Two new Libertarian Papers articles published this week:
41. “Why There are No Dilemmas in Widerquist’s ‘A Dilemma for Libertarians’“, by Lamont Rodgers
Abstract: Karl Widerquist has recently argued that libertarians face two dilemmas. The first dilemma arises because, contrary to what Widerquist takes libertarians to suggest, there is no conceptual link between robust property rights and the libertarian state. Private property rights can legitimately yield non-libertarian states. Libertarians must thus remain committed either to robust property rights or the libertarian state. I call this the “Conceptual Dilemma.”
The second dilemma is empirical in nature. Libertarians can try to undermine state property rights by showing that the means by which all present states came to have their property was unjust. However, doing so would presumably undermine almost all the property claims of private individuals. So the dilemma is that libertarians can undermine state property rights only by undermining individual property rights, on the one hand. On the other, libertarians can vindicate private property rights of individuals only by vindicating state property rights. I call this the “Empirical Dilemma.”
I attempt to diffuse both of these dilemmas here. I argue that the Conceptual Dilemma relies on a misunderstanding of the libertarian’s commitments. In particular, I show that libertarians need not think robust property rights can yield states more extensive than Nozick’s minimal state. I then argue that Widerquist ignores libertarian scholarship aimed at meeting the Empirical Dilemma. Many libertarians have attempted to demonstrate that there are legitimate private property rights which are illegitimately disregarded by current states. The upshot of this discussion is that there are no genuine dilemmas posed by Widerquist’s “A Dilemma for Libertarians.”
42. “Single Trial Probability Applications: Can Subjectivity Evade Frequency Limitations?“, by David Howden
Abstract: Frequency probability theorists define an event’s probability distribution as the limit of a repeated set of trials belonging to a homogeneous collective. The subsets of this collective are events which we have deficient knowledge about on an individual level, although for the larger collective we have knowledge its aggregate behavior. Hence, probabilities can only be achieved through repeated trials of these subsets arriving at the established frequencies that define the probabilities. Crovelli (2009) argues that this is a mistaken approach, and that a subjective assessment of individual trials should be used instead. Bifurcating between the two concepts of risk and uncertainty, Crovelli first asserts that probability is the tool used to manage uncertain situations, and then attempts to rebuild a definition of probability theory with this in mind. We show that such an attempt has little to gain, and results in an indeterminate application of entrepreneurial forecasting to uncertain decisions–a process far-removed from any application of probability theory.
{ 7 comments }
Um, reinventing the wheel much? There’s already a well-developed approach that does this: it’s called Bayesian inference, and it’s been around for a while.
Okay, so what is it that entrepreneurs are *actually* doing that causes success or failure, if not subjective estimates?
Oh, right, I forgot: “judgment”. Where does this come fr– “Judgment.” But what’s the actual, moving-parts model of how it devel– “Judgment.”
As far as Bayes’ theorem is concerned, it only attains meaning in the context of probability as Howden treats it, i.e., what Ludwig von MIses called “class probability.” See the discussion of the law of large numbers by Huerta de Soto in “Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles” for such a conception of Bayes’ theorem. Unfortunately, Bayesian inference is called “subjective,” which has some misleading associations. Considering Howden’s education under Huerta de Soto and his continuing interest in G.L.S. Shackle, he has likely informed himself about probability theory and Bayes’ theorem. His teacher, Huerta de Soto, who has an interest in insurance, surely is also well-informed about probability theory.
A few Austrian School treatments of entrepreneurship are dissatisfactory, but there are many satisfactory treatments, too. Peter Klein’s contribution to the Hoppe festschrift is a good start.
Finally, as for “moving-parts” models, please keep analogies to physical science out of social science.
Um, no. Bayesianism allows you to assign probabilities to anything, case or class, because probability is taken to mean simply your degree of belief. Anti-Bayesian authors don’t get to degree what Bayesians get to use it on.
There will always be analogies to physical science as long as you claim that your beliefs have implications for what you expect to observe. And if entrepreneurs *ever* do anything consumer-satisfying in the first place, there must be some way that they gain the knowledge that turns out to be correct.
What is that mode, if it doesn’t involve subjective estimates? And if there is no way that entrepreneurs can learn what will work — if it’s all random — how is business any different from a lottery?
Though you may disagree with my characterization of Bayes’ theorem, please make an effort to read the literature I recommended. In addition, please be clear on what Bayes’ theorem, which is relatively uncontroversial, actually states. Admittedly, I have yet to start my studies in statistics and probability, but I have enough familiarity with mathematics and the philosophy of science to understand some simple online references. http://mathworld.wolfram.com/ConditionalProbability.html
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/BayesTheorem.html
Perhaps a better presentation here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayes'_theorem
The debate over Bayesianism merely concerns the implications of Bayes’ theorem. I would rather not sound rude, but several of your later comments are various non sequiturs. In particular,
I never denied that entrepreneurship is based upon judgment and knowledge (although I believe Kirzner has overemphasized empirical theory).
Judging where this online exchange is headed, I remember why I never post on blogs.
@Raymond_T._Walker:
Irrelevant. I’m discussing Bayesian inference, it’s entire framework, not simply one theorem that underlies it. So I’m not limited to what other people decree as one theorem’s boundaries.
And as long as we’re using vague citations as a substitute for substantiation, check out some of the work of E. T. Jaynes, Judea Pearl, and Eliezer Yudkowsky.
Of course entrepreneurs use judgment. The point I was making was that “judgment” is insufficient as an explanation for how the knowledge of what is the appropriate use of economic resources, reaches entrepreneurs and allows successful enterprise to happen *at all*. A straightforward reading of Kirzner et all would say it’s all just luck, and thus the market is no different from a lottery with higher payoffs. Yet that contradicts the “judgment” story, to the extent that it says anything at all.
…Because your policy of posting without reading others’ comments leaves you with a vague feeling of disconnect?
I have been reading on this site and blog for more than a year now. Obviously, you have too, considering the sheer volume of arguments you have generated on the Mises blog. But I can safely assure myself I am reading more closely than you are: I at least spelled my opponent’s name correctly.
As far as I can tell, Bayesian inference largely follows from straightforward application of the formal mathematical statement of Bayes’ theorem. There is no reason immediately evident why it is irreconcilable with the probability theory advocated by Howden.
Perhaps I will research the names you mentioned. Also, WolframMathWorld is backed by the same company as Mathematica, so I say its legitimate and formal enough for most purposes.
Seeing how quickly you jumped to personal comments, you appear not to recognize my attempt to provide some effective discussion. Upon reexamining my previous comments, though, I can say I said some things that sounded bitter and made too strong of claims without intending it.
In the meantime, I must go to bed. I have three exams tomorrow.
Silas Barta is the intellectual equivalent of a dirty sanchez.
Comments on this entry are closed.