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Source link: http://blog.mises.org/6350/g-a-cohen-the-rothbardian-hoppean-marxist/

G.A. Cohen, the Rothbardian-Hoppean Marxist?

March 9, 2007 by

In Jan Narveson’s thought-provoking and elegantly-written The Libertarian Idea (1990), he discusses an admission by a Marxist, G.A. Cohen, of a serious problem with communal ownership of property. As Narveson notes (p. 68): “The problem for socialists, as Cohen observes, is how to have both the right of self-ownership … and yet a right of equality, getting us the socialism they are so morally enamored of. That there is a problem here is suggested by” the following comment by Cohen (found on p. 93-94 of his book Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality (originally from G.A. Cohen, “Self-Ownership, World-Ownership and Equality,” in F. Lucash, ed., Justice and Equality, Here and Now (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 113-114):

people can do (virtually) nothing without using parts of the external world. If, then, they require the leave of the community to use it, then, effectively …, they do not own themselves, since they can do nothing without communal authorization.”

Narveson comments: “It is testimony to the strength of our position that even someone so ideologically opposed gives it clear recognition as an argument that must be confronted.”

Does Cohen’s reasoning sound familiar? It should, to Rothbardians and Hoppeans. See below –In Rothbard’s The Ethics of Liberty he argues in favor of self-ownership because the only logical alternatives are “(1) the ‘communist’ one of Universal and Equal Other-ownership, or (2) Partial Ownership of One Group by Another–a system of rule by one class over another.” However, “in practice, if there are more than a very few people in the society,” the first

alternative must break down and reduce to Alternative (2), partial rule by some over others. For it is physically impossible for everyone to keep continual tabs on everyone else, and thereby to exercise his equal share of partial ownership over every other man. In practice, then, this concept of universal and equal other-ownership is Utopian and impossible, and supervision and therefore ownership of others necessarily becomes a specialized activity of a ruling class. Hence, no society which does not have full self-ownership for everyone can enjoy a universal ethic. For this reason alone, 100 percent self-ownership for every man is the only viable political ethic for mankind.

Rothbard goes on,

But suppose for the sake of argument that this Utopia could be sustained. What then? In the first place, it is surely absurd to hold that no man is entitled to own himself, and yet to hold that each of these very men is entitled to own a part of all other men! But more than that, would our Utopia be desirable? Can we picture a world in which no man is free to take any action whatsoever without prior approval by everyone else in society? Clearly no man would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly perish. [emphasis added]

(See also Rothbard’s comments in Man, Economy, and State, where he refutes the idea that the free market robs future generations by wasting natural resources, since “[s]uch reasoning would lead to the paradoxical conclusion that none of the resource be con­sumed at all.”)

Hans-Hermann Hoppe makes some related points as well. In Hoppe’s The Ethics and Economics of Private Property, Hoppe argues that the libertarian principle of original appropriation–”Everyone is the proper owner of his own physical body as well as of all places and nature-given goods that he occupies and puts to use by means of his body, provided that no one else has already occupied or used the same places and goods before him” is not only intuitive and obvious to most people (even “children and primitives”), it is also provable. Hoppe argues that there are only two alternatives to this rule: “Either another person, B, must be recognized as the owner of A’s body as well as the places and goods appropriated, produced or acquired by A, or both persons, A and B, must be considered equal co-owners of all bodies, places and goods.” However, the first rule reduces A to the rank of B’s slave, and is therefore not universalizable. As for the “second case of universal and equal co-ownership,”

this alternative would suffer from an even more severe deficiency, because if it were applied, all of mankind would instantly perish. (Since every human ethic must permit the survival of mankind, this alternative must also be rejected.) Every action of a person requires the use of some scarce means (at least of the person’s body and its standing room), but if all goods were co-owned by everyone, then no one, at no time and no place, would be allowed to do anything unless he had previously secured every other co-owner’s consent to do so.

Thus, “universal communism,” as Rothbard referred to it, is a “praxeological impossibility.”

For similar comments, see A Theory of Socialism of Capitalism (1989), pp. 142-143.

