Recreational Drug Prohibitions, by Mark Thornton and Simon W. Bowmaker
On the whole, economists have tended to be against prohibition of recreational drugs, dating back to the days of the ban on alcohol in the USA. Tullock and McKenzie (1985) state that:
“In the early part of this century, many well-intentioned Americans objected to the consumption of alcoholic beverages. They succeeded in getting the Constitution amended to prohibit the sale of alcohol. By the 1930s most of them had given up because they discovered how difficult it was to enforce the law. If they had consulted economists, I’m sure they would have been told that the law would be very difficult and expensive to enforce. With this advice they might have decided not to undertake the program of moral elevation. The same considerations should, of course, be taken into account now with respect to other drugs.” (p.7)
There have been exceptions, however. Irving Fisher, one of the USA’s greatest ever mathematical economists, was a leading proponent of alcohol prohibition. As late as 1927, Fisher claimed he could not find one economist to speak out against prohibition at a meeting of the American Economic Association, and in The Noble Experiment, published in 1930, Fisher clearly remained a strong believer in the virtues of alcohol prohibition:
“Summing up, it may be said that Prohibition has already accomplished incalculable good, hygienically, economically and socially. Real personal liberty, the liberty to give and enjoy the full use of our faculties, is increased by Prohibition. All that the wets can possibly accomplish is laxity of enforcement or nullification: in other words, enormously to increase the very disrespect for the law which they profess to deplore. Hence the only satisfactory solution lies in fuller enforcement of the law”. (p. 454-5)
More recently, Thornton (1995, 2004) reports that in relation to illicit drugs, the majority of economists (in the USA at least) are relatively anti-prohibition. He reports the findings of a survey he conducted in 1995 of 117 randomly selected professional economists based on membership of the American Economic Association. Of those who offered an opinion, 58 per cent were in favour of drug policy in the USA being steered toward decriminalization of drugs. Only 16 per cent favoured complete legalization, while 71 per cent of those who gave a response other than keeping the status quo, favoured either legalization or decriminalization. Less than 2 per cent supported stronger prohibition other than longer prison sentences and increased enforcement budgets.
In a separate survey conducted in 2004, Thornton solicited the views of US economists who are actively engaged in drug policy research. Three general conclusions emerged. First, most argued that the current policy of prohibition in the USA is fairly ineffective, very ineffective, or even harmful. Second, most agreed that the current policy stance ought to be shifted. Third, most believed that this shift ought to be in the direction of liberalization. A source of disagreement, however, centred on the degree of liberalization.
In light of the above, the principal purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the costs and benefits of prohibition and an evaluation of the likely outcomes of drug legalization. To set the scene, we begin with an overview of the history of recreational prohibition.
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I believe that the first Opium War was provoked when a Chinese government official burned down a warehouse full of opium belonging to a British company. So you can see that even this disgraceful episode in history, which apparently shows a government running amok for the purposes of encouraging the consumption of recreational drugs, was itself the product of yet another failed government attempt to proscribe their use. As far as I can tell the common motivation behind both the British and the Chinese governments was mercantilism: Britain wished to promote the drug trade with China in order to prevent the one-way exchange of British silver for Chinese silk, chinaware and tea, and China wished to erase of the trade deficit of Chinese silver for Indian opium.
Another point which I don’t think is raised in this paper is that there is no definition of which substances are recreational and which are medicinal. The definition of both kinds of drugs is, “something which makes you feel better”. When a government seeks to ban certain drugs it is dictating to its people which kinds of pleasure it wishes them to receive, and which kinds of discomfort are deserving of treatment. And if you examine the kinds of discomfort which tend to be relieved with drugs deemed both “recreational” and “harmful”, you will find that those types of pain are usually caused by government. For example: boredom and frustration from being locked in government schools and prisons; the pain and depression of unemployment and underemployment due to government interference in labor markets; and the stress caused by working in professions which are highly restricted and highly regulated by government (stock broker, surgeon).
That is why, in the latter part of the paper in which the possible ill effects of deregulation are discussed, I think that the danger of greater drug use can be minimized. If deregulation of the drug market is accompanied with lower taxes, less bureaucracy, less labor market regulation, etc. then drug use will not greatly increase, but would more likely decrease: those government-caused illnesses of boredom, frustation and stress will be largely cured, therefore there will be far less need to treat their symptoms with drugs such as marijuana and cocaine.
Boredom, frustration and stress are not illnesses. They may be unpleasant, but so is a kick to the groin. I’m with Caplan and Szasz on these “illnesses”. But maybe I’m just a square and don’t get it, mmaaaaaannn.
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