHIP AS A SPECIFIC CASE
“While many of Murphy and Callahan’s critiques are inadmissible given Hoppe’s insistence on categorical imperatives, I am now going to argue that Hoppe’s claim of selfownership as the only ethical solution to the problem of social order is still too strong. Accepting his premises, self-ownership remains a specific case of a general continuum of permissible ethics.
“Consider a scenario which I will label D: Each man will be partially and equally owned by everyone else, while maintaining a controlling share of ownership in himself. Here I will define controlling share as a share of ownership in something that is larger than any other individual man’s share of ownership in that something. (If the share is smaller than or equal to any other man’s share I will refer to it as a non-controlling share.) D is a valid categorical imperative; it also does not rule out action. A controlling share implies that a man’s own will to act overrides any other individual’s share taken alone. A man’s own will could only be overridden by a coalition of two or more equal other-owners of non-controlling shares.â€
For starters: How does owning a controlling-share, as opposed to a libertarian majority share in one’s self, imply that action is not ruled out? How does the fact that no single man can override another’s will, imply that a man’s own will can be acted on at all? Without a majority agreement, he still seems to need to obtain a majority agreement before he can act at all. And it strikes me that he must act before he can obtain such agreement – a deadlock situation. Therefore, he is doomed to the fate of one pursuing proposition B: he must suffocate to death.
“To restate, my argumentation for D would entail the following statement: Each man is partially and equally owned by everyone else, while maintaining a controlling share of ownership in himself. Exercising my share of ownership in myself constitutes my ability to argue the point; likewise I presume that any opponent can exercise their share of ownership in themselves. The analogy to ownership in a corporation should not be lost here because it effectively indicates that exclusive control is not presumed in justifying one’s actions and statements rationally. Moreover, one need not even presume a controlling share of ownership, as in D. Every shareholder in a corporation typically exercises an argument in the actions of the corporation with weight of 1/n where n is the number of equal unit shares in ownership. Presuming the smallest, i.e., 1/nth, weight to a given argument in the outcome of an argumentation does not in any way belie the fact that it is indeed an argument!â€
I think the shared self-ownership – corporate share ownership analogy is very shaky. This is because the share owners/voters of a firm are and must be independent contracting private property owners prior to becoming involved in this shared arrangement with this firm. Prior to such an arrangement, homesteading, private property ownership, and voluntary transfer of title of property from one contractor to another are all presupposed in this arrangement. That means a right to 100% control over previously homesteaded scarce resources, including one’s own body, must already be established to entertain ideas of such a contractual arrangement of share ownership in a private firm.
So it is not convincing to use such an analogy in support of a thesis that is in contradiction to the very foundation of such an example.
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