Hoppe also criticizes the notion that aggression can be viewed as “an invasion of the value or psychic integrity of” others’ property, as opposed to the libertarian view under which aggression is “defined as an invasion of the physical integrity of another person’s property.” Hoppe critiques this alternative conception of aggression because

While a person has control over whether or not his actions will change the physical properties of another’s property, he has no control over whether or not his actions affect the value (or price) of another’s property. This is determined by other individuals and their evaluations. Consequently, it would be impossible to know in advance whether or not one’s planned actions were legitimate. The entire population would have to be interrogated to assure that one’s actions would not damage the value of someone else’s property, and one could not begin to act until a universal consensus had been reached. Mankind would die out long before this assumption could ever be fulfilled.

See similar arguments by Hoppe in his 1988 Austrian Economic Newsletter article, The Justice of Economic Efficiency (p. 3). Interestingly, in the ensuing exchange between the late David Osterfeld and Hoppe, they use language eerily similar to Cohen’s: Osterfeld (p. 9): “Hoppe argues that socialism is ‘argumentatively indefensible’ because if private property is not recognized, then one would have to come to an agreement with the ‘entire world population’ prior to committing oneself to a course of action, a requirement that would paralyze all human action, and thus all life. It is not clear that the only alternative to individual ownership is ownership by the ‘world community’.” (I cannot find the exact phrases “entire world population” or “world community” in the Hoppe piece Osterfeld is critquing, however.) In Hoppe’s response (p. 239), he notes: “Osterfeld claims that I construct an altemative between either individual ownership or but that such an altemative is not exhaustive. This is a misrepresentation. Nowhere do I say anything like this.” (emphasis added)

{ 72 comments }

Peter March 13, 2007 at 8:59 pm

the objection is not meaningless, and is certainly not akin to saying 2 + 2 = 5, because it is possible that the situation i described can exist, without any assumption of aggression on anyone’s part.

What do you mean by “possible”? You mean you can imagine a world in which that situation obtains, in the same way you can imagine a world in which the speed of light is 17mph? Or do you mean it’s actually a possibility in this real world? Because if you mean the latter, you’re wrong. And if you mean the former, it is indeed meaningless.

Stephan Kinsella March 13, 2007 at 9:07 pm

Sasha: “Someone like me have parents with property (where I lived until I turned 18), but what if they kicked me out of there? Now imagine a hypothetical world in which everything is privatized and I don’t have anyone’s invitation to live on their property (Ste’s scenario). What then?

My response to Ste was: In the anarcho-capitalist world, I would have a limited privilege of necessity to obtain food and shelter, but I would have to compensate the owners… My aggression against owners (refusal to pay) is not presupposed.”

Yeah–someone so unliked, so despicable, such a loser, that their own parent kick them out, they have no friends they can stay with, no charitable groups they can avail themselves of, no job with their own income–such a person is likely to be able to pay compensation for trespass, right? Uh, yeah.

Sasha Radeta March 13, 2007 at 9:14 pm

Dr. Kinsella,

Inability to pay does not excuse anyone from legal liability. Such person still owes his body and ability to do at least some kind of labor (any form of useful labor, as demonstrated by the ability to get on someone’s property and feed himself). It is up to the owner to decide whether to forgive a poor person – not up to the legals system.

Regards.

Peter March 13, 2007 at 9:21 pm

Will shop-owners rights be violated if I take their food in order to sustain my life? NOT NECESSARILY. Only if I refuse to pay them at the later time – that would constitute a violation! And trust me: anarcho-capitalism would sanction these violations.

Of course the violation occurs at the time you take the food. Paying for it after the fact is restitutive punishment. (Regarding your earlier post, about a shipwrecked man washing up on a private island, I can’t for the life of me see how he owes the owner anything for that)

[Also note that you're using the word "sanction" in an unusual way. The normal meaning is "allow" or "approve of"; confusingly, it is sometimes used to mean "punish" recently, which is apparently what you mean, but it'd make a lot more sense if you said "anarcho-capitalism would NOT sanction these violations" (not that it actually makes any sense either way: anarcho-capitalism is a concept, concepts don't give approval to actions)]

Sasha Radeta March 13, 2007 at 9:33 pm

Peter,

OK. You violate rights of restaurant owner when you eat your dinner there – and your payment for it is “restitutive” punishment.

