Daniel Kahneman (the psychologist who won the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in 2002) and Jonathan Renshon try to explain why those who are more willing to favor military action and coercive force succeed in tipping the scales in international affairs:
As the hawks and doves thrust and parry, one hopes that the decision makers will hear their arguments on the merits and weigh them judiciously before choosing a course of action. Don’t count on it. Modern psychology suggests that policymakers come to the debate predisposed to believe their hawkish advisors more than the doves. There are numerous reasons for the burden of persuasion that doves carry, and some of them have nothing to do with politics or strategy. In fact, a bias in favor of hawkish beliefs and preferences is built into the fabric of the human mind.
Social and cognitive psychologists have identified a number of predictable errors (psychologists call them biases) in the ways that humans judge situations and evaluate risks. Biases have been documented both in the laboratory and in the real world, mostly in situations that have no connection to international politics. For example, people are prone to exaggerating their strengths: About 80 percent of us believe that our driving skills are better than average. In situations of potential conflict, the same optimistic bias makes politicians and generals receptive to advisors who offer highly favorable estimates of the outcomes of war. Such a predisposition, often shared by leaders on both sides of a conflict, is likely to produce a disaster. And this is not an isolated example.
In fact, when we constructed a list of the biases uncovered in 40 years of psychological research, we were startled by what we found: All the biases in our list favor hawks. These psychological impulses—only a few of which we discuss here—incline national leaders to exaggerate the evil intentions of adversaries, to misjudge how adversaries perceive them, to be overly sanguine when hostilities start, and overly reluctant to make necessary concessions in negotiations. In short, these biases have the effect of making wars more likely to begin and more difficult to end.
Here is an article detailing the work of the Iran Syria Policy and Operations Group (ISOG) that has its sights set on Tehran and Damascus.
And, then there is the increase of troops in Iraq soon to be proposed by President Bush. “Instead of a surge, it is a bump,” said a State Department official. He spoke on condition of anonymity, because Bush hasn’t yet unveiled details of what the White House is calling a “new way forward” in Iraq.
“In short, these biases have the effect of making wars more likely to begin and more difficult to end.”
Indeed.
{ 4 comments }
Cambodia? Vietnam? Anyone? Perhaps on a much larger scale?
Begging the question, I’m afraid. The thesis, stated at the very beginning, seems to be that hawks “win more than they should”. But how often “should” hawks win? With the frequency that Kahneman Renshon et al would prefer? We are told they make wars “more likely to begin and more difficult to end”. Than *what*? Than if human nature were other than what it is? Than in a fantasy alternate-universe imagined by the authors wherein fewer wars are fought?
A feature of human nature (even if that is what he has identified) which leads to outcomes that Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon do not like is not a ‘bias’ to be corrected, but… a feature of human nature.
Suppose I wrote an article stating that strong, tall, attractive men mated more than they should. That there was a “bias” among women to prefer strong, tall, attractive men, thus such men passed on their genes more often than they should. Would you see the problem then?
What is “should”? How do you defined “should” scientifically? You don’t.
Still, let me grant the authors’ premise for sake of argument. Here’s a possible reason for the hawkward “bias”: Human groups in which the men-leaders behaved more “hawkishly” survived and passed on their ideas/patterns more often. Those which didn’t, didn’t. (Because they were wiped out in wars and stuff…)
If so, it’s a survival mechanism developed among human societies over time. Stack that up against “how hawkish the authors think humans should behave” and, I can’t say I’m very impressed with the latter. Put another way, even if the authors are right, it doesn’t matter.
Justin, thanks for posting this.
Rational behavior may be impossible, but surely understanding our cognitive biases is essential to those who wish to makle the effort. It is also essential to those who wish to avoid manipulation by cynical and/or self-deceived politicians.
To broaden the subject somewhat: I wonder about those inborn biases – they seem analagous to genetic mutations that are neither selected for or against in normal life. Why would it not be possible to consciously adjust for them, one they’re made evident in everyday life activities? Doing so would be acting entrepreneurally, I would think.
Perhaps it’s because the subjective (opportunity) cost of organizing your life in that way is too high for the perceived (subjective) benefit that would result from doing so.
Comments on this entry are closed.