Of course I’m joking, but you demonstrated your ignorance of basic legal concept. If “necessity” was in fact violation, a person would not only owe for something he used, but he would also pay PUNITIVE damages. No such thing exists… sorry.

Also note that a legal definition of “sanction” is “embargo” or “punishment” – hence the term “legal sanction.” I agree that if somebody fell from Mars, he would find my use of term “sanction” unusual. I did not talk about Latin or Indo-European root of this word.

When I say that anarcho-capitalism would not sanction something, I refer to people under such order – which is also clear to everyone.

Thanks for your contribution. Regards.

Peter March 14, 2007 at 2:03 am

OK. You violate rights of restaurant owner when you eat your dinner there – and your payment for it is “restitutive” punishment.

If the owner doesn’t want to serve you, that would be true. Otherwise, you’re eating there on the understanding that you’ll be paying for it (or someone will), not just taking the food.

If “necessity” was in fact violation, a person would not only owe for something he used, but he would also pay PUNITIVE damages.

It’s certainly a possibility.

Also note that a legal definition of “sanction” is “embargo” or “punishment” – hence the term “legal sanction.”

The term “legal sanction” means exactly the opposite of what you say: legal approval to do something, not punishment. E.g., the first hit on Google, an article entitled “Bush administration seeks legal sanction for torture” – means Bush wants approval to use torture, not that Bush wants to be punished.

Björn Lundahl March 14, 2007 at 3:28 am

Life and self-ownership

Mark Humphrey “I don’t want to precipitate trench warfare with devoted Rothbardians, but I strongly suspect that Rothbard owed his insight about “life as the standard of moral value” to Ayn Rand. I can’t prove this, of course. Sadly, in “The Ethics of Liberty”, (published in the early Eighties) Rothbard chose to, in a sense, blacklist Rand by claiming that NO ONE, other than himself, in the libertarian movement was working to develope a system of rationally defensible ethics. (Maybe Rothbard meant “at the moment I am writing this statement”.)”

Björn That life is an axiomatic value and functions “as the standard of moral value” in an ethical system, Rothbard could, alternatively for example, have gotten this insight from Mises himself through analyzing his statement in his book, “Human Action”, page 11:

“We may say that action is the manifestation of a man’s will.”

http://mises.org/humanaction/chap1sec1.asp

I am not saying that Rothbard did get his insight from Mises; I am only saying that it was possible. Surely, many other possibilities exist which we do not know anything about.

Mark Humphrey “It has been awhile since I’ve read Hoppe, and Rothbard; but I suspect Hoppe’s reasoning goes: either we all own ourselves, or everyone owns everyone else. Since the first proposition is clearly more defensible than the latter absurd proposition, one can affirm self ownership as valid. But if this is the argument, it fails. For that argument assumes that which it sets out to prove, namely that an ethical concept, “ownership”, exists. But on this basis, ownership remains unproven, so that one could just as well assert: “no one owns anything, and anything goes.””

Björn Self-ownership is a natural fact, since a man in his very nature controls his own mind and body (natural disposition), that is, he is a natural self-owner of his own will and person (having a free will) and if this was not true, neither could he effectively control any property and, therefore, not own it. In other words; “nothing could control and own something”.

Naturally, praxeology the science of human action, by itself logically confirms the natural fact of self-ownership, since praxeology is based upon “the acting man consciously intending to improve his own satisfaction” and I quote from answers.com:

“From praxeology Mises derived the idea that every conscious action is intended to improve a person’s satisfaction. He was careful to stress that praxeology is not concerned with the individual’s definition of end satisfaction, just the way he sought that satisfaction. The way in which a person will increase his satisfaction is by removing a source of dissatisfaction. As the future is uncertain so every action is speculative.

An acting man is defined as one capable of logical thought — to be otherwise would be to make one a mere creature who simply reacts to stimuli by instinct. Similarly an acting man must have a source of dissatisfaction which he believes capable of removing, otherwise he cannot act.

Another conclusion that Mises reached was that decisions are made on an ordinal basis. That is, it is impossible to carry out more than one action at once, the conscious mind being only capable of one decision at a time — even if those decisions can be made in rapid order. Thus man will act to remove the most pressing source of dissatisfaction first and then move to the next most pressing source of dissatisfaction.

As a person satisfies his first most important goal and after that his second most important goal then his second most important goal is always less important than his first most important goal. Thus, for every further goal reached, his satisfaction, or utility, is lessened from the preceding goal. This is the rule of diminishing marginal utility.

In human society many actions will be trading activities where one person regards a possession of another person as more desirable than one of his own possessions, and the other person has a similar higher regard for his colleague’s possession than he does for his own. This subject of praxeology is known as catallactics, and is the more commonly accepted realm of economics.”

http://www.answers.com/Praxeology?gwp=11&ver=2.0.1.458&method=3

Further:

The Ethics of Liberty, page 45:

Footnote:

“[1]Professor George Mavrodes, of the department of philosophy of the University of Michigan, objects that there is another logical alternative: namely, “that no one owns anybody, either himself or anyone else, nor any share of anybody.” However, since ownership signifies range of control, this would mean that no one would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly vanish.”

http://mises.org/rothbard/ethics/eight.asp

Or in my own words from the essay “Normative principles”:

“Why must anybody own anything?

In accordance with our objective test to find out if something is a condition for something else, we grasp a state of things where the following principle is none existent anywhere and at all:

“Everybody owns themselves and their Justly owned property rights”.

Nobody would be able to do anything, since nobody has the right to control anything. Not even themselves (see below about property rights in your own person).

This question is not only a contradiction it is also silly. You ask a question which means that you control yourselves (natural disposition), that is owning yourself (see below the excellent writing of Hans-Hermann Hoppe). The other contradiction is that if nobody would own anything, nobody would be able to hinder anyone to own anything either since they would otherwise have an invalid control (having the disposition to) of everyone else, that is having an invalid ownership to everybody else (see below about valid property rights in your own person).

Ownership itself is, therefore, an objective condition for the preservation of human life.”

http://normativeprinciples.blogspot.com/2006/12/normative-principles-pure-free-market_10.html

An Animated Introduction to the Philosophy of Liberty:

http://www.isil.org/resources/introduction.html

The animation in full-sized window:

http://www.isil.org/resources/introduction.swf

Björn Lundahl
Göteborg, Sweden

Sasha Radeta March 14, 2007 at 8:36 am

Peter,

You say: “Otherwise, you’re eating there on the understanding that you’ll be paying for it (or someone will), not just taking the food.

But that is also true of “necessity.” You are eating in order to survive, exercising substantive self-ownership, understanding that you will pay for it.

Coming from the legal definition of “violation” – you cannot say that you must commit it in case of pure necessity, when you acknowledge that you will pay for it. Anarcho-capitalism might hypothetically and unlikely lead to a situation in which a particular person will not have any means for producing his own food – but that does not mean that this person’s act out of necessity can ever be viewed as unlawful and forceful (violation) as long this party does not refuse the responsibility to compensate the owner. There can be no punitive damages when it comes to necessity.

I accept your concerns, but for the most part they were unnecessary.

PS
[As far as term "sanction" goes, it has different meanings and people will understand me from my context, rather than "google". English has a few other words that can refer to opposites, such as the verbs dust (meaning both "to remove dust from" and "to put dust on") and trim (meaning both "to cut something away" and "to add something as an ornament").]

Sasha Radeta March 14, 2007 at 10:41 am

So the last line of defense of anarcho-communism has been reduced to a false assumption that anarcho-capitalism could hypothetically lead to world which is so subdivided that there is no land on which a proletariats (people who own nothing but themselves) can establish an adverse possession or homesteading. But even if this happens – it does not mean that these proletarians will automatically commit any violation if they act out of pure necessity. Dr. Kinsella’s objection that proletarians have no wealth to pay any compensation does not hold – as long as proletarians own themselves (and their body as a valued mean of production).

Communists logically failed and their alternative plan to argue universal co-ownership of the world’s resources was effectively debunked by Rothbard and Hoppe.

ste March 14, 2007 at 11:47 am

Sasha,

“But even if this happens – it does not mean that these proletarians will automatically commit any violation if they act out of pure necessity.”

i still think you are ignoring my point. how can non-violation rest on the person agreeing to compensate? as Stephan Kinsella pointed out, it is very possible that the person cannot or will not compensate. but this i think comes after the point at which the objection strikes. i assume that Stephan does not agree with my objection, but this does not necessarily follow from his comment. also, you seem to have some disagreements with Peter now, despite you both disagreeing with me. this is yet more evidence for me of the importance of how anarcho-capitalists successfully refute objections such as the one i raise.

as i already asked, how are you to deny the logical necessity of trespass that pertains when all property owners justly refuse access? in this sense rights are not compossible (all realisable without violation), and herein lies the objection. do you agree that *this* sense of ‘necessity’ is very different to the one used if the person CHOOSES to eat the food of someone else in order to survive?

Jordan March 14, 2007 at 12:49 pm

Ste,

My initial impression is that yes, it does pre-suppose that there is either a location to which that person owns or has contracted to reside, or a location to which entry is assumed to be allowed (a “public” place, in the non-governmental sense). I imagine that this scenario only comes up in very primitive, limited cases (if ever) and that in the real world, there would always be a place for the non-landowner to legally stand.

That’s just my initial impression, however. I haven’t given it a lot of thought–In a moment of haste, I’ve thought 53 and 28 made 71 as well…

Michael A. Clem March 14, 2007 at 1:23 pm

I’ve got to agree with Peter, Sasha. It’s quite different for a restaurant to allow you to order and eat with the expectation that you’ll pay at the end of the dinner than it is to have somebody trespass out of necessity, and then pay compensation.
And I still have to go with “unlikely” on the trespass problem, simply because I’m not going to be absolutist and say it’s impossible when it’s possible but absurd. Still, I think the analogy to a restaurant is fair. Under what circumstances would a restaurant, from a high-class French joint to your local McDonald’s, deny a person to dine on their premises? Their whole raison d’etre is to sell their food/service to customers. There would be no good, rational reason to denying a thorougly unobjectionable person with the means to pay from dining. They would only reject him if they knew that he couldn’t pay, or he was a health risk (Typhoid Mary?), or he was a danger, or he was a known restaurant thief, or SOMETHING like that.
Land, of course, has various and sundry uses, and use as rental property is only one of them. But the same considerations apply, at least to landlords. They must have some good reason for denying someone on their property, not because I say so, but because they, like the restaurants, want to make money.
Thus, like I said, the circumstances of the situation matter. It might be entirely understandable, even to the most ardent anti-AC’er, why some particular person would not be legally allowed on people’s property. Without knowing the circumstances, it’s hard to make blanket, generalized statements that will be true.

Sasha Radeta March 14, 2007 at 6:04 pm

Michael,

You didn’t surprise me with siding with Peter. You don’t understand that principle of necessity does not imply “violation” as long as you pay for your use. I only used the restaurant example, because in many cases people who don’t have money to pay in a restaurant – get a deal with the manager to wash the dishes and compensate him in that way. But in case of necessity, self-ownership (which cannot be exercised if you starve to death) will be protected – but the owner will be compensated (there will be no injured side).

—–

Ste,

I did not ignore any of your objections. Self-ownership is absolute, and property ownership is the only ethical way to exercise it.

You mentioned Dr. Kinsella’s objection that a person who act out of necessity perhaps will not be able to pay for his use. Hold on one second… There is nothing criminal about not being able to pay. How can you classify it as a “violation” then? “Violation” by its legal meaning is something criminal (check the definition) – and “necessity” can never be classified as such.

You also mention the possibility that the proletarian will refuse to pay for his use of someone else’s property. HOLD ON ONE SECOND! Such criminal act would be punishable in anarcho-capitalism, and such violations would occur in any system (except that socialism would legalize such unlawful acts). The fact that you point out such irrelevant nonsense only illustrates you lack of ideas.

Despite of disagreements from some people here, they did not raise any valid objections to anarcho-capitalism. The only possible way to prove that self-ownership could theoretically create a conflict with property rights in anarcho-capitalism – is by claiming that use in case of necessity is a crime (implying that it would yield some punitive damages). Unfortunately for anarcho-communists, such assumption would be nothing but a lie.

You asked: “how are you to deny the logical necessity of trespass that pertains when all property owners justly refuse access?”

Who said I would do something so silly. Trespasses are always possible – and that’s how people obtain adverse possessions and easements. Anarcho-capitalists do not claim that they would eliminate trespass. We only claim that self-ownership would not be conflicted with property rights, because even necessity will be countered by liability compensation.

Michael A. Clem March 14, 2007 at 6:36 pm

I merely agreed with Peter that there’s a difference between a common expectation and an unexpected use, such as an emergency or crisis situation.
I think that the idea of necessity has validity under certain, limited circumstances, but
I’m not sure if the land example would be such an application, given the lack of circumstancial evidence.

Sasha Radeta March 14, 2007 at 7:22 pm

There was actually no need to create such absurd scenario in which there is no space for adverse possession of a proletarian…

Ste could have created a more realistic example in which one parcel of unfertile land is completely surrounded by its neighbors’ land. According to an ignorant view of anarcho-capitalism, this person will starve to death, unless he commits a “violation” against his neighbors. However, there is such a thing called “easement” or “right-of-way,” which will allow to this person to leave his property – but he will in turn have to compensate his neighbor(s). So we cannot talk about “violations,” when we talk about non-criminal exercise of self-ownership rights – and compensation for such use of someone else’s property. Accidents (unintentional trespasses) cannot be called “violations” in legal terms (anarcho-capitalism would not eliminate accidents against property of others, either), but this fact does not mean that a victim of an accident would not be entitled to a compensation.

Anarcho-communist simply doesn’t have a valid objection and they can’t find a contradiction in our views – as long as we insist on compensation for any property use, even if such use is absolutely necessary. Roman law, from the Twelve Tables to the Theodosian Code and the Justinian Corpus, recognized the right of private property as near absolute. Property stemmed from unchallenged possession…
- BUT prior usage always established easements and necessity yielded limited privileges. In either case, owners would not be uncompensated. Is the objection to anarcho-capitalism reduced to the statement that in perfectly privatized world we would not be able to eradicate the principles of privileged necessity and easements? Well, thank dear God that we would not get rid of these wonderful principles – even if only 1% of the world was privatized.

Peter March 14, 2007 at 7:25 pm

But that is also true of “necessity.” You are eating in order to survive, exercising substantive self-ownership, understanding that you will pay for it.

In the case of the ordinary diner at the restaurant, you could consider it a (very short term) credit situation; but for the guy claiming “necessity”, the restaurateur hasn’t agreed to extend credit. You say “understanding that you will pay for it” – but how much is he expected to pay? The restaurateur doesn’t want to serve him. Or maybe he could say “fine, you can eat here, but all the menu prices will be in units of $1000 instead of $1″ – if he decides to walk away and then take the food anyway and claim “necessity”, would you have him pay the replacement cost for the food, the menu price, the menu price multiplied by 1000, or what? No; there’s no question he’s stealing in this situation, regardless of any willingness/intent to pay – the restaurant owner could demand “punitive damages” (“two eyes for an eye”), but if the theft was “necessary” I’d expect the owner who did so to come under fire (figuratively, not literally) from the majority of his customer base.

Sasha Radeta March 14, 2007 at 9:30 pm

Peter,

You can say that eating somewhere out of necessity is a credit situation. While the restaurant owner can demand “punitive damages” against someone who eats and refuses to pay for the heck of it – someone who is in dire need cannot be liable for any punitive damage (no intent of wrongdoing), but he will be liable for the property he used.

You ask: how much a person owes to the owner? If the owner cannot reach an agreement with the user, it’s up to the courts to decide what would be expected compensation of regular customer (to determine how much would person in need pay if he had money in wallet).

Trying to compare “necessity” with theft is nonsensical. It can only be compared to unintentional trespass, since the person in need does not have a choice in his decision to use someone else’s property. In other words, anarcho-communists cannot prove that proletarians would be forced to become thieves by the virtue of self-ownership – even if the entire world was privatized and unwelcoming. As I said, the principle of limited privilege in case of necessity is like an easement for self-ownership right, which precedes all property.

It seems to me that libertarian-communists think that anarcho-capitalists are senseless bastards who would create an order in which some people could starve to death in the middle of unused paradise of wealth. They forget that our property theory includes concepts like adverse possession, necessity, and easement.

Like I said – even if only 1% of world was privatized, these principles would still hold for anarcho-capitalists. There is no need to imagine absurd scenarios like Ste’s (or Cohen’s).

Sasha Radeta March 14, 2007 at 11:51 pm

When it comes to those libertarian-communists who try to invent the arguments against anarcho-capitalism by playing devil’s advocate and pretend that they are concerned about property owners who could be theoretically placed in a “horrible” situation in which a proletarian is forced to cross over their property, while looking for a shelter – all I can say is this:
————————————————–

Dear advocates of the extinction of the mankind,

There is no need for you to invent absurd scenarios in which there is not even a single spot on which someone can find a land to establish his own adverse possession. Even a capitalist world with plenty of unused land that “waits” for homesteading will unavoidably have issues which you try to dishonestly exploit:
- Even if we had an entire new planet ready for settlement, here on Earth we will have private properties that get completely surrounded by other private properties — and they will need path to communicate with the outside world.
- Even in such world in which there is unused abundance of food, there will be shipwrecks, plane-crashes, or any case of dire poverty, which will force some people to use other people’s property in order to survive.
- There will always be possibility of car-crashes, accidents with weapons, people who loose direction, and other unintentional trespasses (accidents) against people’s property — as long as property exists.

Yes, private property rights necessarily leads to these situations, even if only a small portion of Earth was inhabited – but even in Roman times, law based on absolute protection of private property provided solutions for these situations. People who use their privilege of necessity in order to survive on someone else’s property, as well as people who use easement right to cross someone else’s property, will legally be liable to compensate the owner whose land they used. Law in anarcho-capitalism will not tolerate any injury to this owner.

However, this does not mean that law can guarantee that the person who owes compensation will have means to pay his debt. Debt default situation is possible in any system in which property exists – but the fact remains: the rightful owner will still have a legal claim and ownership of goods for which he awaits delivery. As long as indebted side owns his body and capability to work, there are ways in which this debt can be repaid.

So what’s the problem with this? If you seek to avoid theoretical possibility of accidental injuries to your body (for which you would be compensated) – simply kill yourself! If you want to be spared from someone crossing your property and paying you for that – abolish your right to any property (to control anything but your body) and simply starve to death! If you can’t cope with the fact that someone in dire need may use your property to survive – you can simply decide that we all co-own everything in this world, and don’t take another breath before you get permission from everyone — and simply starve to death. You see, anarcho-capitalism allows you to practice what you preach.

What anarcho-capitalism does not allow — is to use your property right to deny substantive property rights of someone else, but no one can cause any injury to your property without owing the adequate remedy for that action. Prior usage always establishes easement for which the other side will be compensated — and the oldest “prior usage” is self-ownership. No contradiction exists there.

Regards,

Björn Lundahl March 15, 2007 at 2:27 am

I want to emphasise this regarding my above comment with the headline “Life and self-ownership”:

In a world without any property rights there wouldn’t be any property rights at all which, naturally, excludes any state or public property rights too.

That would mean that no one would have a right to anything not even to themselves.

Without any property rights the human race would quickly vanish.

This is a logical conclusion which can not, therefore, be refuted by empiricism.

Björn Lundahl

Björn Lundahl March 15, 2007 at 3:04 am

This might instead be clearer:

Why must anybody own anything?

In accordance with our objective test to find out if something is a condition for something else, we grasp a state of things where the following principle is none existent anywhere and at all:

“The existence of property rights”:

In a world without any property rights nobody would be able to do anything, since nobody has the right to control anything. Not even themselves (see below about property rights in your own person).

This question is not only a contradiction it is also silly. You ask a question which means that you control yourselves (natural disposition), that is owning yourself (see below the excellent writing of Hans-Hermann Hoppe). The other contradiction is that if nobody would own anything, nobody would be able to hinder anyone to own anything either since they would otherwise have an invalid control (having the disposition to) of everyone else, that is having an invalid ownership to everybody else (see below about valid property rights in your own person).

Ownership itself is, therefore, an objective condition for the preservation of human life.

Please read some of Hans-Hermann Hoppe´s excellent writing from the book “The Ethics and Economics of Private Property”:

http://mises.org/etexts/hoppe5.pdf

And to:

ON THE ULTIMATE JUSTIFICATION OF THE ETHICS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY:

http://www.hanshoppe.com/publications/econ-ethics-10.pdf

Björn Lundahl

ste June 3, 2007 at 4:22 pm

Sasha,

You know, I’m still not convinced.

“If you want to be spared from someone crossing your property and paying you for that – abolish your right to any property (to control anything but your body) and simply starve to death! If you can’t cope with the fact that someone in dire need may use your property to survive – you can simply decide that we all co-own everything in this world, and don’t take another breath before you get permission from everyone — and simply starve to death. You see, anarcho-capitalism allows you to practice what you preach.”
Does absolute private property require that I allow someone to cross my property? Why can’t I shoot them dead? In any case, that was not my objection, which instead centred on certain necessary trespasses (see above posts). In Hillel Steiner’s words, the first come, first served ethic is incompossible. That is, that the mutual consistency of all the rights in the proposed set of rights is at least a necessary condition of that set being a possible one.

“What anarcho-capitalism does not allow — is to use your property right to deny substantive property rights of someone else, but no one can cause any injury to your property without owing the adequate remedy for that action. Prior usage always establishes easement for which the other side will be compensated — and the oldest “prior usage” is self-ownership. No contradiction exists there.”
Again, if adequate remedy is required, that would suggest a rights violation occurred. None of what I said implies the correctness of any other set of rights. Anyone else?

ste.

Sasha Radeta June 8, 2007 at 5:29 am

STE said:

“Does absolute private property require that I allow someone to cross my property? Why can’t I shoot them dead? In any case, that was not my objection, which instead centred on certain necessary trespasses (see above posts). In Hillel Steiner’s words, the first come, first served ethic is incompossible. That is, that the mutual consistency of all the rights in the proposed set of rights is at least a necessary condition of that set being a possible one.”

You are confusing the issues here. Private property only stems from self-ownership rights, and you cannot violate this right of others even if they cross your private property. You cannot shoot someone dead just because he uses his easement rights in order to leave his own property and/or sustain his life. You also cannot “evict” a passenger from your airplane at 41000 feet, even if you don’t want him there at the moment. Hillel Steiner forgets that we have absolute self-ownership rights, while all other property serves as a mean of sustaining these rights. As H.H. Hoppe brilliantly showed, only Lockean principle of property acquisition is ethical and all other alternatives (when completely applied) would lead to the extinction of mankind.

Again, if adequate remedy is required, that would suggest a rights violation occurred. None of what I said implies the correctness of any other set of rights.”

Not true sir. Compensation for use of someone else’s property does not presuppose any “violation”. We can talk about violations only if a user refuses to compensate the owner for his use. Use of someone property is not a violation in itself.

Anyway, anarcho-capitalism includes the concepts of necessity and easement, simply because property rights are means of sustaining self-ownership — and these rights can never serve as a mean of violating someone else’s self-ownership.

Anyhow, the existence of easement and necessity rights do not prove any inconsistency or logical problem in anarcho-capitalism. Likewise, the fact that there will always be plane crashes or accidental entries on someone else’s property does not “prove” that there is any problem with the Lockean view of private property rights. Anyone else?

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